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Abstract
Police  and  Crime  Commissioners  (PCCs)  are  hailed  as  one  of  the  greatest
constitutional reforms of the police in modern times and were elected in 2012 in a
blaze of controversy. Whilst some claim these powerful actors can ensure policing is
more responsive to local priorities, others claim that PCCs will undermine democratic
police accountability by encouraging populism and inequalities, and become too close
to their chief constables to ensure that they are more robustly held to account. This
thesis investigates whether PCCs have improved local police accountability through a
mixed-methods study of how police-initiated stops are governed in three PCC areas,
using interviews, observations, and statistical and documentary analysis. As such, it is
one of the first  empirical  studies to explore this  new model of police governance,
certainly in relation to the operation of police powers.
Research suggests that police-initiated stops are a flash-point in relations with ethnic
minority  communities,  are  disproportionately  used  against  them,  and  has  reduced
perceptions of police legitimacy. Despite this, their use has grown exponentially and,
as this thesis argues, is exemplary of a democratic deficit in local police accountability
whereby  police  officers  have  become  more  responsive  to  national  government  in
exercising their powers rather than local priorities.
Unexpectedly,  stop  and  search  became  heavily  politicised  during  the  fieldwork,
resulting in improved governance and dramatic reductions in their use. The findings
suggest  that  this  was  due  to  national  developments,  thus  indicating  that  although
police powers are  amenable to  external  influence,  their  governance remains highly
centralised.  However,  chief  officers  remain  powerful  in  determining  whether  any
reforms are implemented locally. Despite potential controversies, PCCs have been able
to  influence  various  operational  practices  but  appear  too  hesitant  to  risk  this  for
'minority issues' like police-initiated stops, thus  undermining their  own capacity to
enhance local democratic police accountability.
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1. Introduction
Directly-elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) have been hailed as one of the
greatest constitutional reforms of the police in modern times (Lister, 2013; Reiner, 2016).
This is amid claims that they enjoy stronger powers than the former police authorities to
set police priorities and more robustly hold their chief constables to account. However,
others  argue  that  they  are  more  likely  to  have  a  deleterious  effect  on  local  police
accountability  by  encouraging  populism,  exacerbating  inequalities  and  potentially
becoming too close to their chief constables to sufficiently hold them to account (Jones,
2008; Millen & Stephens, 2011; Lister, 2013; Lister & Rowe, 2015). This thesis explores
these  claims  through  a  multi-site,  mixed-methods  study  of  three  PCC  areas  and  the
governance of coercive  police powers to stop and search members of the public and to
conduct other types of stops. This thesis is the first study of PCCs' impact on relations with
ethnic minority communities, as well as how the wider range of stakeholders, including
national government agencies and the electorate, influence commissioners.
PCCs were elected only a year after Britain experienced its worst public disorders in thirty
years. In August 2011, five days of rioting and looting across a number of cities caused an
estimated  half  a  billion  pounds of  damage and some of  this  violence  was deliberately
targeted towards police property and personnel (Riots Communities and Victims Panel,
2011). This included parts of the cities of Birmingham and Nottingham, which fall into two
of the case study areas. Although rioters came from a range of backgrounds, the centre of
those disturbances took place in areas where large ethnic minority populations reside and
dramatically highlighted how poor relations had become between the police and minority
communities.  Research with the rioters revealed that  anti-police sentiment  arising from
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prior  experiences  of  stop  and  search  was  a  common  aggravating  factor  fuelling  the
disorders (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011; Lewis et al., 2011). But what was
striking was just how similar this was to other disorders throughout the 1980s and 1990s
(see Scarman, 1981; Keith, 1993). Thus it appears that public frustrations towards these
coercive powers have remained constant over the decades despite the repetitive cycle of
crisis and reform discussed in the literature review (chapter 4).
In fact, police-initiated stops have expanded considerably in that time as their scope has
been  strengthened  and  regulatory  controls  weakened,  thus  enhancing  the  'highly
permissive'  nature of police powers and shielding them from the necessary visibility to
ensure effective oversight into their use (Baldwin & Kinsey, 1982; Reiner, 2010; Manning,
2010; Sanders et al., 2010). It also points to the lack of power afforded to ethnic minorities
to  change  their  policing  experiences,  arguably  providing  little  incentive  to  engage  in
existing formal arrangements for police accountability.
Research has consistently found that police authorities were overall too bureaucratic, 'out
of touch' with the public, and unwilling to exert the full extent of their powers to ensure
policing was more responsive to their local populace (Scarman, 1981; Morgan & Swift,
1987;  Jones  et  al.  1994;  Millen  & Stephens,  2011;  Caless  & Tong,  2013).  It  is  then,
perhaps, not surprising that they were also unable to ensure people from ethnic minority
backgrounds had more equitable policing experiences despite this being a defining criteria
for any arrangement for police governance to be considered 'democratic' (chapter 2). This
lack of robust accountability led to claims of police authorities being the ‘architects of their
own decline'  (Jones  et  al.,  1994)  and there  being a  ‘democratic  deficit'  in  local  police
accountability (e.g. Baldwin & Kinsey, 1982; Jones, 2008). But these criticisms have not
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always  been fair  given that  successive  governments  have circumscribed  the powers  of
police authorities whilst enhancing their own and that of police officers. Thus even the
most  determined  police  authority  could  only  obtain  an  explanation  for  police  practice
rather  than  secure  changes  to  such decision-making,  particularly  as  these practices  are
insulated from direct political control by 'operational independence'. As this thesis argues,
police-initiated stops are a good example of this as police officers have assumed greater
discretionary powers alongside that of increasingly interventionist Home Secretaries who
have tacitly encouraged the expansion in the use of these encounters. Meanwhile, police
authorities  and  ethnic  minority  groups  have  been  powerless  to  change  these  practices
which have disproportionately impacted upon the latter and undermined confidence in the
police and their perceived legitimacy (e.g. Skogan, 2006; Bradford et al., 2009; HMIC,
2013;  Delsol  &  Shiner,  2015).  As  in  the  famous  words  of  Marshall  (1978),  police
accountability in England and Wales has been 'explanatory and co-operative' rather than
'obedient  and  subordinate'.  In  other  words,  the  institutional  arrangements  intended  to
ensure that the police are robustly held to account on behalf of the public have failed to
produce anything other than a retrospective account of decisions already made and unlikely
to change following external scrutiny. Even then, some research suggests that chief officers
have become so powerful that they could even choose whether or not their local policing
bodies would receive a response to any explanations sought (Millen & Stephens, 2011;
Caless & Tong, 2013). 
So with firmer powers to hold their chief constables to account, this thesis analyses the
capacity of  PCCs to introduce  greater  local  police  accountability  in  relation  to  police-
initiated  stops,  with a particular  focus on opportunities  afforded to the public by three
PCCs.  Unexpectedly,  stop  and  search  became  heavily  politicised  shortly  after  the
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fieldwork for this thesis began. This resulted in significant changes to their governance and
reductions in use, partly due to legal challenges by members of the public and partly due to
national government reforms in response to these and the 2011 riots. Later, the broader
range of police stops also came under scrutiny, notably those conducted under road and
traffic legislation. Although the origins of this thesis predate the government reforms, these
developments are also analysed throughout the findings for their revealing insight into the
power dynamics between the Home Secretary, PCCs, chief constables and ethnic minority
groups. The activities of three of the most active PCCs with regards to police-initiated
stops  are  analysed  to  understand  how  commissioners  sought  to  strengthen  local
accountability  in  relation  to  these  encounters  and  empower  their  ethnic  minority
populations to more directly shape their own policing experiences.
1.1. Thesis outline
Reforms to the arrangements for governing the police in England and Wales are typically
legitimised  through claims  of  improving 'democratic  accountability'  and,  therefore,  this
thesis starts by reviewing academic theories on what this constitutes (chapter 2). Chapter 2
reviews the very British and ambiguous concept of 'operational independence' and how it
promotes  explanatory rather  than more  robust  forms of accountability.  It  then analyses
academic theories on what constitutes democratic police accountability and discusses the
broad  consensus  relating  to  its  core  criteria,  although  areas  of  disagreement  are  also
reviewed. It suggests that equity; responsiveness to public demands, and a greater dispersal
of power are its key components, all of which provide the theoretical framework to guide
this thesis. Additionally, opportunities for public participation in accountability is a fourth
element guiding this thesis despite some differences concerning whether it is a separate
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dimension  to  responsiveness,  or  sufficient  to  be  mediated  through  a  democratically
representative body, such as an elected government, mayor or other official.
Chapter 3 applies these theories to the institutional arrangements governing the police in
England and Wales (i.e. England and Wales) and the extent to which it has sufficiently
produced democratic police accountability. In particular, it analyses the legislative reforms
since  the  inception  of  the  first  professional  police  force  in  1829  and  how  central
government's  influence has grown alongside the expanding powers of chief constables,
both  at  the  expense  of  local  democratic  bodies.  It  is  here  that  a  discussion  of  the
'democratic  deficit'  in  local  police  accountability  takes  place  (e.g.  Baldwin  & Kinsey,
1982;  Jones,  2008;  Reiner,  2016),  which  is  said  to  be  amplified  in  relation  to  issues
affecting ethnic minorities (Bowling et al., 2008). It ends by analysing PCCs’ functions
and powers to assess whether, at least theoretically, they appear to represent a reversion to
the historic local democratic deficit and ahead of the findings which discuss how they were
found to operate in practice.
Chapter 4 analyses police powers to stop and search and the conduct of other encounters as
an  example  of  how  the  democratic  deficit  operates  in  practice.  Relying  upon  police-
recorded  data  and  a  review  of  the  related  literature,  it  shows  how  the  strong  central
influence  and  over-reliance  upon  regulation  to  control  expansive  police  powers  have
encouraged adversarial contact between the police and the public, particularly for ethnic
minority groups who have been powerless to change these experiences.
Chapter 5 outlines the methodology for this study, the significant challenges experienced
throughout the fieldwork, related decision-making, and their potential impact upon the data
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analysis relied upon to arrive at the claims made in the findings. As chapter 5 explains,
shortly  after  the  fieldwork  started,  stop  and search  powers  were  subject  to  significant
national government attention following a series of damning reports into their use nation-
wide. This made it impossible to understand what may have happened had the only change
during this thesis been the introduction of PCCs. However, it was extremely revealing of
the power dynamics within this new arrangement for governing the police.
Chapters 6 and 7 present the research findings, analysing the power dynamics within the
new governance structures and what they reveal about local police accountability. Chapter
6  analyses  the  significant  changes  to  the  use  and  governance  of  stop  and  search
immediately  before  PCCs  were  introduced.  It  analyses  the  actions  taken  by frustrated
members of the public and the impetus it provided for the national government reforms
discussed  throughout  the  findings.  This  was  a  relatively  straightforward  period  in
comparison to that analysed in chapter 7: the period following the introduction of PCCs.
During  this  latter  period,  pressures  upon  chief  constables  to  implement  government
reforms had intensified but so too had a culture of police resistance that frustrated the
success  of  these  proposals  thus  pointing  to  just  how complex  police  accountability  is
negotiated  in  practice.  It  questions  the  role  of  commissioners  across  the  country  in
influencing those changes and whether national government has really devolved control
towards its flagship police policy.
Chapters 8 and 9 complement the national focus of the previous two chapters by analysing
what role PCCs sought to play in relation to making police-initiated stops accountable to
their public. Chapter 8 analyses the police and crime plans of all 42 PCCs (including the
Mayor for London) published each year during their first term in office. These plans are
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important because they set out the priorities and relevant budget that the police are legally
expected to have regard to. It discusses what appears to be an overall lack of attention to
police-initiated stops or other issues affecting people from ethic minority backgrounds and
its implications for democratic police accountability. Chapter 9 analyses how three of the
country's most active PCCs on police-initiated stops sought to negotiate better scrutiny of
those  practices,  whilst  also  discussing  similar  activities  undertaken  by  commissioners
elsewhere. It raises broader questions about the accountability of operational practice as a
whole and shows how PCCs have enhanced some aspects of what constitutes democratic
police accountability but failed in other respects. 
Finally,  chapter  10  concludes  this  thesis  with  an  overview  of  the  research  findings
concerning whether PCCs do represent a reversion to the historically weak forms of local
police  accountability  that  characterised  their  predecessors.  It  then  analyses  various
government proposals announced in the last year of this thesis seeking to expand PCCs'
functions. Drawing upon the research findings, it discusses whether these proposals can
enhance local police accountability, including in relation to the areas PCCs were found to
be deficient in.
1.2. Collaborative studentship
This PhD took place at  an exciting time in the reform of stop and search governance.
Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, the PhD arose from a collaboration
between the Department  for Sociology at  the University of Warwick and  Stopwatch,  a
charity that campaigns for fair and effective policing.  StopWatch is a coalition of legal
experts, academics, citizens and civil liberties campaigners who aim “to address excess and
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disproportionate stop and search, promote best practice and ensure fair, effective policing
for all.”1
The Department for Sociology and Stopwatch both set the central question that this thesis
would seek to investigate and the overall terms of reference. This included spending at
least one day (often two days) a week with StopWatch and its constituent organisations to
support their following activities:
 “Promote effective, accountable and fair policing 
 Inform the public about the use of stop and search 
 Develop and share research on stop and search and alternatives 
 Organise awareness raising events and forums 
 Provide legal support challenging stop and search.”2
Importantly, the author retained full control over the direction and content of the thesis, the
choice of which three PCC areas to investigate,  and the data analysis  and findings. As
already noted and discussed in the findings, stop and search became heavily politicised
during  the  fieldwork  and  intensified  throughout.  This  meant  that  the  socio-political
environment under research changed frequently, thus making it difficult to follow the full
range of national developments, the local responses of PCCs, police officers and ethnic
minority groups, and what they all revealed about police accountability. However, it also
presented opportunities for the author to inform the activities of national policing bodies
which directly contributed to the political environment studied. This included advising the
stop and search portfolio holders within Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the
College  of  Policing  and  certain  police  forces.  The  start  and  end  of  the  studentship
coincided with the first and second PCC elections in 2012 and 2016, respectively. These
were subject to field observations and the author helped to organise some of these events.
1 See: www.stop-watch.org
2  Ibid
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These issues are discussed in the methodology alongside their potential impact upon the
data collected and analysed to produce the research findings. 
1.3. A note on 'ethnicity', 'race' and 'communities'
The terms ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic minority communities’ are used throughout this
thesis  to discuss group-level  experiences  of the police.  However,  the  veracity of  these
terms has been open to debate. ‘Race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are often used interchangeably and
while  both  carry  connotations  of  foreignness  (Fenton,  2010)  they  are  conceptually
different.  The  scientific  validity  of  formerly  dominant  views  in  the  natural  and social
sciences that human beings inherit their abilities and can therefore be divided into a fixed
racial hierarchy of biological and phenological differences has been discredited (Miles &
Brown, 1989; Fenton, 2010). But whilst it is now widely accepted that race is a social
construct, discourses on race still persist today due to their practical value and are often but
not always  determined by skin colour  or religion due to these being the most  obvious
'signifiers' (Miles & Brown, 1989; Holmes & Smith, 2008).
Theories of ethnicity on the other hand argue that groups are formed on the basis of claims
to  common ancestry  and cultural  identities,  and  are  fluid  and self-electing  rather  than
objectively or scientifically  determined (Bowling & Philips,  2002;  Fenton,  2010).  This
operates partly as an inclusive process that encourages the sense of commonality necessary
to help a group to define itself and promote internal cohesion. At its weakest, it can operate
as what Fenton (2010) describes as a 'diffuse identity', a dormant identity or merely a 'tick-
box' exercise. Simultaneously, identities are also exclusive in that they differentiate group
members from other collectives even if they might possess some similarities between them
and their outer boundaries remain dynamic. This exclusionary process can also serve to
19
marginalise certain groups by denying them specific rights or privileges offered to others
(Rex, 1986). Therefore, both processes operate in mutually reinforcing ways that promote
a sense of community amongst its members.
But the suggestion that ethnicity plays such a defining role in determining social relations
is also debatable because this  assumes that these characteristics are  the most important
factor  in  identity  formation  (Carter  & Fenton,  2009;  Fenton,  2010).  Or  that  they  can
produce and sustain social action (Fenton, 2010). As Carter and Fenton (2009) argue, the
dangers of such an 'over-ethnicised' sociology is that it can distort analyses by dismissing
other factors that may be more salient in explaining social relations and provide a more
powerful  stimulus  for  social  action.  However,  research  shows that  these signifiers  can
become  important  during  periods  of  conflict  (Holmes  & Smith,  2008;  Fenton,  2010),
including between groups who feel subordinated by a police force considered to uphold a
socio-political order that discriminates against them (Keith, 1993). 
According to Carter & Fenton (2009) it is “politics [that] makes groups and not the other
way round” (p.15) and so they argue for a reorientation “away from accounts of social
solidarity defined in terms of ethnicity or culture towards accounts framed in terms of the
practical activities and purposes of people collectively seeking to realise interests” (p.16).
This is important for the current study as it investigates the extent to which policing styles
can become more accountable and responsive to social groups who may have at least some
negative experience of the police by virtue of their ethnicity (or perceived race), and often
organise around those identities. Carter & Fenton do not deny the importance of ethnicity
as  an  explanatory  factor  but  question  its  relevance  for  every  research  setting.  Indeed,
studies have shown that ethnicity can play an important role in explaining conflict with the
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police and stimulating social action, notably in relation to police-initiated stops which is a
common experience for many ethnic minorities and underprivileged groups (e.g. Scarman,
1981;  Keith,  1993;  Macpherson,  1999;  Bowling et  al.,  2008;  Holmes  & Smith,  2008;
Lewis, 2011). As Bowling et al.'s (2008) review of a multitude of policing activities show,
a vast amount of research suggests that ethnic minorities are disproportionately subject to a
range of  police  powers  and simultaneously less  likely to  receive  protection.  But  these
discourses suggest a certain homogeneity of experience that might not be justified because
research also shows important differences in how groups of minorities interact with the
police, including in relation to the various types of police stops (see chapter 4). 
In light of this discussion, this thesis adopts Carter & Fenton's focus on collective social
action in seeking to understand how groups of ethnic minorities are impacted by police
powers  and  seek  to  improve  their  experiences  through  their  PCCs.  This  is  because  it
provides  a  pragmatic  focal  point  by  recognising  some  common  overall  attitudes,
experiences and interests of ethnic minority groups who seek to influence the police, but
also acknowledges the important differences in how group members identify themselves
and interact with the police.
1.4. Stop and Search in England and Wales
Three  case  study areas  were  investigated.  However,  given  the  centralisation  of  police
governance discussed later and how contentious police-initiated stops became during the
fieldwork, it is important to assess trends at the national level. Doing so would situate local
patterns within their wider, national context and help to understand whether these trends
simply reflect developments at the national level or whether the coalition government had
in fact relinquished power in favour of PCCs. 
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In 2011, the year of the last national census and the year that legislation for PCCs was
introduced, over 56 million people were estimated to be residing in England and Wales.
This compares to almost 49 million recorded in 2001, a growth of 14% (see table 1.1;
ONS, 2003). Of these, 86% self-classified as white and the remaining 14% belonged to an
ethnic  minority  group.  Whilst  the  absolute  population  growth  of  whites  and  ethnic
minorities  since  2001  was  approximately  similar  at  3.5  million  and  over  3.4  million,
respectively,  this  represented  a  far  higher  percentage  growth  for  minorities  of  76%
compared to 8% for whites. This is partly due to minorities' smaller population sizes but
there was also wide variation in growth between each major minority ethnic group. By
2011,  Asians  (excluding  Chinese)  represented  the  largest  minority  group,  followed  by
blacks and then mixed and other categories.
Table 1.1 Ethnic composition of England and Wales in 2011 and growth since 2001
White Black Asian Mixed Other Total
Count 48,209,395 1,864,890 3,820,390 1,224,400 956,837 56,075,912
Percentage (%) 86 3 7 2 2 100
Growth since 2001 (N) 3,530,045 732,254 1,572,253 580,989 521,382 6,936,923
Growth since 2001 (%) 8 65 70 90 120 14
Sources: ONS, 2003; ONS (undated)
Despite  comprising  no more  than 14% of  the total  population,  ethnic  minority  groups
experienced higher rates of searches although this ethnic disproportionality fell during the
fieldwork. When fieldwork started in 2012/13, black people were searched at 5 times the
rate of whites under powers that require officers to reasonably suspect criminality has or is
taking place (“PACE searches”). Asians or mixed people were searched at twice the rate of
whites; only those self-defining as ‘other’ were under-represented in these searches (Home
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Office, 2014b). Only 10% of PACE searches resulted in an arrest although this figures
includes arrests of people for resisting the encounter rather than for potential criminality,
and these figures also exclude other outcomes not recorded at the time such as warnings,
fines  or  a  summons.  Under  section  60,  a  power  that  does  not  require  any  suspicion,
disparities were far higher: black people were searched at a staggering 25 times that of
whites, mixed people at over 5 times that rate, Asians at over 3 times and people from
Chinese or other backgrounds were searched at twice the rate of whites. Further, the arrest
rate  was  much  lower  at  5% although,  again,  this  includes  arrests  for  obstruction  and
excludes other outcomes. 
Overall in 2012/13, a total of 20 street searches were conducted per 1,000 of the country’s
population  which  was  down  from  25  and  23  per  1,000  in  2010/11  and  2011/12,
respectively. It was from around this period that recorded stop and search use and ethnic
disproportionality began to decline. Schedule 7 examinations and detentions at ports and
airports had also witnessed reductions in use from 65,684 in 2010/11 to 56,257 in 2012/13,
representing a 14% reduction over that period (Home Office 2014g). 
Interestingly,  as national  government  pressures mounted towards the end of this  study,
disproportionality increased and so too did outward resistance from chief officers to those
reforms. This thesis investigates the historic rise and recent fall of stop and search use, and
what role PCCs may have had in influencing the various developments over the life course
of this study.  
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2. Democratic Accountability of the Police
“The only reason to maintain police in modern society is to make available a
group of persons with a virtually unrestricted right to use violent and, when
necessary,  lethal means to bring certain types of situations under control.
That fact is as fundamentally offensive to core values of modern society as
it  is unchangeable.  To reconcile  itself  to its  police,  modern society must
wrap it in concealments and circumlocutions that sponsor the appearance
that  the  police  are  either  something  other  than  what  they  are  or  are
principally engaged in doing something else.”
(Klockars, 1988:457)
This chapter reviews the literature on what constitutes the democratic accountability of the
police ahead of the next one which assesses the extent to which this has been emulated by
the  various  institutional  arrangements  governing  police  in  Britain.  According  to  the
opening quote from Klockars, the police are a necessary evil despite being “fundamentally
offensive” to the aspirations of “modern society”. It offends because police officers enjoy
“virtually unrestricted” powers to inflict  upon members of the public the very kinds of
violence that modern societies de-legitimise and the police are sworn to protect citizens
against. However, such coercion is rarely necessary (Sanders et al.,  2010) because this
capacity to inflict  violence,  and potentially end lives (Manning, 2010; Klockars, 1988),
engenders public compliance. Police officers can also exploit people's ignorance of their
legal  rights  to  obtain  their  cooperation  in  situations  where  no  lawful  right  exists  to
intervene  (Young,  2016).  Thus,  Klockars  argues,  democratic  societies  “reconcile”
themselves with the presence of police by concealing their functions in “circumlocutions”
that  give  the  impression  of  officers  being  sufficiently  held  accountable  by  the  legal
controls, military-style discipline, professionalism, and community-oriented policing that
actually fails to restrain them in practice.
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Jefferson  &  Grimshaw  (1984:10)  define  police  accountability  as  “the  institutional
arrangements  designed to ensure the obligations  of the police are  upheld” with almost
identical definitions produced by Brodgen et al. (1988) and Lustgarten, (1986). But this is
hardly unique to democratic societies. Therefore, when democratic theories are applied to
accountability  (i.e.  institutional  arrangements)  and  policing  (i.e.  practice)  they  are
particularly concerned with how the liberties required for a democratic society to function
can prevail over the coercive nature of police powers whose use would otherwise render it
illegitimate.  To  complicate  this,  police  powers  are  'highly  permissive'  and  lack  the
visibility necessary to ensure effective oversight (Baldwin & Kinsey, 1982; Reiner, 2010;
Manning, 2010) as in the case of police powers to stop, question and search members of
the public considered by this thesis. However, even where practices are rendered visible,
democratic  accountability  in  England  and  Wales  is  constrained  by  the  autonomous
decision-making legally afforded to police officers known as operational  independence.
This  limits  the  extent  to  which  external  actors  can  influence  police  practice  and  is
discussed in the first section below. The second part analyses the constituent elements of
democratic police accountability and how it relates to operational independence. 
2.1. Police accountability and operational independence
Unlike other public services, the British police is considered to be uniquely accountable to
the law itself rather than “subordinate and obedient” to a democratic body (Marshall, 1978;
also  Jefferson  &  Grimshaw,  1984).3 This  is  intended  to  ensure  the  law  is  enforced
impartially but, in practice, police protection and sanctions are distributed unequally across
social groups, particularly against ethnic minorities (see Bowling et al., 2008 for a good
review of the research evidence). The inability of local democratic institutions to hold the
3 A good contrast is the prison service which is firmly under the direction of the relevant secretary of state,
although the judiciary is another example of a powerful, autonomous body.
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police to account rests partly on the constraints posed by ‘operational independence’ which
Lustgarten (1986:32) defines as the understanding that:
“no  political  body shall  have  the  power  to  direct  or  command  those  in
charge of the police organisation to adopt or reject a particular policy or
practice, and that in the end responsibility for policing rest with the chief
constable.” 
But operational independence is a 'fragile' and 'dynamic' concept (Hewitt, 1991) that has
never been legally defined (Jones & Newburn, 1994). Jefferson & Grimshaw (1984) and
Lustgarten’s (1986) painstaking analysis of case law shows that it was only since the 1930s
that operational independence emerged and was eventually enshrined into statute for the
first  time  in  the  Police  Act  1964,  leading  to  Lustgarten  famously  describing  it  as  a
‘twentieth century heresy’. Archival research into the watch committees, the earliest form
of  local  democratic  arrangement,  reveals  there  was  no  separation  between  operational
matters and police policy, and that these committees not only routinely directed officers
and chief officers but also regularly dismissed those who dissented,  particularly in  the
urban  forces  (Hart,  1956;  Lustgarten,  1986;  Hewitt,  1991).  Since  then,  case  law  has
repeatedly reinforced the autonomy of the police, and government legislation has replaced
these once powerful local institutions with weaker ones whilst also enhancing the powers
of the Home Secretary and the police. The Police Act 1964 placed police forces under the
“direction and control” of their chief constables but failed to define what this meant; this
has  continued  under  the  Police  and  Social  Responsibility  Act  2011  which  introduced
PCCs. This ambiguity,  it  is argued, is purposeful so as to ensure police authorities and
chief constables have room to negotiate, with the Home Secretary acting as an arbiter and
police  authorities  typically  losing  out  (Jones  & Newburn,  1997;  Jones,  2008;  Reiner,
2010). 
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Therefore,  Baldwin  &  Kinsey  (1982:106)  rightly  distinguish  modern  forms  of
accountability- referring to police officers’ “liability to account for a decision after it has
been taken”- from control over those operational decisions which police authorities  have
been denied  since  the 1930s.  This  contrasts  with the  powers  of  elected  mayors  in  the
United States of America to actually direct their police (Newburn, 2012; Sampson, 2012)
which, in the famous words of Marshall (1978), makes them 'subordinate and obedient'
rather than merely  'explanatory and cooperative' as in Britain. Klockars (1988) goes the
furthest in criticising the limited external influence over British policing by characterising
the governance arrangements as circumlocutions for giving the false impression that they
can control operational practices. 
Jefferson & Grimshaw (1984:155), who rather optimistically view the law as  “the most
authoritative  expression  of  democratic  opinion”, agree  and  argue  in  favour  of  giving
democratic bodies room to ensure that policing is responsive to local communities than the
prevalent (mis)reading of case law suggests. As they rightly argue, legal accountability is
deficient for two reasons. First, it fails to help police officers decide what laws and limited
resources should be prioritised which, as Manning (2010) and Reiner (2010) frequently
point  out,  can  exacerbate  inequalities  through  selective  enforcement.  Second,  textual
ambiguities in legislation leave considerable room for interpretation concerning whether
powers should be applied or not in individual circumstances. As the next chapter shows, a
good example of this is the use of police powers to stop and/or search members of the
public for which officers hold widely divergent views concerning when the legal threshold
for reasonable suspicion has been met. Therefore, Jefferson & Grimshaw suggest that legal
accountability  is  only  one  part  of  a  dual  form of  accountability  alongside  democratic
accountability to a representative body which should be responsible for deciding policing
27
policies.  Whilst  they  consider  the  individual  exercise  of  powers  to  be  an  operational
matter,  they  suggest  members  of  the  public  can  play  a  key role  in  resolving the  first
problem  identified.  As  they  forcefully  argue,  this  makes  police  accountability
complementary to operational  independence  and requires  public  direction  if  it  is  to  be
democratic.  The next  section  pursues  this  further  by analysing  theories  on how police
accountability is rendered democratic.
2.2. What makes police accountability 'democratic'?
As Brodgen  et  al.  (1988:2)  argue,  the  police  secure  public  consent  by  “persuasion  if
possible,  violently  if  necessary”. When democratic  theories  are  applied  to  police
accountability  they  are,  essentially,  concerned  with  how the  institutional  arrangements
governing the police can secure public legitimacy by ensuring that the use of their coercive
powers is exercised in ways that preserve wider freedoms rather than undermine them.
Unfortunately,  few  have  sought  to  explicitly  connect  democratic  theories  to  police
accountability (Sklansky, 2005; Manning, 2010) and most police research does so “in a
largely unthinking or uncritical way” (Newburn & Jones, 1997:viii). This means that this
section  relies  upon  only  a  few  and  mostly  dated  works  in  this  long-neglected  field
following a period of 'marked de-politicisation' from the 1990s as Conservative and Labour
governments have converged in pursuing neo-liberal reforms and crime control policies
(Jones,  2008;  Reiner,  2010;  Newburn,  2011).  Fortunately  and ironically,  however,  this
debate appears to have been reinvigorated by a more recent consensus in the last decade
favouring greater  citizen  involvement  in  police  accountability  as  discussed in  the  next
chapter.
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Studies into the relationship between democracy, accountability and policing demonstrate
a  great  deal  of  consistency  in  what  this  entails  even  when approached  from different
angles.  These are  briefly  reviewed here before a  more  detailed  discussion of  what  the
constituent  parts  are.  According  to  Jefferson  &  Grimshaw's  (1984)  legal  analysis  of
operational  independence,  the  police  are  accountable  to  the  law  in  their  operational
practice but the ambiguities arising from how officers interpret those powers and negotiate
competing  priorities  necessitate  a  public  steer,  although  not  to  the  detriment  of  non-
participating social groups. Jones et al. (1994) propose the most extensive criteria of what
constitutes democratic policing in their study of how three police authorities performed
their statutory functions. Ranked in order of descending importance, their seven-pronged
criteria  are:  equity; an  effective  and  efficient  delivery  of  service; responsiveness to
representative bodies; dispersal of power; information; opportunities for redress; and civic
participation.  Although  the  authors  have  reproduced  these  criteria  since  (Jones  &
Newburn,  1997;  Jones,  2008;  Jones  et  al.,  2012),  their  more  recent  works  omit  the
significance of the ordering, thus suggesting that they may no longer see a tension between
these inter-related elements. Most other contributors, however, concern themselves with
elucidating the core elements of how democracy and policing relate rather than examining
how those constituent parts compete. 
Loader  & Walker  (2007) envisage a strong and positive role  of the state  in  producing
security as a 'thick public good' by promoting pluralistic forms of policing co-determined
with citizens  but firmly 'anchored'  around state institutions.  Keenly aware of how state
'vices'  dominate  approaches  to  security,  the  authors  nonetheless  remain  faithful  in  the
state's 'virtues' in exercising its unique capacity to distribute security to produce a cohesive
society  wherein  citizens  can  better  understand  the  diverse  needs  within  a  complex
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democracy, compromise, learn to live with risks and thereby flourish. The public police,
they rightly argue, is placed within its broader environment forming just one component of
a  wider  range of  complex  relationships  that  produce  a  stable  social  order  from which
security emerges. Similarly, Reiner (2010) and Manning (2010) also argue that social order
is produced by society but are more sceptical of the police's ability to do anything other
than help to maintain this order which also serves to reinforce the wider discrimination
experienced by already marginalised social groups. Loader & Walker are aware of this but
nonetheless view the state as the prime defender of its citizens' welfare. They propose a
four-pronged  institutional  framework  to  ensure  security  production  is  governed
democratically:  resources,  recognition,  rights,  and reasoning. States,  they argue,  should
exercise their unique access to security  resources in ways that benefit all social groups,
regulate  the totality  of  security alternatives,  and, where necessary,  intervene  to  protect
marginal  groups.  In  deciding  how  to  distribute  security  and  avoid  marginalisation,
processes for recognising the diverse and competing needs within society are required but
each claim must be evidenced. The then inevitable process of reasoning, they hope, would
promote the shared understandings and co-dependences between social groups to produce
a  cohesive  society  better  protected  but  also  more  informed  about  continued  risks.
Therefore, it is this process of rights recognition that they argue can enhance security and
contrary to the dominant view which suggests a 'trade-off' between the two. 
Finally,  Manning  (2010)  also  envisages  a  strong,  redistributive  role  of  the  police.
Concerned  with  how policing  operates  in  practice,  he  argues  for  the  police's  need  to
become cognisant  of the wider  structural  inequalities  in  the societies  that  they operate
within so as to avoid reproducing them. However, unequal policing can be justified and is
indeed encouraged only so far as this differential treatment can improve the outcomes of
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minorities and other vulnerable groups, such as offering protection to those who cannot
otherwise afford private security. 
This overview of some key works on policing and its relation to democracy, reveals an
important consensus on its constituent parts which are directly relevant to this thesis and
are  discussed  next.  However,  they  also  differ  in  some  respects  which,  although  less
relevant, are worth discussing afterwards to complete the analysis. 
2.2.1. Equity
Equity is given overriding importance in all conceptualisations of democratic policing and
its  accountability (Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; Jones et  al.,  1994; Newburn & Jones,
1997; Loader & Walker, 2007; Manning, 2010). This universally-held value is essential
because it is only through guaranteeing fair treatment that the liberties that democracies
purport  to  afford  their  citizens  be  realised,  including  for  those  who  choose  to  not
participate in democratic processes. Despite this, few indicate how equity is to be achieved.
Jones et al. (1994) suggest that equity is achieved by first, delivering a police service that
satisfies people's needs and, second, exercising only as much force as is necessary and
proportionate  in  apprehending  suspects.  For  Manning  (2010),  the  police's  ability  to
'distribute life chances' leads him to argue more radically than any other in proposing that
policing  goes  beyond  its  usual  call  for  equal  access  to  its  resources  by  explicitly
redistributing services in favour of people most disadvantaged and therefore less likely to
afford greater protections. For Reiner (2010), it is precisely this uneven nature of policing
that  makes  it  so  inherently  political  and  partisan,  particularly  against  underprivileged
groups.4 As  his  historical  account  of  British  policing  shows,  it  was  partly  due  to  the
4 See Bowling et al. (2008) for an excellent review of the literature on ethnic minority experiences of the
police as both victims and suspects.
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Metropolitan Police's strategy of integrating the lower social classes into its functions that
helped it gain acceptance in a society then vehemently opposed to its introduction in the
early  1800s.  Conversely,  it  was  public  perceptions  of  overzealous  and  unequal  law
enforcement a century later that resulted in the police entering a period of crisis from the
1960s  and  then  outright  conflict  with  social  groups  during  the  1980s,  with  ongoing
concerns for legitimacy during the current era of 'crime control'. Although equity is not
directly relevant  to the structural  issues analysed in this  thesis,  its  central  relevance to
democratic police accountability necessitates this thesis to be mindful of it, particularly as
it concerns the differential policing experiences of various ethnic minority groups. 
2.2.2. Responsiveness and public participation
Responsiveness to public concerns is another essential feature of democratic policing and
this is typically underlined by the assumption that the 'public will' is both identifiable and
then implemented. Jones et al. (1994; also Jones & Newburn, 1997), however, make an
explicit distinction between responsiveness and public participation. Responsiveness, for
them,  requires  that  police  priorities  are  formulated  in  consultation  with  a  body
representative of public opinion, whether local or national. Participation, which they rank
last in their seven-pronged hierarchy, denotes the actual opportunities afforded to citizens
to more directly influence policing. They offer two reasons to justify this distinction and
relegation of participation. First, they highlight the practical constraints in managing mass
participation  beyond  the  historically  narrow  input  of  elite  individuals  and  argue  that
expanding arrangements beyond a small group of representatives is therefore unnecessary.
Second, and rather  contradictory,  they point to the  “uphill  struggle” of ensuring issues
discussed are salient enough to interest a wider group of people. This conclusion is perhaps
unsurprising given that their framework is derived from an analysis of historical practices
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that have traditionally limited meaningful opportunities for public participation rather than
elucidating what is, arguably, the aspirational nature of democratic police accountability.
Unlike  other  works,  the  authors  do  not  attempt  to  understand  the  causes  of  selective
participation,  such  as  the  disenfranchisement  of  people  who  are  regularly  subject  to
policing (e.g. Loader & Walker, 2007), or acknowledge their lack of power to change those
experiences (Morgan, 1997; Brogden et al., 1988; Rowe, 2004). Brogden et al.'s (1988)
review of the-then newly introduced mechanisms for public scrutiny5 highlights the narrow
scope of accountability  that  they afford and the authors  lambast  these mechanisms for
failing to tackle the more fundamental issue of police culture and discretion. The fact that
these mechanisms still form the bedrock for public consultation today shows how little has
changed over the decades to enhance public participation and is something that Jones et al.
surprisingly ignore. However, whereas scholars have traditionally conflated responsiveness
with  civic  participation,  more  recent  contributions  have  joined  Jones  et  al.,  albeit
implicitly,  by  distinguishing  the  two.  Following  the  political  convergence  on  electoral
reform  of  police  authorities,  these  recent  contributions  have  asserted  that  direct
participation  may in fact  undermine  democratic  policing  and a more  responsive police
service by encouraging inequitable practices, particularly against minority groups (Jones,
2008;  Millen  & Stephens,  2011;  Lister  & Rowe,  2015).  Thus  responsiveness  is  never
questioned,  only  the  extent  to  which  direct  participation  can  achieve  this  without
undermining the central concern for equity.
Related  to  this  and more  practically,  the literature  frequently highlights  the difficulties
posed in obtaining citizens' views to then inform how police resources should be allocated
between  the  divergent  and  competing  interests.  However,  even  fewer  have  sought  to
5 These  are:  internal  supervision;  public  monitoring;  community  partnerships;  crime  surveys;  and
independent community monitoring groups. The authors are less critical of the latter precisely because
these lay outside of the very structures that seek to limit external influences.
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answer this  problem,  all  of whom propose collective negotiations.  These processes are
important because, as Manning (2010:4) argues, democratic policing is “deeply rooted in
practices  and  ensemble  rather  than  the  structure  and  function”  of  such  arrangements.
Therefore, it is inclusive processes that generate consent and democratic legitimacy. For
Jones (2008:695) representative bodies, irrespective of the extent of  participation,  must
move  beyond  attempts  to  “reflect  the  'community  view'”  as  there  is  no  homogeneous
public but must instead seek to “provide a genuine conduit for expression, negotiation and
ordered compromise”, or at least a compromise that “proves satisfactory to all” (Brogden
et al.,  1988:191).  Unfortunately,  this  rather optimistic  outlook fails  to devote sufficient
attention to how the product of such negotiations can be attuned to the needs of people less
likely  to  participate  owing  to  their  lack  of  faith  in  a  system  perceived  to  routinely
discriminate against them. Reiner (2010:34) alone recognises this and provides a sobering
view by asserting that the police “can never command universal love” and so should ensure
“at a minimum that the broad mass of the population, and possibly even some of those who
are policed against, accept the authority, the lawful right, of the police to act as they do,
even if disagreeing with or regretting some specific actions.” 
But, as with the most scholarship, these are abstract arguments and only two contributions
stand out for attempting to devise any practical arrangements for generating consent and
negotiating interests.6 Jefferson & Grimshaw (1984) propose the establishment of citizens-
led, elected police commissions with the statutory responsibility for consulting the public
and clearing the ambiguities arising from legal accountability by directing chief constables
on how resources are to be allocated.7 However, their proposals are silent on how these
6 Of course, a great deal of literature exists on 'procedural justice' which is discussed in chapter 4 rather
than here. This is because such theories are more narrowly concerned with how routine experiences of the
criminal  justice  system  can  engender  trust  rather  than  seeking  to  elucidate  grander  theories  about
democracy and its relationship to police accountability as this chapter does.
7 This is remarkably similar to the police and crime commissioners investigated by this thesis.
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commissions should be composed, how they are to fulfil their mandate of ensuring public
representation, and how to resolve competing interests. It is for those involved, the authors
argue,  to  decide  their  own  processes  and  scope  of  accountability.  Similarly,  direct
participation is core to Loader & Walker's (2007) idea of security as a 'thick public good'
of  which  citizens  are  its  co-determinants.  Thus  the  authors  also  encourage  affording
citizens with considerable autonomy to not only define the scope of their deliberations but
also  the  processes  by  which  they  negotiate  outcomes.  Through  these  considered
deliberations  ('reasoning'),  citizens  would  come  to  appreciate  the  diversity  of  security
needs  ('recognition'),  realise  their  mutual  dependencies  and  arrive  at  what  Jones  aptly
(2008:695) refers to as an “ordered compromise”; all that is required is faith in humanity. 
In sum, there is a conceptual difference between responsiveness and participation despite
scholarship routinely conflating the two. Responsiveness presumes to understand what the
public want and may be mediated through elected bodies such as police authorities and
national  government  who  may  pursue  partisan  or  majoritarian  interests.  Participation,
however,  requires  direct  public  engagement  including  with  the  minority  social  groups
whose electoral size is too small  to sufficiently influence those elected bodies. Further,
participation itself does not automatically lead to policies being adopted by the police and
this reinforces its distinction from responsiveness. This thesis explores both of these owing
to their relevance to the research question.
2.2.3. Power
Police governance is essentially about power relations.  Unfortunately,  only Jones et al.
(1994) explicitly identify this as a core element of democratic policing and argue for a
greater distribution of power. Marshall (1978) argues for firmer accountability structures to
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balance the considerable powers of chief constables but chief officers, their police officers
and the Home Office have since then continued to grow in power as local democratic
bodies  have  been weakened (see  chapter  3).  The narrow accountability  Brogden et  al.
(1988) identify essentially stems from this lack of power citizens enjoy to influence the
police beyond the limited opportunities provided by police consultative groups (also Rowe,
2004). Jones et  al.  (1994) show awareness of this  but still  relegate  participation to the
bottom of their seven-pronged criteria. The proposals of Jefferson & Grimshaw (1984) and
Loader  &  Walker  (2007)  have  already  been  discussed  and  stand  out  as  the  only
contributions to the literature to have sought to address these uneven power relationships,
even  if  couched  in  terms  of  democratic  principles  rather  than  explicitly  of  power.
However,  now that  the  public  have  been  given  greater  opportunities  to  define  police
priorities through their elected PCCs, it seems that a more recent turn in police studies has
ensued,  breaking  away  from  the  earlier,  radical  advocates  of  direct  public  input  in
formulating these priorities. This new camp is characterised by a self-contradiction which
is keenly aware of the deficit in local police control but yet still rejects or criticises the new
arrangements  for  injecting greater  public  steer  of  police  priorities  (Millen & Stephens,
2011; Lister, 2013; Lister & Rowe, 2015). 
Earlier  studies  viewed the increased  police  autonomy as  problematic  and sought  more
radical  approaches  to  enhancing  the  power  of  local  democratic  institutions  to  directly
influence policing, including through electoral reform (Baldwin & Kinsey, 1982; Jefferson
& Grimshaw, 1984; Brogden et al., 1988; Lustgarten, 1986). This was a time of expanding
police powers unaccompanied by a commensurate strengthening of the supervisory powers
of local bodies to which chief officers were supposedly accountable for their decisions and
that of their officers (see next chapter). Recent contributions, however, perceive these local
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democratic  structures  to  be  problematic  and  argue  in  favour  of  protecting  operational
independence  from  directly-elected  commissioners  (Millen  &  Stephens,  2011;  Lister,
2013; Lister & Rowe, 2015; Reiner,  2016).  Two reasons may account for this  shift  in
debate. First, despite their contrasting positions, both share a common concern for equity.
The  studies  that  were  published  in  the  1980s  were  written  at  a  time  Reiner  (2010)
described as highly controversial for the police following a series of public disorders in
1981,  related  concerns  of  discriminatory  police  practice  and  opposition  towards
government  proposals  at  the  time  to  further  enhance  police  powers.  These  were  later
incorporated into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which has been described
then and since as the most significant expansion of police powers (Bridges & Bunyan,
1983;  Reiner,  2010;  Sanders  et  al.,  2010).  The  more  recent  studies,  however,  also
acknowledge the inequalities in police practice but argue that concentrating power into the
hands  of  directly-elected  officials  would  exacerbate  this  by  introducing  political
partisanship, particularly against ethnic minority groups (Millen & Stephens, 2011; Lister
& Rowe, 2015). From this perspective,  operational independence serves as a protection
against partisanship but this argument fails to appreciate the inevitable inequalities already
inherent within discretionary police practices. This thesis investigates both claims but, for
now,  another  potential  reason underlying  this  change may be  the  narrowing of  police
research towards being applied rather than concerning itself with the more fundamental
questions of democratic police accountability that featured more prominently in the 1980s.
This  is  what  Manning  (2010)  criticised  as  a  shift  of  focus  in  studies  since  the  1990s
towards being 'for' the police at the expense of more fundamental research 'of' them which
so concerned the earlier  criminologists  (also Morgan, 2000).  The speculative nature of
more recent works and shortage of empirical research into PCCs which this thesis aims to
fill may also explain some of these tensions.
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In  sum,  power and  responsiveness to  the  public,  whether  through direct  participatory
opportunities for the public or indirectly mediated through an elected body, are three core
elements  of democratic  policing and its  accountability.  Incidentally,  these are the most
relevant criteria to this thesis and so provide this  study with its theoretical  framework.
Underlying  democratic  accountability  is  the  fundamental  concern  for  equity which,  in
assessing the impact of PCCs on ethnic minorities' policing experiences, is also explored
but is of less relevance. From hereon, this chapter discusses the differences in scholarship
to compete the analysis and is returned to in the conclusion of this thesis.
2.2.4. Other criteria
Whereas Reiner (2010) and Manning (2010) emphasis the negative role of the police in
distributing inequalities, Jones et al. (1994) and Loader & Walker (2007) emphasise its
positive capacity for 'public good'. For this reason, service delivery itself features as Jones
et al.'s second most important criteria of what constitutes democratic policing which they
argue is derived from equity. Loader & Walker understand the typically negative role of a
state and police in distributing security but seek to remedy this by unlocking its potential to
act  virtuously.  Reiner  acknowledges  some  widespread  societal  benefit  arising  from
policing  but  advances  a  more  nuanced  view  by  recognising  that  even  this  remains
differentially experienced. Jones et al. suggest that service delivery must be measured by
other criteria and the twin pillars of efficiency and effectiveness. However, these are both
highly  subjective  sub-criteria  and  are  likely  to  be  shaped  by  perceptions  of  police
legitimacy.  Therefore,  as is implicit  in Jones et al.'s  argument,  the capacity for service
delivery to enhance democratic policing may be better read alongside its ability to deliver a
responsive service rather than forming a distinct criteria.
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Good information, as Jones et al. (1994:48) rightly distinguish from just 'information', is
another  necessary  feature  of  democratic  policing  as  it  is  an  enabler  of  accountability,
providing that it extends beyond “the provision of routine information alone... some body
should be able to interrogate the police service and find out more through a sequence of
interactions.” For Loader & Walker (2007), the state has a unique capacity to produce and
disseminate information to enable citizens to understand risks, make informed decisions
about their security arrangements, and alleviate the scepticism that the authors encourage
citizens to have concerning government intentions to restricting liberties in the name of
enhancing security. Police authorities have held the primary responsibility for interrogating
police  decision-making  but  research  suggests  that  they  have  often  acted  as  passive
receivers  of  information  and  failed  to  ask  the  'right  questions'  to  ensure  more  robust
accountability (e.g. Jones et al. 1998; Millen & Stephens, 2011). But despite local failures,
it is still worth emphasising the importance of information in enabling better accountability
and also attending to the power dynamics in soliciting information. As research shows,
some  chief  constables  have  been  able  to  determine  the  type  of  information  police
authorities relied upon to hold them to account thus undermining robust scrutiny (Jones et
al. 1998; Millen & Stephens, 2011; Caless & Tong, 2013).
Finally,  only  Jones  et  al.  include  redress  as  an  essential  aspect  of  democratic  police
accountability. This is a surprising omission by others given the consensus that the exercise
of police powers is largely hidden away from the arrangements for accountability and fall
disproportionately on minority and other vulnerable groups. As one of the only available
opportunities  for  citizens  to  officially  register  their  dissatisfaction  and  seek  remedies,
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redress forms an obvious, necessary dimension of police accountability which could also
promote organisational changes. 
2.3. Conclusion
This  chapter  reviewed  the  literature  concerning  what  constitutes  the  democratic
accountability of the police, focusing particularly on its relation to police powers. It has
shown the considerable agreement that exists concerning its core aspects, albeit with some
differences  that  can  be  explained  by the  broader  socio-political  context  at  the  time  of
writing. This should not, however, obscure some fundamental differences and omissions,
such as whether the police can function as a universal public good, and the obvious role of
redress in police accountability. Perhaps the most important difference and central to the
next chapter is the role of direct public participation in police accountability.  For Jones
(2008), more 'imaginative' solutions are required rather than the 'periodic input' afforded by
the  occasional  election  as  this  does  not  in  and  of  itself  automatically  lead  to  greater
democratic  control,  a view shared by others  (Millen  & Stephens,  2011; Reiner,  2016).
Despite these differences, this thesis is predominantly concerned with the following areas
of consensus as it better reflects the focus of this thesis: responsiveness, opportunities for
direct  public participation,  and the  distribution  of  power.  As Manning (2010:4)  notes,
democratic policing is “deeply rooted in practices and ensemble rather than the structure
and function” and it  is  precisely these  process-related  issues  that  generate  the  consent
underlying democratic forms of police accountability.  As the next chapter analyses,  the
historic arrangements for local police accountability have fared badly in meeting these core
requirements, prompting suggestions of a 'democratic deficit' in local police governance.
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3. The  'Democratic  Deficit':  Local  Police  Accountability  in  England
and Wales
Using the criteria developed in the previous chapter, this one analyses the extent to which
the various institutional  arrangements governing the police in England and Wales have
been conducive to local democratic accountability. It supports the consensus within police
studies that power over the last century has been centralised between national government
and chief constables and at the expense of local democratic bodies. This has prompted
claims of a 'democratic  deficit'  in accountability (e.g.  Baldwin & Kinsey,  1982; Jones,
2008;  Reiner,  2016),  particularly  with  regards  to  the  policing  experiences  of  ethnic
minorities (Bowling et al., 2008). This chapter starts by analysing the foundations of this
democratic deficit during the period of 'watch committees', the earliest local arrangement.
It  then discusses their  successors, the police authorities,  whose remaining powers were
curtailed by increasingly interventionist Home Secretaries. Finally, it analyses the origins
of the newly introduced directly-elected PCCs and the extent to which they may represent
a reverse to this centralised control ahead of future chapters which draw upon this study's
fieldwork to investigate this empirically (chapters 6-10).
3.1. Watch Committees, 1829 to 1963
When the first  professional  police force was set  up in  London in 1829 in response to
concerns of a rise in crime, it faced considerable opposition from all social classes who
feared that this would undermine individual civil liberties and represented a shift towards
an oppressive state (Newburn, 2007; Reiner, 2010). To allay these fears, the police were
placed  under  the  direct  oversight  of  the  Home  Secretary  to  ensure  it  was  directly
answerable to parliament, but day-to-day control was delegated to two justices appointed
as  its  first  commissioners  (one  ex-military  colonel,  one  barrister).  Soon  after,  the
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Municipal  Corporations  Act  (MCA)  1835  and  County  and  Borough  Police  Act  1856
required other local councils country-wide to also establish their own police force and a
separate local watch committee of elected councillors to supervise them. However, many
refused to do so (Hart, 1956) thus illustrating central government’s lack of control over
local  matters  at  the  time.  Nonetheless,  these  Acts  gave  watch  committees  powers  to
appoint and dismiss constables; levy a 'watch rate' upon residents to pay for the police; and
set out regulations to prevent neglect of duty and enhance police efficiency. Two appointed
justices were only given powers to suspend constables but also enjoyed executive powers
to appoint  'special  constables'  to  support  the ordinary police if  the latter  were deemed
“insufficient at the date of the warrant to maintain the peace of the borough” (MCA 1886,
section 196(4)). Exemplary of the Home Secretary's limited influence at the time outside of
London, he8 retained a narrow oversight role in only receiving quarterly reports from watch
committees detailing their regulations issued to constables. Police constables themselves
enjoyed broad discretionary powers to apprehend people they had “cause to suspect of
intention to commit a felony” or, more loosely, “apprehend any idle and disorderly person
whom he  finds  disturbing the  public  peace...  and  deliver  him to  a  watch-house  to  be
brought before a justice” (MCA 1882, Section 193).
Further,  in  recognition  of  the  huge  public  opposition  towards  the  police  at  the  time,
constables were recruited from the lower strata of society whose daily lives were most
affected by the new police. They were also under instruction to adhere to '9 Principles of
Policing' emphasising the maintenance of good relations with the public, obtaining consent
in exercising the law and exercising restraint where coercion was necessary, (Jones et al.,
8 The Home Secretary is referred to in the masculine form as office holders were until recently all men.
Later on in this chapter and throughout the rest of the thesis, the feminine form is used as office holders
since 2007 have been predominantly women.
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2004,  Reiner,  2010).9 These  were  later  accompanied  by  the  'Judges'  Rules',  a  set  of
guidelines  issued  to  constables  relating  to  how  suspects  ought  to  be  detained  and
questioned,  following  concerns  within  the  judiciary  over  the  impact  of  malpractice  in
undermining the quality of evidence heard in court. Although breaches of the Rules could
result  in  disciplinary  action  or  evidence  rendered  inadmissible,  and there  were  indeed
concerns over the widely divergent interpretations of those rules (RCPPP, 1929), neither
sanctions tended to be applied (Wood, 2010). Up until the 1930s, these arrangements were
considered by officialdom to be operating well and police misconduct to be rare (RCPPP,
1929). Little historical research exists on how watch committees exercised their powers or
sought to involve the public in the formulation of police priorities. What is clear, however,
is  that  this  early  period  was  one  where  these  local  democratic  bodies  wielded  “great
powers  of  control  over  the  police”  which,  as  Lustgarten’s  (1986:37)  seminal  analysis
shows, was “exercised regularly, and involved sacking head constables when they resisted
directions”  although  “such  occasions  of  conflict  were  relatively  rare,  for  the  extreme
exercise  of  power  was  seldom  necessary”  given  the  degree  of  chief  constables'
subordination to their committees.
By 1929, however, the situation appeared to have altered in favour of chief constables. As
the previous chapter argued, the 1930s was a key transitional period during which watch
committees  began  to  lose  their  powers  to  directly  control  the  police  in  relation  to
'operational'  matters.  A Royal  Commission  at  the  time  found watch  committees  to  be
“mainly concerned with matters of policy and finance and interfere[d] little, if at all, with
the executive or technical control of the Force” (RCPPP, 1929: para38). Simultaneously,
however,  the  increased  autonomy  of  the  police  had  also  come  under  significant
9 Widely known as the ‘Peelian principles, these  can be read here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent [Accessed 20/09/2015].
43
controversy by members of the public amid claims that police powers were not subject to
adequate  controls,  although more  fundamental  opposition  to  the  police's  existence  had
largely subsided by then (Reiner, 2010). Wood's (2010) archival research into news reports
of police malpractice challenges the largely positive assessment of the Royal Commission
which itself was established to investigate public concerns into how the police handled and
interrogated suspects.10
3.1.1. The Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures (RCPPP, 1929)
In 1928, what became known as the Hyde Park case evoked outrage amongst members of
parliament and the British press (HC Deb 17 May 1928; Wood, 2010) leading to a Royal
Commission to investigate how the rights of citizens could be balanced against the use of
police  powers,  particularly  during  interrogations.  This  was  prompted  by the  five-hour
interrogation of a 22 year old woman for public indecency (i.e. associating with a married
man) after  which she claimed to have been sexually harassed by her  interrogators  and
coerced into providing a confession. This was despite an original police investigation being
dismissed by the Director for Public Prosecutions and no action taken against her more
'respectable' associate who was, helpfully for the case, a former government minister 
As Reiner (2010) argues, the RCPPP (1929) conveyed a 'romanticised' view of the police
by concluding that  the  “Policeman  possesses  few powers  not  enjoyed  by the  ordinary
citizen” (para15) and by rejecting fears at the time that the police were “more arbitrary and
oppressive in their  attitude towards the public than they were before the [First World]
War” (para299). As for the watch committees, the Commission merely remarked that they
“interfere[d] little, if at all, with the executive or technical control of the Force” (para38)
10 It is notable that this is only the first of four Royal Commissions within century relating to the police, the
highest form of public inquiry in the United Kingdom.
44
and so ignored the longer history of greater democratic control over policing, the more
contentious relationship in the urban forces, and their potential role in improving public
confidence. Miscarriages of justice were deemed to be rare despite news reports at the time
suggesting otherwise (Wood, 2010) and the Commission's acknowledgement of concerns
that the Metropolitan Police's detective branch considered itself to be “above the law”. The
Judges Rules were assessed to be working well  even if  the Commission recommended
more  guidance  and  it  explicitly  rejected  proposals  to  move  the  responsibility  for
complaints against police officers to the Director of Public Prosecution. Instead it argued in
favour of  “trust[ing] the Police, in the belief that, having the responsibility for their own
discipline they will discharge it more faithfully in the absence of interference from some
outside authority” (para283). Clearly, watch committees had no role in complaints either.
In summary, the limited research into watch committees suggests that this early period was
one where the police was robustly held to account by their local democratic bodies. These
committees could even exert control over police decisions right up to the 1930s when this
became increasingly circumscribed as the concept operational independence emerged (see
chapter 2). Unsurprisingly, the resulting ambiguities concerning what powers these bodies
retained led to a number of disputes with their chief constables, particularly in the 1950s as
the Home Secretary reinstated the chief constables for Nottinghamshire and Birmingham
after  they  were  dismissed  by  their  watch  committees  (Critchley,  1978;  Jefferson  &
Grimshaw, 1984;  Brodgen et  al.,  1988).  To exacerbate  this,  Parliamentary conventions
prevented  the Home Secretary from answering questions  from Members  of  Parliament
about  this  or  other  developments  outside  of  London  because  of  his  lack  of  direct
supervisory powers over other constabularies (Critchley, 1978). Eventually, another Royal
Commission,  the  Royal  Commission  on  the  Police  (RCP,  1962:1),  was  established  to
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“review the constitutional position of the police”, the accountability of chief constables;
how complaints can be managed more effectively; and also investigate pay and conditions.
Its  recommendations  led to  the establishment  of  the 'tripartite'  structure  of  governance
which  survived up until  the introduction  of  PCCs in 2012 and consisted of the Home
Secretary,  chief  constables,  and  local  police  authorities  which  replaced  the  watch
committees. The next section analyses this structure particularly with regards to successive
national government legislation which limited the powers of police authorities bodies and
centralised police accountability.
3.2. Police authorities, 1964 to 2011
3.2.1. Police Act 1964
Following the RCP (1962) the Police Act 1964 for the first  time sought to  clarify the
functions of the various actors and their powers in relation to one another (Critchley, 1978;
Jones,  2008;  Reiner,  2010).  It  introduced  a  'unified'  system  of  accountability  widely
criticised for being “self-contradictory or vague at crucial points” (Reiner, 2010:227). This
is perhaps an outcome of the considerable disagreement at the time between the Labour
Party, which proposed more intrusive powers for police authorities to decide police policy,
and  the  Conservative  government  which  opted  for  less  direct  approaches  through
introducing measures that gave members of the public opportunities to input into policing
(Morgan & Swift, 1987). Incorporating the recommendations of the RCP, the 1964 Act
significantly  empowered  the  Home  Secretary  and  chief  constables  (Critchley,  1978;
Morgan & Swift, 1987; Reiner, 2010) but ignored the Commission's proposals to balance
this by enhancing police authorities' supervisory powers. Police authorities were given the
statutory duty of maintaining an “adequate and efficient” police force (section 4(1)) but
chief constables assumed power over the “direction and control” (section 5(1)) of their
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constabulary  in  what  is  widely  interpreted  as  the  first  enactment  of  operational
independence (Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; Morgan & Swift, 1987; Jones, 2008). The
Act failed to define what this meant but this is considered to be deliberate (Jefferson &
Grimshaw,  1984;  Morgan  &  Swift,  1987;  Jones,  2008)  to  provide  some  room  for
negotiation (Hewitt, 1991). Although police authorities were not prevented from issuing
directions  to  their  chiefs,  they  lacked  the  formal  powers  to  enforce  such  measures
(Critchley,  1978; Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; Hewitt, 1991). What was clear was that
chief  constable's  direction  and  control  extended  to  powers  over  the  appointment,
suspension and dismissal of all officers below the rank of assistant chief constable; their
ability to enter into cross-force collaborations with other chiefs and share resources, albeit
with  consent  of  their  police  authorities;  and providing personnel  or  other  resources  to
reinforce  the  capacity  of  other  requesting  chiefs  or  upon  the  direction  of  the  Home
Secretary,  both  irrespective  of  their  police  authority's  consent.  Arguably,  this  latter
provision  was  the  first  direct  attempt  of  a  national  government  to  expressly  curb  the
powers  of  police  authorities  by  removing  them  from  future,  controversial  decisions
concerning how resources  were to  be deployed.  As discussed in  the next  section,  this
tension became pronounced during the miners' strike in the 1980s where radical-leaning
police authorities found themselves powerless to stop their chief constables from aiding
other forces who were engaged in efforts to dismantle and frustrate local protests against
the government's closures of coal mines across the country (see Loveday, 1986).
Police  authorities  could  appoint  and  dismiss  their  chief,  deputy  and  assistant  chief
constables; and determine the ranks within the force but all subject to the Home Secretary's
approval.  Even  their  powers  to  manage  buildings  and  premises  required  the  Home
Secretary's approval. Police authorities could request their chief constable to report on any
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matter,  unless  the  latter  deemed  it  beyond  the  authority's  remit  or  against  the  'public
interest'  in  which  case  s/he  could  appeal  to  the  Home  Secretary  against  disclosure.
Importantly,  the  default  position  was  non-disclosure  unless  overruled  by  the  Home
Secretary and, although no research exists on how often these powers were invoked, chief
constables  clearly  gained  a  determinant  role  in  deciding  what  information  police
authorities  could rely upon to then hold them to account.  Whereas  the RCPPP (1929)
recommended no role for police authorities on complaints against the police, the Police Act
1964  did  but  only  gave  them  the  extraordinarily  vague  duty  of  keeping  themselves
'informed' of those processes without any further guidance on how. 
The Home Secretary made huge gains in the Act, as proposed by the RCP (1962) and a far
cry  from his  earlier  impotence.  He enjoyed  a  “general  duty”  to  use  his  powers  as  he
considered “best  calculated  to  promote  the efficiency of  the police”  (section  28).  This
included powers to require  chief constables to retire  or submit  to him a report  on any
matter;  hold  inquiries;  make  information  public;  set  up  research  bodies  and  others  to
promote efficiency; force constabularies to amalgamate or collaborate and to overrule any
voluntary  agreements;  and  establish  regulations  into  disciplinary  procedures,  how  the
police are governed more generally, and the provision, design and use of equipment.
Overall,  the Act continued the shift of control already under way since the 1930s from
local policing bodies to chief constables, and now also to the Home Secretary. Whereas
case law had circumscribed the scope of control local policing bodies had over their chief
constables,  the  Police  Act  effectively  shrunk  this  by  ignoring  the  RCP's  proposals  to
enhance their  supervisory powers in concomitant with the expansion of powers for the
police and the Home Secretary. Arguably, the most significant development in the Act was
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its granting the Home Secretary powers to interpret the law for all parties and then bind
them to his conclusion. If the watch committees had fought a losing battle against their
chief constables, their predecessors were now enmeshed in a struggle against both their
chiefs and the Home Secretary.
3.2.2. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
Up until this point, the role of the public in directly shaping policing was largely ignored.
However,  well-publicised urban riots  across the country throughout  the 1980s led to a
'moral panic' (Keith, 1993) and exposed the failures of the tripartite structure to ensure
police  powers  were  exercised  in  ways  congruent  to  local  expectations,  particularly  for
ethnic minority communities. A number of 'race riots' had occurred since the 1960s (Keith,
1993) but it was the Brixton riots in 1981 in South London that led to reforms. The riot
was triggered by false rumours that police officers had caused the injuries of a young,
black  man  who later  died  from his  wounds  (Scarman,  1981).  However,  long-standing
hostilities  towards  the  police  had reached fever-pitch  in  the  days  before by 'Operation
Swamp', an anti-burglary police operation which deliberately subjected vast numbers of
black people to a stop and search (Scarman, 1981).11 
Lord  Scarman's  (1981)  inquiry  report  into  the  disturbances  pointed  to  a  number  of
underlying  causes  behind the  disorders,  much  of  which  laid  outside  of  police  control:
housing, education and social cohesion. Although he denied the police and British society
were 'institutionally racist', he did acknowledge the “strong racial element” to the disorders
(para3.110) and blamed the police for provoking anti-police sentiment  by their  lack of
“flexibility” and “imagination” in enforcing the law at the expense of their more important
11 The role of stop and search in prompting the anti-police sentiment that fuelled these riots, which also
spread to other cities, is notable and is discussed in chapter 4.
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and concomitant duty of “keeping the peace” (para3.79). For Scarman, chief constables
lacked accountability  to  the  same police  authorities  that  he partially  blamed  for  being
“somewhat  uncertain of themselves” in exercising their  powers with greater “firmness”
(para5.62), but also to the public who chiefs were failing to consult and were therefore
producing a police service with an “inward thinking... siege mentality” (ibid:para5.58). His
recommendation to establish statutory police liaison committees to give members of the
public  opportunities  to  influence  police  practice  was  incorporated  into  the  Police  and
Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984, whose main purpose was to balance police powers
with  safeguards  following  the  recommendations  of  the  1981  Royal  Commission  on
Criminal  Procedure,  including in  relating  to  stop and search.  However,  it  is  debatable
whether the correct balance has been achieved (Bridges & Bunynan, 1983; Reiner, 2010).
PACE placed a duty upon police authorities to obtain their public's views on policing and
seek their co-operation in preventing crime, but in consultation with their chief constables
(PACE 1984,  section  106).12 In  line  with the  now interventionist  predisposition  of  the
Home Secretary, the Secretary of State was empowered to require any police authority to
submit to him a report on these arrangements if he deemed them to be inadequate, and then
request further reports having considered the first. Significantly, however, despite hopes
now being pinned upon these police consultation groups to secure better relations between
the  police  and  the  public,  particularly  with  ethnic  minorities,  chiefs  were  under  no
obligation to take account of any views expressed in those meetings. Therefore, the aim
behind these groups was not to actually devolve power but, as Morgan (1987:89) observes,
merely to project “outward and visible sign[s] that policing was being consented to”, thus
12 The Metropolitan Police, whose jurisdiction covered Brixton, had no police authority at the time and so
its  commissioner  was  responsible  for  making  those  arrangements  for  every  London  borough  in
consultation  with  all  constituent  local  councils.  However,  it  was  required  to  take  into  'account'  any
guidance issued by the Home Secretary to whom it remains directly accountable.
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resulting in them “becoming incoherent repetitive talking shops” (ibid:p.94). Essentially,
whilst the public now enjoyed a statutory right to be consulted on a range of issues, albeit
still mediated through their police authority,  and nothing could prevent them from even
making  recommendations,  they  were  denied  any  real  power  to  ensure  their  proposals
translated  into  operational  practice.  Further,  their  ability  to  ensure  effective  police
accountability was hampered by their lack of representation of the social groups routinely
subject to police powers and their  reliance upon the police for information with which to
hold them to account (Morgan, 1987; Rowe, 2004). Instead, the essence of PACE was to
make the police accountable to the law through administrative rules and codes of practice
rather than external actors. As Klockars (1988) argues, this is a 'circumlocution' given that
the  law  has  never  provided  adequate  controls  for  police  malpractice  (also  Bridges  &
Bunyan, 1983; Reiner, 2010; Sanders et al., 2010). Indeed, PACE had incorporated into
law what was already routine malpractice, including in relation to stop and searches, and
therefore  had  a  legitimising  effect  of  such  transgressions  rather  than  inhibiting  them
(Baldwain & Kinsey, 1984; Reiner, 2010).
Even fundamental  changes to the system of complaints  against  the police was averted.
Although  Scarman  (1981:para7.21)  strongly  recommended  the  introduction  of  an
independent  system  of  complaints  to  ensure  that  it  commanded  the  necessary  public
confidence  to  give  the  process  legitimacy,  the  Act  only  replaced  the  existing  Police
Complaints Board with that of a Police Complaints Authority (PCA) and set out a more
detailed process for complaints, including tribunals chaired by chief constables to consider
disciplinary  sanctions.  Here,  the  Home  Secretary  also  gained  wide  ranging  powers  to
regulate every stage of the complaints process and how the various parties exercised their
functions. Police authorities retained powers to investigate complaints against officers of
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the rank of assistant chief constable and above but all others fell under the remit of their
chief.  In  another  highly  ambiguous  duty,  police  authorities  were  required  to  keep
themselves  informed  of  their  force's  complaints  processes  without  detailing  what  this
meant  nor  how  far  they  could  extend  themselves  without  breaching  operational
independence. Members of the public had no role in this process besides as complainants
and  choosing  whether  to  opt  for  informal  resolution  before  initiating  any  formal
disciplinary  proceedings.  Perhaps  their  only  consolation  was  knowing  that  complaints
following  deaths,  serious  injury,13 or  any  cases  requested  by  the  PCA  were  to  be
automatically  forwarded  onto  it  for  investigation  rather  than  by  the  force  complained
against.  Also,  for  ethnic  minorities  at  least,  the  Act  added  'racially  discriminatory
behaviour' to the list of disciplinary offences.
Police authorities'  lack of influence became most  apparent  during the miners'  strike of
1984-5, a bitter year long protest against the intentions of then Conservative government to
close coal mines across the country. The dispute placed considerable pressures upon the
chief  constables  whose forces  covered the mines  or the 'picket  lines'  set  up to  disrupt
access  to  those  locations,  and  also  upon  other  chiefs  who  were  required  to  supply
personnel  or  other  resources  under  mutual  aid  agreements,  thus  losing  officers  and
witnessing  increases  in  crime  locally  (Loveday,  1986).  What  the  strike  most  clearly
demonstrated was just how sidelined local policing bodies had become. Supported by the
Home Secretary, chief constables set up a National Reporting Centre to coordinate mutual
aid and excluded any input from police authorities. Authorities were powerless to veto the
transfer of resources and even unable to solicit the information necessary to ensure that
13 Originally defined as a “fracture, damage to an internal organ, impairment of bodily function, [or] a deep
cut of deep laceration” (see PACE 1984, section 87(4)).
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they were fulfilling their own legal obligation of ensuring that their force was effective and
adequately maintained (Loveday, 1986).14
3.2.3. Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994
The first major revision to the relations established by the Police Act 1964 came much
later  in  the  Police  and  Magistrates'  Court  Act  (PCMA)  1994.  This  introduced  a
'managerialist' approach to police governance through the imposition of local and national
performance targets. It was also the Conservatives' last police Act before being succeeded
by a Labour government. PCMA was introduced at a time when Britain's political parties
had  converged  in  pursuing  harsh  penal  policies,  an  era  Reiner  (2010)  dubs  as  'crime
control', and traditional concerns for civil liberties were replaced by those seeking greater
police  efficiencies  and  reductions  in  crime.  Loveday  (1997:76)  views  the  Act  with
optimism, arguing at the time that it could potentially “alter” police authorities' relationship
with their chief constables by enabling them to influence the strategic direction of their
forces and matters falling into operational independence. For Jones & Newburn (1997),
“potential” was indeed the prime word in an uncertain future where, at time of writing,
these relations were untested, particularly the Home Secretary's vast powers to impose any
targets unpopular with police authorities and chief constables. Overall, however, as is now
discussed, the Act had made the roles of police authorities and their chief constables more
interdependent and transferred further powers to the Home Secretary.
Police authorities central duty was redefined to “secure the maintenance of an efficient”,
rather than merely adequate, “and effective police force” (PCMA 1994, section 4(1)). They
were given the responsibility for issuing a local policing plan setting out the priorities for
14 Although the Home Secretary had part-financed mutual aid, the police authorities whose chief constables
were in receipt  of aid were still  required to reimburse those authorities whose forces were supplying
resources.
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their force for every financial year but with the proviso that all objectives had to comply
with those set nationally by the Home Secretary. Oddly, chief constables were responsible
for drafting the plan in the first instance before handing it over to the police authority who
could  then  make  amendments  before  publishing  it,  providing that  they consulted  their
chiefs on any changes. Police authorities were required to consult the public through the
police-liaison groups set up by PACE in developing their objectives. Any views obtained
needed to only “be considered” thus showing how peripheral the public really were to this
process. Additionally, authorities were required to publish an annual report assessing the
extent to which these priorities had been met or not, and to also send a copy to the Home
Secretary, perhaps as a way of pressuring chiefs to conform with the plans. 
Other changes included reducing police authority's membership to seventeen; introducing
independent members with wider skill-sets to fulfil the authority's enhanced functions; and
giving them powers to employ civilians. Confusingly, all civilian employees were placed
under the direction and control of chief constables, including the powers of “engagement
and  dismissal”  unless  otherwise  agreed  between  them,  thus  showing  how  further
interdependent their functions had become. 
Jones  &  Newburn's  (1997)  detailed  study  of  the  PCMA,  its  former  Bills  and  the
circumstances  surrounding the  Act's  introduction  shows that  the  composition  of  police
authority members was the most controversial proposal. As they argue, the Conservative
Home Secretary's far-reaching proposals to directly appoint the chairperson and a higher
number of independent members was defeated by successful police lobbying. Instead, the
final Act ensured elected councillors constituted the majority of an authority's membership,
enabled them to select their own chair and introduced a complicated process of nominating
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independent  members  whereby  the  Home  Secretary  could  shortlist  candidates  but  not
decide the final  appointees.  What  the Home Secretary did gain was greater  powers  to
amalgamate  and make alterations  to  forces  without  the  need for  the  prior  consultation
required by the Police  Act  1964.  He also gained powers to  directly  intervene  into the
workings of police authorities by issuing codes of practice regulating their conduct; powers
to require reports on any matter be submitted to him and, potentially, to make this public;
and also to direct them to undertake any measures he considered necessary if their force
received a negative inspection report.
Overall,  the PCMA had made the roles of chief constables and police authorities more
interdependent but, as others have argued, had also increased the potential for greater local
democratic control over policing (Jones & Newburn, 1997; Loveday, 1997). Significantly,
this  was  against  the  centralising  trend  of  legislation  at  the  time.  In  particular,  police
authorities' ability to set performance targets and use this to base their decision concerning
whether to renew their chief constable's contract and to decide performance-related pay
gave them considerable  powers  to  potentially  influence  areas  that  fell  into  operational
independence  (Loveday,  1997).  However,  their  powers  were  subject  to  important
constraints. First, the success of police authorities depended upon them actually exercising
their powers with the confidence that they had thus far been 'shirking' (Scarman, 1981;
Morgan, 1987; Jones & Newburn, 1997). Second, much depended upon how future Home
Secretaries  exercised  their  powers  to  define  local  priorities,  establish  regulations  and
enforce them upon police authorities and chief constables. Further, chief constables were
given  a  'get-out  clause'  allowing  them  to  ignore  local  and  national  objectives  where
justified by operational reasons (Loveday, 1997; Jones & Newburn, 1997), another highly
ambiguous and undefined criteria. 
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Jones  &  Newburn  (1997)  conclude  that  the  tripartite  structure  immediately  following
PCMA's  introduction  was  one  of  little  practical  change  aside  from  an  immediate
concentration  of  power into the hands of chief  constables.  As they stress,  this  is  only
because the Home Secretary at the time- who had encountered tremendous difficulties in
introducing the Act- had refrained from exercising his vast  powers in  ways  that  could
trigger  further  political  controversies  and  issued  vague  objectives  already  prioritised
locally. Although relations were “untested” for some time, the potential “for some highly
significant confrontation” remained (Jones & Newburn, 1997:209). However, the potential
for this and more robust local police accountability was short-lived following the election
of a Labour government shortly after PCMA.
3.2.4. Crime and Disorder Act 1998
Labour's first legislation on policing and crime came in the form of the Crime and Disorder
Act (CDA) 1998 which implemented its electoral promise to introduce tough measures
against anti-social behaviour.15 The Act required local government councils- rather than
police authorities- to “formulate and implement... a strategy to reduce crime and disorder”
in their area (section 6(1)). As 'responsible authorities', local councils were required to first
gather, analyse and publish data on crime in their area and then use this to consult and
develop appropriate strategies in partnership with other bodies they considered appropriate
to involve. Although police authorities were among the partners to be consulted on these
strategies, they could at best only achieve 'co-operating body' status if either their chief
constable or any constituent local authority granted them such a role.  Therefore,  crime
reduction strategies were placed firmly in the hands of responsible authorities rather than
15 The Act defined anti-social behaviour incredibly broadly as “a manner that caused or was likely to cause
harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself” (CDA 1998,
section 1(a)&(b)).
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the police authorities who could even have short-term and long-term targets imposed upon
them  to  measure  their  performance!  At  this  point,  the  Home  Secretary  only  had  a
monitoring role through powers to require local councils to submit reports and, potentially,
to make them public. He obtained no additional powers over chief constables although he
could still  rely upon section 30(1) of the Police Act 1964 to request a report  on such
matters or impose targets through the PCMA. Significantly, he did not gain any powers to
intervene in or direct the activities of responsible authorities. However, as discussed later,
this was quickly rectified as the Labour government continued to amass central powers to
direct local policing.
Finally, responsible authorities could seek judicial orders against people over the age of ten
from engaging in  anti-social  behaviour.  The Act  granted  them considerable  latitude  to
decide what the order should entail  having deliberately failed to impose constraints  on
potential sanctions and even required such orders to last for a minimum of two years. The
only safeguards introduced was the requirement of a magistrate to grant the order and the
possibility of it being revoked in the unlikely circumstance that all responsible authorities
and any co-operating body agreed (defendants could request changes to the order but not
its revocation). Whilst these are arguably operational matters, police authorities were given
no specific powers to monitor these arrangements despite their far-reaching consequences
upon members of the public.
3.2.5. Crime, Justice and Police Act 2001
Labour's  first  amendments  to  the  Police  Act  1996,  which  already  consolidated  the
legislative  changes  to  the  1964  Act  and  others  outlined  above,  came  in  two  minor
amendments in Crime, Justice and Police Act 2001. Its main provisions were to introduce
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additional measures to reduce crime and disorder and establish national policing bodies.
The  Act  reintroduced  the  requirement  for  police  authorities  to  appoint  a  deputy  chief
constable and gave them powers to suspend or dismiss them, again all predicated upon the
Home Secretary's approval. It made changes to their structure by giving them the option,
annually,  to  elect  among  themselves  at  least  one  vice-chair  and  abolished  the
disqualification of members who reached the age of seventy. Overall, these amendments
may have facilitated more efficient workings of each actor within the tripartite structure
rather than seeking to alter their functions and relations unlike the next Act discussed.
3.2.6. Police Reform Act 2002
Continuing with their  priority of tackling anti-social  behaviour,  the Police Reform Act
(PRA) 2002 finally expanded the list of 'responsible authorities'  for crime and disorder
reduction partnerships (CDRP) to include police authorities and other agencies, such as
local  fire  services.  It  also  widened  these  strategies  to  include  the  misuse  of  drugs.
However, PRA's central feature was to substantially enhance the Home Secretary's powers
to monitor and direct police authorities, chief constables and local government councils in
matters  previously  negotiated  locally;  and  it  also  established  an  Independent  Police
Complaints Commission (IPCC) to investigate complaints.
The Home Secretary was required to publish a National Policing Plan every year setting
out  what  priorities  he  expected  from  the  police  and  the  targets  used  to  measure
performance in meeting those objectives. Police authorities were required to produce three
year  policing  plans  detailing  the  medium and  long  term strategies  of  their  force  and,
crucially,  both they and their  chiefs  were legally  obliged to  have  regard  to  the Home
Secretary's  priorities  and performance  targets.  In  case  there  was any doubt,  the  Home
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Secretary could more explicitly issue police authorities with specific guidance on what he
expected them to include in their plans and, to ensure compliance, they had to send their
plans to him. If the Home Secretary felt that any local plan was inconsistent with or did not
sufficiently take into account his national plan, he could inform them. Oddly, considering
Labour's tendencies, the Act did not grant him with any firm measures to mandate any
changes  other  than  his  already  existing  powers  to  call  for  further  reports.  He  could,
however, rely upon his now expanded powers to commission Her Majesty's Inspectorate of
Constabulary (HMIC) to inspect more specific matters and direct remedial action to be
taken where the HMIC deemed any force to be inefficient or ineffective in that respect. It
was this power to direct remedial action that gave national government the greatest scope
to intervene  in  the activities  of  police  authorities  and chief  constables.  Previously,  the
Police Act 1996, which again replaced the 1964 as the main legislation concerning the
tripartite arrangement,  enabled the Home Secretary to issue remedial orders if a HMIC
inspection judged a police force to be operating inefficiently more generally. However, the
2002 Act enabled him to be more intrusive in commissioning inspections and remedies on
more specific issues. Although a police authority, in consultation with its chief, had a legal
right to present its own measures to potentially avert central direction, the Home Secretary
could amend their proposals or dismiss them entirely by setting out his own programme of
reforms, targets, deadlines and reporting periods. Finally, PRA made it easier for the Home
Secretary  to  make  a  police  authority  suspend  or  dismiss  their  chief  or  deputy  chief
constable  in  the  interests  of  “public  confidence”  in  addition  to  the  existing  criteria  of
efficiency and effectiveness.
Clearly,  Labour's  PRA  continued  the  Conservatives'  approach  of  increasing  central
government's steer of police priorities but also signalled an era of unprecedented micro-
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management  of  policing  and  now  also  police  authorities.  However,  as  Jones  (2008)
described, and also similar to the PCMA, the Act was in fact a watered down version of a
Bill the government had failed to introduce which sought even greater national steering
had it not been defeated by successful police lobbying. Nonetheless, the end result was one
of substantial centralised police accountability enabling the Home Secretary to not only
directly control the priorities formulated by police authorities but also define the targets
used  to  measure  performance  in  meeting  those  objectives,  setting  out  regulations
concerning how police forces were to operate, and making it easier for him to dismiss chief
constables even against the relevant police authority's wishes. To illustrate how potent the
Home  Secretary's  powers  were,  Reiner  (2010:236)  gives  the  example  of  its  then
incumbent,  David  Blunkett,  and  chief  architect  behind  the  PRA,  whose  dismissal  of
Humberside's chief constable was supported by the High Court following a legal challenge
by the police authority themselves.
Much  has  been  written  about  central  performance  targets  in  undermining  operational
independence. The previous chapter showed how local democratic bodies since the 1930s
have  only  managed  to  achieve  a  shallow  degree  of  accountability  through  obtaining
retrospective explanations without powers to control police decision-making. By contrast,
empirical research has shown that the PRA gave national government direct influence, if
not control, over those same operational matters supposedly legally under the direction and
control of chief constables. As much of this research shows (e.g. Loveday, 2006; Cockcroft
& Beattie, 2009), such was the potency of Home Secretary's powers, that police officers
had become so preoccupied with meeting national targets that they became less responsive
to crimes more relevant to local populations and exercised their coercive powers, such as
police-initiated stops, in circumstances where they would not have otherwise done so.
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3.2.7. Police Authorities and the Local Democratic Deficit
As this survey of legislation and patchy research into its implementation shows, police
accountability since the 1930s has become increasingly centralised. Whereas case law had
limited police authorities'  control over what later emerged as operational police matters
(chapter 2), this chapter has argued that they were further hampered by legislation which
strengthened the powers of chief constables and the Home Secretary whilst diminishing
those of the police authorities. This produced a democratic deficit wherein chief constables
and  their  officers  became  more  responsive  to  central  government  rather  than  local
democratic  bodies,  even  prompting  claims  of  “a  de  facto  national  police”  (Reiner,
2010:205). Part of the explanation for this lies in long standing tensions concerning how
far police authorities should exert influence over their chiefs, especially between radical
Labour authorities and Conservative governments. As already discussed, the 1950s saw the
Home  Secretary  reinstate  chief  constables  dismissed  by  their  police  authorities  which
partly led to the 1962 Royal Commission (Critchley, 1978), which itself led to the uneven
tripartite  relationship  set  up  by  the  Police  Act  1964.  The  ambiguities  within  the  Act
produced further tensions with yet another Conservative government in the 1980s which
enacted more limitations to police authorities' powers, particularly following the attempts
of radical  Labour authorities  to  prevent  their  chief  officers  from disrupting the miners
strike (Loveday, 1986; Reiner, 2010). It is no surprise, therefore, that with limited powers
and resources, police authorities have been unable to more robustly hold their chiefs to
account, especially following further diminution to their role as the Labour government
had adopted and expanded the former Conservative government's centralising agenda.
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Despite being weakened and finding themselves micro-managed by national government,
the failures of police authorities to fully exercise their remaining powers led to scepticism
concerning  their  ability  to  ensure  robust  police  accountability  locally.  With  some
exceptions, research has consistently found that police authorities were unwilling or even
unaware of how to exercise their powers to more robustly hold their chief constables to
account, and that members were 'out of touch' with the opinions of their local populations
(Morgan & Swift,  1987; Jones et  al.,  1994; Millen & Stephens, 2011; Caless & Tong,
2013). The major public inquiries and Royal Commissions set up to inform the legislative
changes  analysed  above have  also supported this  finding or  completely  omitted  police
authorities  from  their  deliberations,  thus  privileging  regulatory  controls  over  local
democratic accountability (notably RCPPP, 1929; RCP, 1962; Scarman, 1981). Morgan
(1987:93-94) argues that police authority members were “shrink[ing]” from their duties
due  to  a  reluctance  to  appear  “collusively  responsible  for  jointly  formulating  policing
policy” that they had no power to determine how it was implemented. Thus, he concludes,
the arrangements for local accountability were encouraging members “to be irresponsible
about operational policy” (p.93). He also points to their limitations in relying upon police
generated information and lack of “methods whereby they can independently verify and
monitor these police-filtered accounts” (p.93). Of course, engagement with the public has
always been one means of verifying police accounts but police authorities were also found
to be lacking in this regard. 
Subsequent  research  has produced broadly similar,  if  more  varied,  results.  Jones et  al.
(1994) disagree with the idea that police authorities were “impotent” having found a more
varied relationship in their study of four police authorities. They argue that all but one had
been  very  active  in  asserting  its  role  and  with  varying  degrees  of  success,  although,
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essentially, none had managed to exert any significant influence over operational practice.
They highlight the need for authority members to understand their legal powers and their
findings suggest, at least implicitly, that chief constables have been able to determine how
they are held to account.
Similarly, Millen & Stephens' (2011) study reveals how complex police accountability is
negotiated locally. They conclude that police authority members were well aware of their
limited powers within the tripartite structure and opted for pragmatic strategies. However,
such is the power of chief constables, they argue, that even where changes do occur they
do so within “almost agreed boundaries” (p.280). To remedy this, the authors make two
recommendations: first, police authorities should enhance  public awareness of their role
and  the  degree  to  which  local  communities  can  participate  in  accountability,  thus
transforming the tripartite structure into a quartet.  Second, they should develop a more
“inquisitive” and “investigative” mindset that can challenge the “strictures which the other
two members of the tripartite system permit them to work within” (p.280). Key to this is a
“robust  secretariat”  but  this  was  already  enabled  by  the  PCMA 1997.  As  the  authors
findings suggest, over a decade later the police authorities they studied did not establish a
robust secretariat, thus giving some support to the idea that they have been 'architects of
their  own decline'  (Jones & Newburn, 1997).  Caless and Tong (2013) would probably
welcome this in their scathing assessment of police authorities following their study of
chief constables attitudes towards the tripartite structure. They rightly locate some of the
tensions  in  the  fact  that  “no  one  seems  certain  where  the  independence  of  police
operational  activities  ends and the proper  democratic  exercise of oversight by a police
authority begins” (p.13) and also cast doubt upon proposals at the time for directly-elected
police and crime commissioners to resolve this. Strangely, they blame police authorities
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and their presumed enhanced powers for what they describe as the “marked deterioration”
in tripartite  relations.  This places them at  odds with the other studies already analysed
because, as this  chapter has argued, police authorities have remained largely powerless
despite the significant expansion of police powers. Further, any rare enhancement of their
functions has been predicated upon the consent or direction of the Home Secretary. This
makes Caless and Tong's  judgement  misplaced and better  aimed at  central  government
who even they acknowledge as having attracted the greatest scorn of the chief officers they
interviewed. 
In sum, police authorities have been unfairly blamed for failing to ensure that policing is
more responsive to the demands of local populations, including by both the Conservative
and Labour parties whose centralising tendencies have produced this outcome. However,
this should not deflect from police authorities own failures to understand their role and
confidence in exercising their powers with greater firmness. Nonetheless, it was within the
context of growing concerns about a democratic deficit in local police accountability that
proposals  for  electoral  reform  gained  ground.  This  culminated  in  the  introduction  of
directly-elected PCCs, as is now discussed before concluding this chapter.
3.3. Police and Crime Commissioners, 2011 – present
PCCs  were  introduced  in  2011  following  the  election  of  a  Conservative-led  coalition
government and at a time when Britain's main political parties had converged in seeking
reforms to police authorities. Loveday & Reid (2003) are widely credited with introducing
the idea of electoral reform later pursued by the Conservatives (e.g. May, 2013, 2016; see
Newburn,  2012).  Unfortunately,  Jefferson  &  Grimshaw's  (1984)  proposals  have  been
largely forgotten despite being the first to actually propose directly-elected commissioners.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, they proposed introducing directly-elected 'public
commissions' tasked with defining police priorities and directing resources according to the
public  will,  although,  crucially,  the  police  would  retain  independence  over  individual
operations (a position shared by Loveday & Reid, 2003). However, they were thin on how
these  commissions  were  to  be  composed,  canvass  opinion,  and  resolve  competing
demands. 
Two decades later, Loveday & Reid (2003) also made similar proposals in their scathing
assessment of the capacity of British, Dutch and French governance structures to deliver a
responsive  police  service,  which  they  also  blamed  for  increasing  crime  and  conflict
between ethnic groups at the time. Loveday & Reid proposed introducing American style
structures whereby the police would be unambiguously placed under the control of elected
mayors or local council leaders. To ensure the police were responsive to local demands
rather than national government, constabularies would be financed entirely through local
taxation and divided into smaller units to coincide with their mayor or district council's
geography.  Further,  what  constitutes  operational  independence  would  be  deliberately
narrowed to cover individual operations only so as to ensure the greatest of scrutiny and
policy direction from elected officials. All specialist operations would be merged under a
National  Crime  Agency  accountable  to  the  Home  Secretary  who  would  also  provide
support  to  local  forces  when required,  although  this  specific  proposal  would  probably
exacerbate  the  dissonance  and  lack  of  responsiveness  of  specialist  units  to  local
communities that the authors claim to address.
In opposition,  the Conservative  Party (2005:15) adopted electoral  reform in their  2005
manifesto promising a smaller but tougher government with harsher crime policies, stricter
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controls  on immigration,  and greater  accountability  of public  services  including of  the
police. The manifesto proposed devolving control over policing to locally elected police
and crime commissioners but was thin on their functions until its 2010 manifesto set out
what powers they would enjoy: “setting policing priorities for local communities”, “setting
the  budget  and  the  strategy  for  local  police  forces,  with  the  police  retaining  their
operational independence” (Conservative Party, 2010:57). The Liberal Democrats (2005)
also proposed devolving powers to local councils and residents including in relation to the
police but did not specify how they would do so. The Labour government briefly flirted
with  idea  of  electoral  reform  before  backtracking  in  2008  following  claims  of  the
politicisation  of the police  after  the-then Metropolitan  Police Commissioner,  Ian Blair,
resigned and alleged he had been forced to do so by the newly elected Conservative Mayor
(Newburn,  2012;  Sampson,  2012).  Interestingly,  Labour  had  in  fact  been  an  earlier
advocate of stronger democratic oversight of the police. One of its greatest achievement in
this regard was introducing a police authority to oversee the Metropolitan Police as part of
a wider devolution of powers to the capital  through the Greater London Authority Act
1999. Up until then, the Metropolitan Police was the only constabulary without a dedicated
police authority and was solely accountable to the Home Secretary. The Act created the
position of a powerful elected Mayor of London who enjoys a wide portfolio, including
sharing joint responsibility for the Metropolitan Police with the Home Secretary. However,
the  Home  Secretary  retains  powers  to  appoint  and  dismiss  the  Commissioner,  deputy
commissioners  and  assistant  commissioners  although,  in  practice,  this  is  usually  in
consultation with the Mayor. It also created a separate and very influential, wholly elected
London  Assembly  to  hold  the  Mayor  to  account  in  fulfilling  his  duties  but  also  the
Metropolitan  Police  Commissioner  and  deputy  and  assistant  commissioners  through  a
dedicated sub-committee. Yet as early as 2005, and certainly by 2008, Labour had cooled
66
to the idea of stronger electoral controls over the police and instead proposed to increase
police-public consultation through expanding its flagship neighbourhood policing teams
and  also  giving  residents  powers  over  how  their  local  councils  dealt  with  anti-social
behaviour (Labour Party, 2005). 
Following the Labour government's re-election in 2005, its Home Secretary commissioned
a review into the modernisation of the police and later fully accepted its recommendations.
Flanagan's (2008) review tackled a range of issues including how to enhance local police
accountability.  Whilst he reviewed various models, including those proposed by Labour
and the Conservatives,  Flanagan (2008:85)  declined  to  endorse any particular  one  and
instead  called  for  a  distinctly  consumerist  approach through the “acceleration  in  fully
adopting a citizen-focused approach to policing; putting customer service and the interests
and needs of local people at the core of priority setting.” The specific form that this took,
he argued, was less important than achieving the outcome of giving the public a genuine
say over policing and ability to the hold their police to account. Subsequently, ahead of the
2010 election,  Labour vehemently opposed the Conservatives'  plans for directly-elected
police and crime commissioners (PCCs), attacking what they saw as the politicisation of
policing  (Labour  Party,  2010).  Instead,  it  proposed  yet  further  expansions  to  its
neighbourhood policing model by giving local residents a 'right' to hold senior officers to
account, although it did not specify how, and also proposed firmer action against forces by
introducing  powers  to  “take  over”  borough  commanders,  entire  police  forces  or  chief
constables deemed to be consistently failing.
It was only once the Conservative-led coalition government was elected in 2010 that police
authorities were replaced with directly-elected PCCs in all police force areas outside of
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London16 by the Police Reform and Social  Responsibility Act (PRSR) 2011. Under the
Act, PCCs inherit their predecessors responsibilities for securing an efficient and effective
constabulary and holding the chief constable to account, but they also gain firmer powers
over the budget, to commission services that could contribute to safety or crime reduction,
and to hire and dismiss their chief constables.
As Loveday & Reid (2003) repeatedly highlight, chief constables' dual reporting to both
their police authorities and the Home Secretary produced conflicting lines of accountability
with the  latter  gaining  precedence.  The Act  attempts  to  address  this  by placing  chiefs
firmly under their PCCs control through a number of provisions. First, and unlike their
predecessors, PCCs enjoy complete control over drafting the police and crime plan which
sets their force's priorities, although they must consult the public and their police and crime
panels, and publish a response to any of the latter's recommendations.17 Although chief
constables must be consulted for each and every revision to the plan, they can only make
suggestions, they have no legal power to make recommendations, and but are still legally
obliged to have 'regard' to the plan in carrying out their duties. Relatedly, the Act repealed
Labour's legislation which imposed central targets upon the police and gave commissioners
the legal right to do so, although the Home Secretary has since repeatedly encouraged them
to avoid imposing targets  (e.g.  May,  2013).18 PCCs also gained powers to  manage the
police budget, estates, land and other resources without requiring the consent of the Home
Secretary.
16 The Mayor of London performs the duties of a PCC in London and currently delegates this responsibility
to  a  deputy.  The  City  of  London  police  retains  its  former  police  authority  and  so  does  the  British
Transport Police which polices the national railways and the London Underground network.
17 Police and crime panels are a group of locally elected councillors within a PCC's geographic area set up
with the conflicting duty of scrutinising their commissioners but also supporting them in their activities.
18 As the Rt Hon Theresa May was appointed as the Secretary of State in May 2010 and maintained this
position throughout the fieldwork, from hereon references to the Home Secretary will be referred to in the
feminine form.
68
Finally, PCCs inherit powers to hire chief constables but, more significantly, have stronger
powers to dismiss them with only limited checks. PCCs must inform their panels of their
nominated chief constable to enable them to hold a 'confirmation hearing' to reach its own
conclusions  and  potentially  veto  this  decision.  This  process  also  governs  any  other
appointments made by the PCC, such as a deputy PCC, although in such cases they have
no right  of  veto.  PCCs lost  powers  to  appoint  and dismiss  deputy  and  assistant  chief
constables who are now under the control of their chief constable. Where a PCC invokes
their  power  to  dismiss  their  chief,  they  are  no  longer  required  to  obtain  the  Home
Secretary's  permission  but  they  must  first  inform their  panels  and  provide  them with
enough time to scrutinise that decision. Ultimately, however, commissioners are not bound
by the  panel's  subsequent  verdict.  Clearly,  by  removing  national  targets  and the  legal
requirement for the Home Secretary's consent to appoint and dismiss their chief constables
or manage police resources, PCCs enjoy greater executive powers than their predecessors
and  can  exercise  their  functions  with  considerably  less  interference  from  national
government.
What  the  Home  Secretary  does  retain  is  quite  broad  and  wide-ranging  powers  of
regulation, including to arbitrate any conflict between PCCs, chief constables and police
and crime panels. To ensure the adequate policing of nationally strategic issues, the Home
Secretary issues a Strategic Policing Requirement setting out the threats facing the country
for which chief constables must also have 'regard' to in addition to their PCC's priorities
(Home Office, 2012b). Whilst this contains an assessment of the threats, it does not impose
any performance measures upon local actors.  The Home Secretary must  also publish a
Policing Protocol setting out how the relevant actors within this new landscape of policing
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must work together and, importantly, also refrain from using their powers so as to promote
co-operation (see Home Office,  2011b). The Act also amended the Police Act 1996 to
ensure  that  the  Home  Secretary  could  still  require  chief  officers  to  provide  her  with
information on any local or national matter and even make this information public. 
What  is  clear  from the  provisions  outlined  so  far  is  that  the  Home  Secretary  has  not
abdicated responsibility for policing but rather the Act has bolstered the powers of local
policing bodies to allow “the Home Office to withdraw from day-to-day policing matters”
(Home  Office,  2011b:para27).  Of  course,  chief  constables  retain  their  operational
independence in determining the direction and control of police officers and civilian staff,
although they must act “in such a way as is reasonable to assist the relevant police and
crime  commissioner  to  exercise  the  commissioner’s  functions”  (para23).  Perhaps  in
recognition of the potential  for conflict  to arise in this  politicised system,  the Protocol
obliges PCCs and their chiefs to “work together to safeguard the principle of operational
independence” (para35) but chiefs are obliged to ensure that commissioners request for
“access to any information must not be unreasonably withheld or obstructed” (para19).
Ultimately, it also deliberately left what constitutes operational independence undefined so
as to provide PCCs and their chiefs room to negotiate, with the Home Secretary retaining
her role as the final arbiter. Despite this, it is unclear whether the Home Secretary would
continue  the  long  tradition  of  ruling  in  favour  of  chief  constables  against  their  local
policing body, and the research on PCCs thus far is silent on this matter.
As can be seen, overall PCCs gain stronger power than their predecessors even if they lost
control  over  assistant  and  deputy  chief  officers.  They  are  also  closer  to  Jefferson  &
Grimshaw's  (1984)  proposals  for  directly-elected  'public  commissioners'  rather  than
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Loveday & Reid's (2003) American-inspired reforms which recommended placing chief
constables under the control of mayors or council leaders and limiting what constitutes
operational independence.  However, current government intention to devolve powers to
local, directly-elected mayors who would also act as the PCC for their area, similar to that
in London, goes some way to realising Loveday & Reid's model. Yet, this all casts doubt
upon  the  claim  that  British  policing  has  been  'Americanized',  particularly  given  the
ongoing central importance of operational independence which is virtually non-existent in
the United States and the reluctance of national  government  to completely abdicate  its
responsibility for policing (Newburn, 2012; Sampson, 2012). But whether PCCs can fill
the  historic  democratic  deficit  characterising  local  police  accountability  with  their
enhanced  powers  and  public  profile  has  been  subject  to  surprisingly  little  academic
scrutiny  and  one  that  this  thesis  investigates.  Further,  since  national  government  still
supplies  the  lion's  share  of  the  police  grant  and  directs  national  policing  bodies,  the
literature has been silent on how future Home Secretaries may use these levers to steer
local  policing  (Newburn,  2012).  This  is  perhaps  better  analysed  in  relation  to  specific
policing issues rather than more generally, as this thesis does. Unfortunately, despite PCCs
having completed their first four-year term,19 the academic literature thus far is dominated
by theoretical  speculation  and a  lack  of  empiricism which  this  thesis  seeks  to  fill  (cf.
Caless  &  Ownes,  2016).  However,  they  do  raise  important  questions  outlined  in  the
concluding section and answered in the rest of this thesis.
3.4. Conclusion
Directly-elected  PCCs were introduced under  huge expectations  to  reverse the historic
democratic  deficit  in local police accountability that arose from the legislative changes
19 Following the initial elections in 2012, a second PCC election took place in May 2016. Unlike in 2012,
these were held on the same day as other local council and mayoral elections.
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discussed in the second part of this chapter. In particular, PCCs are tasked with enhancing
the police's responsiveness to their diverse communities through using their firmer powers
to ensure the police are attentive to local concerns and by also ensuring that the public can
participate in more firmly setting police priorities, three core elements of what constitutes
democratic  policing  (chapter  2).  As  chapter  2  argued,  the  overriding  concern  for
democratic accountability of the police is to promote equity but the research into PCCs is
still  in its infancy and most assessments of their ability to fulfil these criteria has been
speculative.
Flanagan (2008) warns  that  elected  commissioners  could produce a  governance  model
unrepresentative  of  Britain's  diversity  and  even  argues  that  appointed  police  authority
members were more representative of their local communities than elected councillors, and
also held a wider skill set. This is something supported by Lister & Rowe's (2015) analysis
of the first cohort of PCC candidates. According to Lister & Rowe (2015:364), the lack of
female PCCs reflects a “[white] male hegemony within party political structures” as the
female-male ratio is actually lower than that of Members of Parliament and even chief
officers, and there are no ethnic minority commissioners. This, they argue, “present[s] a
significant challenge to the democratic legitimacy of the office... [which] may be having
unforeseen and important consequences for the social organisation of the police” (ibid).
Arguably, this largely reflects the lack of diversity in political parties' nominations but the
authors  main  concern  is  for  its  potential  consequences  on  democratic  legitimacy  and
particularly  on  how policing  priorities  are  formulated.  Their  analysis  of  the  manifesto
pledges  of  all  2012  candidates  illustrates  a  severe  lack  of  attention  towards  issues
concerning ethnic minorities and therefore, they conclude, demonstrates just how narrow
PCCs have interpreted their already “brittle” mandate having secured a turnout of only
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15%, the lowest turnout of any modern election (Electoral Commission, 2013). However,
whilst  Lister & Rowe's findings show the narrow framing of policing and crime issues
during the first election, their analysis does not take into account the police and crime plans
of  candidates  subsequently  elected  which  legally  sets  out  their  force's  priorities.  This
means that their findings cannot be indicative of how PCCs conceptualise their role whilst
in office and is something analysed in chapters 8-9 of this thesis. What it does raise is real
questions  about  PCCs'  ability  to  overcome the temptation  to  prioritise  the concerns  of
majority or privileged groups and at the expense of those most affected by the operation of
police powers but least likely to participate in these institutional processes.
Police  authorities  are  alleged  to  have  been  'out-of-touch'  and  unaccountable  to  their
populations, in turn created a police service unresponsive to local populations. The next
chapter analyses this further in relation to the use of police-initiated stops. The electoral
nature  of  PCCs  supposedly  enhances  the  public's  say  in  policing,  at  least  through
commissioners duty to consult the electorate when devising their plans and setting their
priorities. However, this is a narrow interpretation of participation and, as Jones (2008) and
Reiner (2016) argue, such limited and periodic input does not necessarily produce more
responsive  or  democratic  policing.  PCCs  are  of  course  free  to  introduce  whatever
mechanisms they feel can give their electorate a more meaningful say over policing but
this relies upon their own initiative and can lead to significant variation across the country.
Further, the traditional reliance upon community consultation groups is unlikely to resolve
inequalities as they tend to include already privileged groups, potentially resulting in what
Reiner (2016) calls a 'plutocracy'.  The lack of statutory footing of any alternative, more
innovative initiatives developed by PCCs to improve public input means that its success is
entirely reliant upon the co-operation of their chief constables. Yet research casts doubt
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upon anyone but the most determined of commissioners to move accountability beyond the
existing  'explanatory  and  co-operative'  forms  that  have  prevailed.  This  is  particularly
difficult given how powerful chief constables have been in determining the extent to which
their local policing bodies can hold them to account (e.g. Jones et al.,  1994; Millen &
Stephens, 2011; Caless & Tong, 2013). This itself raises questions about whether even this
shallow explanatory form of accountability has been achieved.  Even progress made by
police authorities on more general issues has been due to astute chief officers permitting
such developments to take place rather than any forceful attempt by those bodies (Millen &
Stephens, 2011; Caless & Tong, 2013). Thus PCCs must come to terms with their far more
experienced counterparts  who are  particularly  adept  at  frustrating  external  reform (e.g.
Shiner, 2015a, 2015b).
Finally,  the  fundamental  issue  of  power  has  rightly  remained  core  to  much  police
scholarship  even  if  couched  almost  exclusively  in  terms  of  operational  independence.
Lister (2013:5) speculates that PCCs' governance and executive responsibilities has created
“too  powerful  an  office-holder”  for  chief  officers  to  resist  “encroachment”  into  their
operational independence, a prospect probably welcomed by the radical scholarship that
dominated  the  1980s  (e.g.  Jefferson  &  Grimshaw,  1981;  Baldwin  &  Kinsey,  1982;
Brogden et al., 1988). Despite this, Lister contends that these powers have made the role of
PCCs and their chief constables “mutually contingent” and therefore places no incentive
upon commissioner to publicly criticise their chiefs and risk any negative publicity which
might  also  raise  questions  their  own  competence.  By  contrast  Newburn  (2012)  and
Sampson (2012) doubt the ability of even the most outspoken of commissioners to ensure a
more responsive police service due to their powers being more limited than is commonly
perceived. 
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Taken together, scholarship thus far on PCCs suggest that they face major constraints in
exercising  their  powers  whether  by acquiescence  or  by design.  However,  various  high
profile fall-outs between a handful of PCCs and their chiefs within their first year in office
demonstrates  that  these  'new kids  on  the  block'  have  not  been  afraid  to  flex  a  bit  of
muscle,20 leading to a committee of MPs expressing concerns over the lack of safeguards to
prevent them from politicising their powers to hire and fire chief constables (HASC, 2013).
Whether these were only extreme cases of commissioners trying to 'make their mark'- for
there have been no cases since-21 or whether PCCs are willing to exercise their powers to
more  robustly  hold  police  officers  to  account  for  the  operational  practices  that
disproportionately affect ethnic minorities remains to be seen and is explored in this thesis
with regards to police-initiated stops. Significantly, these early power struggles concerned
the PCC-chief constable working personality and more general policing issues rather than
those disproportionately affecting ethnic minority voters for which Lister & Rowe (2015)
suggest  PCCs  have  been  largely  disinterested  in.22 Suffice  to  say  for  now  that  how
operational independence is negotiated is one of the best measures of the extent to which
power has been devolved to PCCs and one particularly relevant for this thesis given its
focus on police-initiated stops.
20 These were Avon and Somerset, Lincolnshire and Gwent.
21 Unlike the former cases which were allegedly due to personality clashes, other chief constables have also
since been suspended and even dismissed but this was for proven misconduct.
22 The Lincolnshire chief constable was initially suspended for allegedly providing undue support to  an
ethnic minority police officer in gaining a promotion. However this was overturned following a judicial
review in the case of Rhodes vs Police and Crime Commissioner for Lincolnshire. Although this was the
specifics of the case, the issue was one of general malpractice rather than ethnic minority progression
within the police.
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4. Regulating Police-Initiated Stops: A History of Crises and Reform
As the previous chapter argued, police accountability has been deliberately centralised by
national government leading to imbalances in the tripartite structure. Using the example of
police-initiated stops, this chapter develops this  argument by showing how the ensuing
local democratic deficit has encouraged more adversarial forms of policing, particularly for
ethnic minorities,  as police officers have become more responsive to national priorities
rather than their local communities. As previously alluded to and analysed here, legal rules
form the primary means  of  regulating  police practice  since the 1980s.  Contrary to  the
retrospective and  explanatory  nature  of  police  accountability  (chapter  2),  regulation  is
prospective and seeks to anticipate potential misconduct (Smith, 2009) whilst maintaining
opportunities for redress when they do occur (Shiner, 2015b). But regulations rely upon the
police to implement those controls into their discretionary practices and therefore limits the
scope for local policing bodies and the public to participate in these processes. 
The first  part  of  this  chapter  outlines  the  main  police  powers  to  stop  and search  and
conduct other types of stops. The second part analyses the uneven regulatory framework
governing  police  stops  that  has  evolved  from a  repetitive  cycle  of  crisis  and  reform,
namely the requirement for reasonable suspicion; prior authorisation; and record-keeping
and monitoring. The third section augments this by analysing historic data on the use of
these powers to assess the effect that this local democratic deficit has had in encouraging
the huge expansion of their use. This chapter concludes by discussing the implications of
these encounters for democratic police governance.
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Stop  and  search  is  a  flash-point  in  relations  between  the  police  and  ethnic  minority
communities (Delsol & Shiner, 2015) and is associated with reduced perceived legitimacy
of the police as well as major anti-police disorders since the 1960s (Scarman, 1981; Keith,
1993; Miller et al., 2000; Bowling & Philips, 2007; Riots Communities and Victims Panel,
2012; HMIC, 2013, Medina, 2013). But it is just one of a wider range of police-initiated
stops with similar implications. Taken together, they raise questions about the extent to
which these police practices are democratically accountable, particularly to the minority
groups most affected by their  use. Searches under counter-terrorism legislation are also
discussed throughout this thesis despite being treated separately by most research in this
area (e.g. Hallsworth, 2006; Qureshi, 2007; Parmar, 2011; Lewis, 2015). So too are other
encounters which do not result in a search (e.g. Young, 2016), although Delsol & Shiner
(2015)  provide  a  notable  exception.  Despite  some  key  differences  in  their  regulatory
framework and varied scope for public accountability, they reveal a common trajectory and
societal impact. Therefore, a holistic focus can help to better understand the broad range of
influences that shape police officers' use of their coercive powers, how it then translates
into  people's  policing  experiences  on  the  ground,  and  how  existing  institutional
arrangements have promoted or undermined police accountability. Doing so also reflects
the  realities  of  operational  practice  whereby  police  officers  interchange  between  their
available powers and practices to maintain social control.
4.1. Stop and search and other police-initiated stops
'Stop and search' refers to powers available to police officers to search people in public
places for dangerous weapons, stolen property or other prohibited items like controlled
drugs.23 As an investigatory power (Delsol, 2006), its main purpose is to discover evidence
23 A 'controlled' drug is one that is illegal to possess or supply unless authorised to do so by a warrant under
the the Misuse of Drugs Act 1974.
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of  law-breaking,  and  any  prohibited  items  found  may  be  seized  for  any  criminal
proceedings and the person arrested, although police officers have the discretion to apply
other sanctions such as a warning, fine or a community penalty notice. Because people
searched are obliged to comply and police officers may use 'reasonable force' to effect
searches, such encounters constitute a legal form of detention (Bowling & Phillips, 2007).
However, officers are encouraged to first question suspects in order to better inform their
decision to search, but this is not a requirement of any encounter (Home Office, 2014h;
TSO, 2012).
Before the modern legislation analysed in this thesis, police officers relied upon ad-hoc
local  by-laws  to  conduct  searches.  This  caused  wide  variation  in  the  quality  of  those
encounters and the lack of controls resulted in racially discriminatory practices (Brogden,
1981; Scarman, 1981; Willis, 1983). Additionally, up to the early 1980s, the Vagrancy Act
1824 provided officers across the country with the only national power to arrest people for
suspected  intent to  commit  a  crime,  whereas  local  search  powers  required  the  higher
threshold of actual evidence of law-breaking for an arrest to lawfully take place (Demuth,
1978; Willis, 1983). This power was known as 'Sus' because arrests and prosecutions were
led by officers' suspicions regardless of whether there was any evidence of such crimes
having taken place or likely to occur (Demuth, 1978). Following a recommendation of the
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP) in 1981, Sus was repealed and PACE
replaced all stop and search powers with a permanent, nation-wide power regulated by a
code of practice ('Code A').24 Since PACE, more powers to stop and search members of the
public have been added to police officers' arsenal (see Appendix A). Most of these require
police officers to have some degree of prior suspicion of law-breaking in order to detain a
24 Scarman (1981) recommended all stop and search powers be repealed and replaced by a single, national
power. This was not endorsed by the government at the time nor any other since. 
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person for a search. These are discussed first,  followed by the minority of 'exceptional
powers'  that  do  not  require  suspicion  and  are  targeted  towards  serious  violence  or
terrorism. Finally, other types of encounters or legal powers that are used in considerable
volumes to stop and/or search people, drivers and vehicles are discussed.
4.1.1. Powers requiring 'reasonable suspicion'
Most  stop and search powers require  reasonable suspicion  that  an individual  is  or has
committed an offence in order to lawfully search them (Appendix A). This is the same
legal  threshold  for  an  arrest  and,  following  lessons  learned  from  Sus,  points  to  the
secondary aim of searches: to avoid unnecessary arrests (Scarman, 1981). Section 1 of the
Police Criminal and Evidence Act 1984 is one such power and enables police constables
to search people and vehicles for evidence of a wide range of offences such as carrying
weapons, fireworks and stolen or other prohibited items obtained through burglary, fraud
or theft.  Additionally,  Section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 allows officers to
search people and vehicles believed to possess controlled drugs. Further, Section 47 of the
Firearms Act 1988 provides powers to search people and vehicles suspected of carrying
firearm or ammunition in a public place or about to commit a crime anywhere using that
weapon. Finally,  Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 enables police officers to search
people  (and drivers  under  Section  43A)  for  evidence  of  involvement  in  terrorism and
stands out  from other  all  counter-terrorism powers  in  being the only one that  requires
reasonable suspicion.
4.1.2. Exceptional powers
Three powers currently exist which do not require officers to have prior suspicion of a
person's involvement in crime in order to stop, question and/or search them. These are
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known  as  'exceptional  powers'  because  they  are  meant  to  be  used  only  in  the  rare
circumstance  that  routine  powers  are  deemed insufficient  to  manage  serious  threats  of
violence or incidents of terrorism to justify their deployment. In recognition of the ease
with  which  people  can  be  searched  without  suspicion,  these  powers  require  the  prior
authorisation of a senior officer to bring it into legal effect and only for a defined period of
time. But this has been found to provide little practical safeguards, as discussed later.
Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provides powers to stop
and search people and vehicles without the requirement for suspicion in locations where
“serious violence” may take place or dangerous or offensive weapons are believed to be
carried “without good reason”. It requires prior authorisation by an officer of the rank of
Inspector or above where s/he believes that such authorisations are expedient to preventing
such violence and can last up to an initial period of 24 hours with a possible extension to a
further 48 hours. Section 60 is the only exceptional power governed by PACE Code A but
is “solely in the hands of local police” because unlike other exceptional powers it does not
require the external authority of the Home Secretary (Bridges, 2015:25). When in place,
Section  60AA provides  officers  with  an  ancillary  power  to  require  people  to  remove
disguises used to conceal identities but this requires a separate authorisation to have effect.
Section 47A25 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides powers to search people and their
vehicles for evidence of involvement in terrorism, also without the requirement for prior
suspicion. It is the most recent addition following the repeal of section 44 of the same Act,
a power which is also analysed in this thesis due to its on-going relevance to debates on
and legal challenges to stop and search.26 Whereas an authority to use  section 44 could
25 Not to be confused with Section 47 of The Firearms Act 1988, already discussed.
26 Chapter 6 discusses the reasons and circumstances behind the repeal of section 44.
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only be granted where an officer of at  least  the rank of assistant  chief  constable  (or a
commander of a London borough) believed that terrorism may occur and the power was
expedient to prevent those acts, section 47A has the higher threshold of requiring belief
that acts of terrorism  will take place and that the power is  necessary  to prevent it. The
duration and geographical extent of section 47A authorisations is also stricter although,
unlike  section  60,  it  requires  the  confirmation  of  the  Home  Secretary  to  last  the  full
duration, although the Secretary of State can also shorten or cancel it altogether.
The maximum period for a section 44 authorisation was 28 days if confirmed by the Home
Secretary otherwise it would automatically lapse at the end of the first 48 hours. However,
police forces  were exploiting  this  loophole by making 'rolling authorisations'  every 48
hours  for  large  geographical  areas  irrespective  of  the nature of  threats  perceived (HM
Government, 2011; Lennon, 2013). By contrast, section 47A can only last up to 14 days if
confirmed by the Home Secretary otherwise it automatically lapses after 48 hours, and the
geographical extent of the order can only be as far as is considered necessary to prevent
terrorism. Further, the codes of practice attempt to defeat the former loophole by expressly
forbidding constabularies from making another authorisation for the same area by stating
that  the  Home Secretary will  only extend orders  or  requests  to  alter  the  geography if
justified by new intelligence (TSO, 2012). Therefore, the requirements surrounding section
47A is far stricter than its predecessor and may explain why it has never been authorised in
England and Wales,27 even during major public events where section 44 would have almost
certainly been used, such as the London Olympics in 2012 and various public celebrations
relating to Britain's royal family since.
27 Section 47A has only ever been used once and in Northern Ireland (See: Anderson, 2014).
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Finally,  Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000  is, arguably,  the widest ranging of all
police  powers  to  stop  and  search,  albeit  one  confined  to  ports,  airports  and  their
surrounding areas. Counter-terrorism officers may 'examine' or 'detain' travellers for up to
six hours without requiring any suspicion to believe that they are involved in terrorism.28
During the encounter, officers may undertake any of the following. First, they can examine
a person for up to an hour to question them; inspect their passport or other identification;
and search the individual, their property and any associated vehicle(s). If by the end of the
first hour officers still wish to examine the person, they must formally detain them for up
to an additional five hours, although the detention can commence earlier  on during the
encounter. However, no combination of an examination and detention can last beyond the
maximum legal period of six hours and suspects are obliged to co-operate with the full
extent  of  the  encounter.  Following  recent  legislative  changes  discussed  in  chapter  6,
detentions can now only take place with the authority of a 'review officer' who is at least
one  rank  above  the  detaining  officer(s),  was  not  involved  in  the  original  decision  to
examine the  person,  and s/he must  also review the  detention  at  least  every two hours
thereafter. Where officers are authorised to detain a person, they can carry out more in-
depth  questioning  of  that  detainee;  conduct  a  more  extensive  search  of  their  body,
belongings,  or  any  associated  vehicle(s)  still  in  the  port,  and  all  areas  of  the  port  or
transport that they are believed to have used; carry out a strip-search if they believe the
detainee is concealing any items; take samples of their DNA and fingerprints regardless of
the outcome of the encounter;  scan and download information  from electrical  property
such as mobile phones, laptops and tablet computers;  and confiscate property for up to
seven days for further analysis or longer for any criminal proceedings.
28 During  the  research  period,  legislative  changes  were  made  to  Schedule  7,  including  reducing  the
maximum detention period down from nine hours to six as discussed in chapter 6.
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4.1.3. Other police-initiated stops
In addition to the powers outlined above, there two other types of police encounters which
are used in considerable volumes.  Section 163 of the Road and Traffic Act 1988 is a
stand-alone power enabling police  constables  to  stop motor  vehicles  and people riding
bicycles without requiring any suspicion or even a specific reason to do so. Sections 164-
165 provide ancillary powers to require stopped drivers to produce their driver’s license,
name, address, insurance certificate and state their date of birth if they are believed to have
been involved in any traffic offences or a road accident. This power is not governed by any
of the statutory codes of practice nor is data on its use required to be collected by forces.
Should officers wish to search a person or their vehicle, they must use any of the other
legal powers already described.
Stop and account is another type of police-initiated stop and the least intrusive of all.
Here, people are asked to account for themselves, their behaviour or presence in an area
but, crucially, officers cannot search them unless they invoke one of the legal powers just
described. Significantly, stop and account is not a legal power and so people are neither
formally detained nor obliged to answer questions. However, police officers usually obtain
compliance by exploiting people's wrongly-held belief that they are obliged to co-operate
(Young, 2016) and, in any case, from the public's awareness that officers could invoke
more forceful action should persuasion fail (Klockars, 1988; Brogden et al., 1988). The
misconception that the encounter is a legal power came from the statutory requirement to
record  it  following  a  recommendation  of  Macpherson's  (1999)  inquiry  into  the
Metropolitan  Police's  mishandling  of  the  racist  murder  of  teenager  Stephen Lawrence.
Macpherson recommended the recording all stops, including those that did not result in a
search, and giving people a written record of the encounter. This arose from the evidence
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he heard from ethnic minority groups across the country suggesting that police stops was a
universal cause for concern despite the repeal of Sus and rationalisation of the law almost
two decades beforehand. As Young (2016) argues, the police successfully persuaded the
government at the time to not extend the statutory requirement to record the full range of
stops, notably traffic stops, owing to concerns about the 'bureaucracy' involved. Therefore,
recording stop and accounts alongside the legal powers to search promoted the idea that it
too was a legal power. However, by 2011, less than a decade after it begun, the police
succeeded in persuading the Conservative-Liberal Democrat to revoke the requirement to
record these encounters, as discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Most police forces
immediately ceased doing so without any public consultation (Bridges, 2015). Thus, as
Reiner (2015:xiii) rightly points out, “we are left with a phantom power brought into some
kind of formal existence by a now abolished safeguard”. This raises significant questions
about  the  extent  to  which  regulation  is  effective  in  ensuring  police  officers  are  held
accountable for using their powers, as is now discussed.
4.2. Regulating police stops
Clearly, police officers enjoy a broad range of discretionary powers to stop people and, if
desired, to also search them. These functions have grown over the decades alongside the
expansion of police powers more generally and the weakening of procedural safeguards,
particularly since 'crime control'  has become the 'hegemonic'  discourse since the 1990s
(Reiner, 2010; Sanders et al.  2010). At the same time, for the reasons explained in the
previous chapter, numerous legislation have made the police more accountable to the law
through regulatory controls rather than to police authorities or local community groups.
This  section  analyses  the  efficacy  of  the  following  three  primary  forms  of  regulatory
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controls  over  police  stops  and  their  implications  upon  democratic  accountability:
reasonable suspicion, prior authorisation, and record-keeping.
4.2.1. Reasonable suspicion
Reasonable suspicion is defined by PACE code A and applies to section 1, section 23 and
section 47; a similar definition applies to section 43 which used to be governed by the code
until a separate one was established for it and other counter-terrorism street powers (see:
TSO,  2012).  Code  A  states  that  reasonable  suspicion  “should  normally  be  linked  to
accurate and current intelligence or information, relating to articles for which there is a
power to stop and search, being carried by individuals or being in vehicles in any locality”
(Home  Office,  2014h:para2.4;  TSO,  2012:9).  This  could  be  based  upon  officer's  own
assessment of how people are behaving rather than any actual evidence that suggests they
may or have already committed a crime.
The extent to which reasonable suspicion limits unnecessary searches is open to debate.
Whereas studies of exceptional powers argue that it does, in comparison, limit use by at
least requiring some explanation to be recorded and given to persons searched (Parmar,
2011; Lennon, 2013), others consider it to be weak (Bowling & Phillips, 2007), a “slippery
concept” (Sanders et al., 2010:74), or even rarely met in practice (Lustgarten, 2002). This
could partly be due to the widely divergent interpretations officers have concerning when
that legal threshold has been met (Quinton et al. 2000; Quinton, 2011; HMIC, 2013), but
also the permissive nature of police powers in general (Reiner, 2010; Sanders et al., 2010).
Observational  studies  into  how  police  officers  form  their  suspicions,  though  rare,
collectively show that such decision-making is based upon a combination of subjective
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factors: interpreting people's behaviour; previous contact with individuals already known
to them; perceptions of things being 'out-of-place'; and stereotypes concerning who are the
'usual suspects' involved in crime (Quinton et al., 2000; Quinton, 2011; Johnson & Morgan,
2013). International comparative studies show that this is not unique to the British police
(Delsol, 2006; Johnson & Morgan, 2013), but is a consistent feature of police occupational
culture worldwide (Reiner, 2010; Sanders et al., 2010). 
Basing suspicion purely on the perceived 'race' of a person has long been prohibited by
Code  A  which  states:  “reasonable  suspicion  can  never  be  supported  on  the  basis  of
personal factors” (Home Office, 2014h:para2.2B). In 2009, religion was expressly added to
this list of prohibited factors following claims of discrimination against Muslims since the
New York terrorist  attacks  in 2001 and the London bombings in 2005 (Sanders et  al.,
2010;  Bridges,  2015).  As  Sanders  et  al.  (2010:75)  argue,  this  “twenty-first  century
addition” is “a rare example of the law attempting to take into account the social reality of
policing on the streets.” Additionally, using a person's previous contact with the police or
criminal record to justify a search is generally prohibited, except in relation to counter-
terrorism  searches  given  the  nature  of  those  crimes.  Even  so,  the  codes  still  provide
officers  with  extremely  wide  latitude  to  justify  even  the  most  baseless  of  searches,
particularly  through  claims  of  a  person  'acting  suspicious'.  A  recent  inspection  of  a
representative sample of stop and search records from every police force in England and
Wales revealed that almost a third of them (27%) had in fact no reasonable grounds to
justify the search, with the most common reason being “acting suspicious” (HMIC, 2013).
The scale of such practice also supports Sanders et al.'s (2010) suggestion that formal rules
have had an  'enabling'  effect  by  legitimising  dominant  practice  rather  than  restraining
them. Ultimately, Code A provides officers with practical guidance on how to interpret and
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exercise their powers but any breaches do not make officers liable for their actions even if
it may be referred to in criminal or disciplinary proceedings. Indeed, observational studies
have found that police officers act primarily in accordance to occupational cultures and
rules  developed  on  the  job  (Miller  et  al,  2000;  Quinton,  2011),  thus  suggesting  that
adherence to PACE is largely tokenistic.
Code A was recently strengthening in relation to what constitutes reasonable suspicion to
the following:
“This test must be applied to the particular circumstances in each case and is
in two parts:
(i)  Firstly, the officer must  have formed a  genuine suspicion in their
own mind that they will find the object for which the search power
being exercised allows them to search; and
(ii)  Secondly,  the  suspicion  that  the  object  will  be  found  must  be
reasonable. This means that there must be an objective basis for that
suspicion based on facts and information which are relevant to the
likelihood  that  the  object  in  question  will  be  found  so  that  a
reasonable person would be entitled to reach the same conclusion
based on the same facts and information.”
(Home Office, 2014h:para2.2; original emphasis)
Arguably, this is another example of the law accounting for the social realities of policing
and is significant for many reasons. The revised code did not make any substantial changes
to  the  prohibition  on  race/religion  or  use  of  stereotypes.  Instead,  traditional  concerns
relating  to  fairness  have  been  broadened  from the  narrow  focus  upon  racial/religious
discrimination towards the broader question of: can the intrusion upon a person's liberty be
justified by the reason for the search? The Code answers by suggesting this can only be
objectively justified if some other person is likely to reach the same conclusion. Related to
this,  'hunches'  or  other  more  subjective  factors  are  explicitly  excluded  from  forming
grounds for the “genuine suspicion” described. More significantly, for the first time ever,
the criteria ties reasonable suspicion to a justifiable outcome of the search. By linking this
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to the likelihood of finding the object sought for, this much stricter test recognises the ease
with which people can be searched and is intended to end the practice whereby officers
could detain people and then fish around for a retrospective justification for the search.
There is also hardly any doubt that a search resulting in evidence of a crime having been or
likely to be committed would be justified in the eyes of this hypothetically “reasonable
person”.
It is too soon to ascertain what impact this revision may have on officers' discretion but, in
any case, it is likely to be minimal because formal rules feature less prominently in their
decision-making compared to on-the job occupational rules (Quinton et al. 2000; Quinton,
2011).  A recent  HMIC (2013) inspection,  which prompted these  revisions  to  Code A,
reinforced the findings of earlier Home Office studies (Quinton et al., 2000; also Miller et
al.,  2000)  by  finding  huge  variations  still  exist  in  officers'  understanding  of  what
constitutes reasonable suspicion,  even among those within the same deployment  teams.
Further, this inspection revealed not only a woeful lack of front-line supervision necessary
to ensure that officers are held accountable by their line managers for any misconduct, but,
alongside follow-up inspections, have found that chief officers have not been willing to
provide the necessary leadership to drive through longer term changes to practice (HMIC
2013,  2015a,  2016).  Therefore,  it  is  perhaps  unsurprising  and  inevitable  that  the
ambiguities surrounding what constitutes reasonable suspicion, together with the lack of
proactive internal monitoring against abuse, has rendered this procedural safeguard almost
entirely useless. Even if these weaknesses were to be addressed, police officers could still
circumvent them by exercising their powers  which do not require suspicion or use more
informal means to stop people and make them account for themselves, particularly as this
is no longer longer recorded by most police forces. As the individual decision to subject a
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person to a search is an operational decision, it excludes members of the public from being
consulted or involved in this process. One solution is to subject search records to public
scrutiny,  but  few force have historically  done this  as discussed in  the later  section  on
external monitoring.
4.2.2. Prior authorisation
Exceptional powers do not require suspicion and so their main procedural control emanates
from the need for prior authorisation to bring them into legal effect.  Use of the power
without  authorisation  is  illegal  but  can  go  unnoticed  without  the  adequate  front-line
supervision found to be missing across forces (HMIC, 2013). Only street powers require
prior  authorisation  (i.e.  section  60  and  section  47A)  unlike  schedule  7  which  is
permanently in effect across ports and airports.29 Authorisations are meant to ensure that
the  powers  are  granted  only  in  the  rare  circumstances  that  the  ordinary  powers  are
insufficient to counteract serious violence or terrorism incidents. However, as this section
discusses, once granted, there continues to be little procedural safeguards to ensure that
only people genuinely suspected of serious violence or terrorism are searched, particularly
as senior and chief officers have historically exploited legal loopholes to ensure the de-
facto permanency of the power.
Unlike section 44, section 60 use remains firmly within the police's control because it does
not require any external authority for its initial use nor for any subsequent extensions to the
maximum legal period (Bridges, 2015). The Knives Act 1997 loosened this safeguard by
reducing the level of authorising officer required to make such orders from superintendent
down  to  inspector  and  also  lengthened  the  maximum  period  authorisations  could  be
29 Recent legislative changes to schedule 7 introduced a different type of authority required. This relates to
the role of a 'review officer' in authorising a person's continued detention, as already discussed.
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extended from six hours to twenty-four. Surprisingly, despite wide agreement on the power
having been expanded and misused since (e.g. Sanders et al., 2000; Shiner, 2012; Delsol &
Shiner, 2015), there is only sparing literature on the efficacy of prior authorisations as a
safeguard.
The  Independent  Police  Complaints  Commission  (IPCC),  the  regulatory  body  that
investigates and monitors complaints against the police, raised concerns over the misuse of
section 60 in a complaint it upheld against the West Midlands Police. The IPCC (2007)
concluded that the relevant authorisation was “unjustified” because it was used for routine
crime problems rather than its legally intended purposes. It also highlighted that it  had
“raised similar concerns over the last 3 years” thus suggesting that authorisations had been
frequently  misapplied.  An  analysis  by  the  Equality  and  Human  Rights  Commission
(EHRC, 2012), the U.K.'s equalities watchdog, of section 60 orders across the country
suggests that the issues raised by IPCC has been a wider systemic problem. The EHRC
shows that, even between comparatively similar forces, there was considerable variation in
the  number  of  authorisations  made,  their  average  duration  and that  of  any subsequent
extensions, and the number of searches then conducted. Despite the varied quality of the
raw data  supplied from forces  and reproduced in its  report,  it  also shows considerable
variation in the justifications given for authorisations. Many appear to have been made
simply because large, public events were due to occur, namely football matches,  rather
than  in  anticipation  of  violence  as  the  law requires.  This  all  suggests  that  section  60
authorisations have provided little control against  the routine use of the power and for
unintended purposes, particularly given that a large number of orders were granted without
a single search then having taken place to potentially justify its deployment.
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Before its repeal, section 44 use represented the worst example of how weak regulatory
controls operate in practice. Authorisations were made by chief officers, and subsequently
granted  by  the  Home  Secretary,  to  cover  vast  urban  areas  and  on  a  'rolling  basis'
irrespective  of  the  nature of the threat  at  the time,  particularly across London and the
country's  railway  network  (HM  Government,  2011;  Lennon,  2013).  This  lasted  for  a
number of years and even where requests to extend orders beyond the initial 48 hours were
not granted by the Home Secretary, chief officers had circumvented this by making fresh
authorisations before the end of the previous one, thus ensuring the de-facto permanency of
the power. Ironically, it was a government review into the historic use of section 44 which
exposed the scale of malpractice. The review was initiated soon after the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition government assumed office and in fulfilment of both parties'
electoral pledge to curtail some of the greatest restrictions upon civil liberties enacted by
the previous Labour government (see HM Government, 2011). Astonishingly, it found a
number  of  erroneous  orders  confirmed  by  successive  Labour  home  secretaries  lasting
beyond the total maximum legal period of 28 days. In other words, police officers were
engaged in government-sponsored law breaking and this is particularly revealing of the
extent  to  which  successive  Labour  home  secretaries  had  produced  an  environment
conducive to the flagrant disregard of regulatory controls.
Section  47A  has  since  replaced  section  44  and  contains  far  tighter  controls  over  the
authorisation period, geographic limit, and requests for extensions. As the power has not
yet  been  used  in  England  and  Wales,  it  remains  unclear  how  well  these  processes
safeguard against the historic failures, although the very fact that it has not been deployed
for major public events that section 44 would have almost certainly been used shows that it
may be having its intended inhibitory effect. However, this is highly dependent upon how
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future home secretaries decide to exercise their right to extend, shorten or cancel a section
47A authorisation and whether  they and any requesting chief constable(s)  feel  that the
intense public scrutiny following the first ever deployment of the power is outweighed by
any perceived gain from its use.
In sum, the literature shows that the requirement for prior authorisation has provided little
safeguard against the routine use of exceptional street powers, particularly with regards to
counter-terrorism searches for which it has had absolutely no historical restraint. As this
research also indicates, there is huge variation in the scale of authorisations, subsequent
use of exceptional powers and quality of recording even between comparatively similar
forces. This suggests that the cultural attitudes instilled by chief and senior officers are far
more important in shaping how exceptional powers are used rather than any regulatory
controls.  Further,  the lack  of  external  authorisation  for  section  60 hampers  democratic
accountability as it denies any external body, whether the Home Secretary or members of
the public, a role in deciding whether any intelligence justifies its use. Although section
47A  does  require  the  Home  Secretary's  approval  for  longer  durations,  the  nature  of
counter-terrorism policing precludes  ethnic minorities  or other  social  groups and PCCs
from  being  consulted  on  its  use  or  even  from  offering  any  kind  of  retrospective
accountability.
4.2.3. Record-keeping and external monitoring
'Record-keeping' is a core means by which most police-initiated encounters are regulated
and the law seeks to illuminate this highly discretionary practice hidden away even from
supervising and senior officers.  Official  inquiries in the 1980s (RCCP, 1981; Scarman,
1981)  highlighted  the  lack  of  police  officer  accountability  to  the  public  and  need  to
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monitor  wider  trends  in  stop  and  search  use.  This  resulted  in  PACE requiring  police
officers to record stop and searches, give a copy to persons searched as an immediate form
of  accountability,  and  it  also  placed  a  duty  upon  police  authorities  to  ensure  chief
constables and borough commanders were externally accountable to the public through
police-public liaison committees.
Similar to previous versions, Code A currently requires records and identified trends to be
monitored internally by the police,  with a particular focus on potentially discriminatory
practice,  but  also  externally  through police-public  liaison  committees.  However,  many
searches go unrecorded despite the legal requirement to record them (Willis, 1983; Miller
et al. 2000; HMIC,2013) and many other types of encounters are not recorded, thus making
it impossible for supervisors and senior managers to obtain an accurate picture of officers'
discretionary practice. There has also never been a requirement to record encounters where
a  person  is  originally  detained  for  the  purposes  of  carrying  out  a  search  but  none
subsequently  takes  place,  for  example,  because  the  initial  suspicion  is  allayed  after
questioning.  As Young (2016) argues, the lack of universal recording was primarily the
result  of  successful  police  lobbying  against  it  during  Home  Office  trials  testing  the
viability of recording the broader range of encounters advocated by Macpherson (1999).
This resulted in its scope becoming progressively narrow, notably excluding the significant
number of traffic stops carried out (Miller et al., 2000; Young, 2016). Police resistance to
recording has continued since with officers exploiting the lack of oversight of their practice
to select which searches to record, thus resulting in significant under-recording (Miller et
al., 2000; HMIC, 2013). All of this undermines the ability for record-keeping to accurately
reflect operational practice and, therefore, the public and police authority's reliance upon
this data as the primary source of scrutiny hampers local police accountability.
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Public liaison groups are the most intrusive means by which chief officers are required to
make  themselves  and  their  officers  publicly  accountable.  But  as  the  previous  chapter
discussed, these groups lack representation from ethnic minorities and other groups most
affected by police practices and also lack the power to effect any desired changes to such
practices (Scarman, 1981; Morgan, 1987; Brogden et al.  1988; Rowe, 2004). So whilst
various legislation have expanded the range of issues for which chief constables and police
authorities  are required to consult  their  liaison committees,  there is  no obligation upon
chiefs to make changes to policies or practice in light of any critical feedback. Therefore,
Morgan (1987:94) and Scarman's (1981:para5.69) warnings of the dangers of those groups
becoming endless “talking shops” have failed to be heeded. 
Failures to maintain stop and account recording is the clearest example of how power still
resides in the hands of chief constables rather than the public or their police authorities. As
Code A states:
“Where there are concerns which make it necessary to monitor any local
disproportionality,  forces  have  discretion to  direct  officers  to  record  the
self-defined ethnicity of persons they request to account for themselves in a
public place or who they detain with a view to searching but do not search.
Guidance  should  be  provided  locally  and  efforts  made  to  minimise  the
bureaucracy  involved.  Records  should  be  closely  monitored  and
supervised...  and  forces  can  suspend  or  re-instate  recording  of  these
encounters as appropriate.”
Home Office (2014h:20; emphasis added)
As the Codes state, this decision is firmly within the hands of chief constables. While it
does  leave  open  the  possibility  for  re-recording  stop  and  accounts,  it  is  practically
redundant  because  neither  the  local  policing  bodies  responsible  for  holding  chief
constables to account nor members of the public most affected by these encounters are
given any role in ensuring their chief constable does “re-instate recording” where concerns
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do exist to “make it necessary”, as the Codes require. Revealingly, few forces continued to
record these encounters once the coalition government revoked the requirement to do so in
2011 and most  ceased without even consulting their  local  communities  (Bridges et  al.,
2011).  This  is  despite  stop  and  account  data  at  the  time  showing  high  enough  racial
disparities  to  make  it  as  significant  an  issue  locally  as  stop and search  (ibid).  This  is
unsurprising given the scale of police opposition to recording those encounter  from its
inception (see Shiner, 2010). Further, the lack of recording makes it almost impossible for
local policing bodies or ethnic minority groups to evidence systemic, force-wide concerns
exist to justify re-introducing records. Therefore,  without any external control over this
decision, whether by distributing power to local communities or policing bodies, it relies
entirely  upon  the  will  of  chief  constables  which,  as  the  literature  already  discussed
suggests, will almost certainly not be forthcoming. 
Another example of how powerful chief officers have been in deciding what information is
publicly  available  to  ensure  they  are  adequately  held  accountable  is  their  on-going
resistance to publishing separate figures on their use of section 43, with the sole exception
of  the  Metropolitan  Police.  Although  section  43  use  is  recorded  by every  force,  it  is
published  as  an  aggregate  figure  combined  with  other  powers  requiring  reasonable
suspicion.  Significantly,  this  is  despite  the  persistent  calls  for  separate  figures  by  the
current  independent  reviewer  of  counter-terrorism  legislation  (Anderson,  2011,  2012,
2013, 2014, 2015), a government appointed figure approved by Parliament. Once again,
chief constables rather than any external or other institutional actor appear to be in control.
Yet  even  if  recording  was  extended  to  cover  all  police-initiated  stops,  numerous
inspections  have  found  that  the  supervision  and  leadership  required  to  address  public
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concerns  surrounding  their  use  has  been  missing  (EHRC,  2010;  HMIC,  2013,  2015a,
2016). Also, ironically, the over-reliance upon recorded data to monitor police practice has
contributed to pressures upon police officers to overuse their powers and in circumstances
where  they  may  not  have  otherwise  done  so.  Police  data  has  been  used  by  central
government to measure police productivity and impose performance targets upon senior
and chief officers as most clearly indicated by the Home Office's (2005) stop and search
manual which itself followed the notorious Police Reform Act 2002. This Act gave the
Home Secretary unprecedented powers to issue a National Policing Plan and set objectives
for every police force and police authority to comply with (see chapter 3). As research with
police officers has shown, some have admitted to carrying out searches in order to meet
these targets rather than for reasons justified by law (Loveday, 2006; Cockcroft, & Beattie,
2009). Whilst these studies focused on general stop and searches, the same pressures are
likely to be present for all other types of encounters given how extensively applied the
police performance framework has been. 
In a somewhat similar vein, and in the words of the former independent reviewer of anti-
terrorism legislation,  the pressures upon officers to reduce racial  disparities in counter-
terrorism searches led to “ample anecdotal evidence” to suggest that some were searching
white people in order to “balance” the statistics (Carlile, 2009:para140).30 These seemingly
contradictory pressures to show productivity but simultaneously reduce racial disparities
have produced the same end result. Rather than seeking to decrease the number of non-
white searches and risk facing management action for what would appear to be reduced
productivity,  searches of whites were increased in the hope that this would produce the
balancing effect on the disparities evident in the statistics discussed in the next section of
30 In another twist of irony, that year the-then government's own security minister, Lord West of Spitfield,
admitted to the House of Lords to having been searched under the power for similar reasons (HL Deb
(2009-10) 23 Nov 2009). 
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this chapter. This transformed the primary purpose of monitoring from one that seeks to
ensure  police  officers  are  accountable  to  their  local  communities  for  exercising  their
powers,  to  one  where  these  records  have  been  used  to  measuring  performance  and
compliance with central government dictates.
To conclude the second part  of this chapter,  it  is clear that the regulatory mechanisms
designed to ensure that the police are accountable for exercising their powers has provided
little  restraint  against  misuse.  As  Reiner  (2010:210)  argues  more  generally  “whatever
powers the police have they will exceed by a given margin”, and the foregoing analysis
suggests that police-initiated stops has been a good example of this. Regulatory controls
have contributed to a democratic deficit by excluding members of the public and police
authorities  from any meaningful  role  in  scrutinising  operational  practice  and narrowed
their participation to merely analysing selective data without the necessary powers to effect
any desired  changes  to  underlying  practices.  Unsurprisingly,  the  use  of  these  coercive
powers have increased exponentially despite a series of crises and subsequent attempts at
reforming the law and practice, as is analysed in the next and final part of this chapter. 
4.3. A history of crises and reform
This section analyses historic trends in stop and search use and their impact upon ethnic
minority communities.31 As Figure 4.1 clearly shows, street-level searches have increased
substantially since records were first published in 1986, with any reductions proving to be
only a temporary response to specific crises (also table 4.1). Drawing upon a review of the
literature, this section explains the exponential growth in stop and search use as largely due
to  a  permissive  environment  sustained  by  central  government  and  despite  the  hugely
31 Data for 2009/10 onwards is analysed in the findings (chapters 6-7) as it forms the empirical focus of this
thesis.
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negative impact of those practices were known to have on relations between the police and
ethnic minority communities in particular. In doing so, it finds ample evidence to support
Delsol & Shiner's (2015:31) assertion that the powers are  “intimately bound up with the
broader politics of crime control and the functioning of the nation state” (also Murray &
Harkin, 2016). Unfortunately,  this section can only present a partial  analysis  of police-
initiated stops owing to the selective recording of these encounters, their outcomes and any
racial disparities; historic under-recording (Miller et al., 2000; Sanders et al., 2010); and
missing  data  from intelligence  databases  due  to  misplaced  forms  or  ineligible  records
(HMIC,  2013,  2015).  Nonetheless,  the  data  does  provide  an  insight  into  how  police
officers  exercise  their  powers  and,  together  with  the academic  literature,  questions  the
ability of regulatory controls to ensure that police powers are used in ways congruent with
the expectations of local communities. Before this, this section starts by analysing the use
of 'Sus' laws as it was a precursor to the modern powers analysed in this thesis.
Figure 4.1 - Stops and searches in England and Wales, 1986-2008/09
Notes: (1)  Figures  for  the  British  Transport  Police  are  excluded  as  they  were  only  published  since
2009/10.
(2)  Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A).
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(3) Section 44/47A figures includes searches under section 13A and 13B of the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 1989 which preceded section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Sources: Home Office (1997, 2003, 2012a; 2014b)
Table 4.1 - Stops and searches in England and Wales and total percentage changes, 1986-2008/09
Year Section 1 Section 60 Section
44/47A
Total Total 
change (%)
1986 109,800 109,800
1987 118,300 118,300 8
1988 149,600 149,600 26
1989 202,800 202,800 36
1990 256,900 256,900 27
1991 303,800 303,800 18
1992 351,700 351,700 16
1993 442,800 442,800 26
1994 576,000 576,000 30
1995 690,300 2,380 6 692,686 20
1996 814,500 7,020 40,500 862,020 24
1996/97 871,500 7,970 43,700 923,170 7
1997/98 1,050,700 7,970 15,400 1,074,070 16
1998/99 1,080,700 5,500 3,300 1,089,500 1
1999/00 857,200 6,840 1,900 865,940 -21
2000/01 714,100 11,330 6,400 731,830 -15
2001/02 741,000 18,900 10,200 770,100 5
2002/03 895,250 44,398 32,087 971,735 26
2003/04 749,444 40,436 33,798 823,678 -15
2004/05 861,494 41,611 37,013 940,118 14
2005/06 888,675 36,276 50,047 974,998 4
2006/07 962,897 44,707 42,834 1,050,438 8
2007/08 1,053,001 53,501 126,706 1,233,208 17
2008/09 1,159,374 150,174 210,013 1,519,561 23
Notes: (1)  Figures  for  the  British  Transport  Police  are  excluded  as  they  were  only  published  since
2009/10.
(2) Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A).
(3) Section 44/47A figures  includes searches under section 13A and 13B of the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 1989 which preceded section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Sources: Home Office (1997, 2003, 2012a; 2014b).
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4.3.1. ‘Sus’ laws and stop and search up to the 1980s
Prior to the modern stop and search powers analysed in this thesis, police powers to search
members of the public varied by region. Additionally, 'Sus' laws under the Vagrancy Act
1824 enabled police officers nationwide to arrest people suspected of loitering with intent
to commit crime, mainly thief-taking, or to sanction the 'wandering poor' and bring them
before  a  magistrate  for  prosecution  (Demuth,  1978).  The  overall  lack  of  national
consistency of this 'ad hoc'  system meant  that  it  was impossible  to monitor  how these
powers were being used across the country, particularly since statistics on their use were
not recorded. However, the limited research that exists on the use of Sus and regional stop
and search powers suggests that they were used in racially discriminatory ways and were
straining  relations  between  ethnic  minorities  and  the  police  (Demuth,  1978;  Brogden,
1981; Scarman, 1981; Willis, 1983). 
In her ground-breaking study of Sus, Demuth (1978) argues that the law had made it easy
to arrest and prosecute young black males who were disproportionately affected by the
power, and had effectively shifted the burden of proof onto defendants. This, she argued,
was because the law enabled officers to arrest people for  suspected  intent to commit a
crime rather than based upon actual  proof of this, thus placing defendants' words against
the police. Defendants had limited opportunities to seek trial by jury to ensure independent
cross-examination of police testimonies that magistrates were themselves usually hesitant
to  question.  This  was  despite  the  obvious  limitations  and  contradictions  that  Demuth
claimed to have plagued police  officers'  testimonies,  such as the poor  visibility  of  the
alleged  incident  and  officers'  deliberate  tendency  to  exclude  alleged  victim(s)  from
testifying in court. Demuth suggests that police officers did this to improve their chances
of successful prosecutions by preventing any thorough examination of eye witnesses that
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may result in their accounts contracting that of police officers and cases being quashed.
Further,  her analysis  of Sus-related court  cases and police data in the selected London
boroughs that did record race-related information suggests that the quality of evidence used
to  support  arrests  and  prosecutions  varied  substantially  but  was  weak  overall.  Police
officers were also found to be using Sus against  the same individuals  to reassert  their
authority over poorer and black communities; and used it as a 'catch-all' power to detain
and prosecute people where other laws could not justify an intervention.  Despite all  of
these weaknesses, and occasionally as a result of it, Demuth argued that the outcome of
prosecutions  depended  upon the  magistrates'  own attitudes  towards  the  police  and  the
defendant rather than the nature of the evidence obtained. Thus, she concluded, Sus was
ineffective and was having a deeply negative impact upon ethnic minorities, their future
prospects, and provoked hostilities towards the police.
Similarly, Brogden's (1981:49) study of Sus in Liverpool and its interaction with local stop
and  street  powers  led  to  her  concluding  that  the  powers  were  discriminatory  and
“indicative of... a widening of social control which has blurred the boundaries of guilt and
innocence, captivity and freedom”, particularly against the urban poor and young black
men. Drawing upon 163 interviews with male defendants, Brogden argues that stop and
search is a good example of the “quasi-judicial functions of the police” (p.47) as officers
had begun moving away from arresting people under Sus as it became subject to greater
public scrutiny and magistrates were more “circumspect” towards such cases. Therefore,
she argues, police officers resorted to invoking their powers to stop and search people in
cases where Sus now proved to be ineffective as a sanction or asserting control over the
public. Ultimately, she concluded, “discrimination has shifted backwards from the courts
to the streets” (p.49).  A Home Office study also found that  stop and search recording
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across the country was patchy, disproportionately targeted towards black people and was
resulting in antagonisms towards the police (Willis, 1983). It also found wide variation in
police practices across the country for which it blamed on police policies.
In sum, the literature concerning this early period suggests that relations between the police
and ethnic minorities, particularly black people for whom the research almost exclusively
focuses upon, were highly antagonistic and because police officers were using Sus laws
and  their  local  powers  to  stop  and  search  in  racially  discriminatory  ways.  The  low
evidential threshold required by Sus law to arrest and prosecute suspects and its lack of
transparency alongside the local stop and search powers hampered the ability of ethnic
minority  communities  to  hold  the  police  to  account  for  their  practices.  Such  was  the
concern relating to  Sus that Parliament voted to repealed it in 1981. The extent to which
police-community relations had broken down was typified by urban riots earlier that year
across  the  country,  notably  in  Brixton,  South  London  (see  Scarman,  1981).  A  Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP, 1981) was already underway following an
unrelated scandal into police malpractice relating to the questioning and prosecution of
suspects. It also chose to examine Sus and proposed its repeal as well as replacing all local
powers  to  stop  and/or  search  people  with  a  single  national,  search  power  (Scarman
endorsed the Commission's proposals having declined to make any suggestions himself).
Following this  crisis  in  1981,  the  Conservative  government  at  the time introduced  the
mandatory  recording  and  publication  of  data  on  the  main  powers  to  stop  and  search,
figures analysed next. This was at a time when PACE had significantly enhanced police
powers  and also introduced record-keeping as  one  of  the primary means  of  regulating
practice.
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4.3.2. Expanding powers: 1986 to 1999
Police-recorded  data  shows  that  stop  and  search  volumes  and  racial  disparities  have
increased  sharply,  led  primarily  by  section  1  and  other  powers  requiring  reasonable
suspicion (“PACE searches”).32 This expansion has continued despite those powers having
been found to produce the anti-police sentiments that fuelled numerous public disorders
from the 1970s to  the 1990s (Keith,  1993; also Scarman,  1981).  Indeed, Home Office
research shows that black people continued to be disproportionately affected with one in
five searched compared to one in ten of the general public (Willis, 1981). 
By the new millennium, PACE searches increased by almost tenfold from 109,800 in 1986
to 1,080,700 in 1998/99 (table 4.1). Home Office statistics show that as search volumes
have increased, the proportion leading to an arrest has fallen from 17% in 1986 to 11% in
1998/99 (Sanders et al., 2010:76), thus pointing to an inverse relationship between search
volumes  and their  effectiveness.  Towards  the  end of  that  period,  the  police  were also
granted exceptional powers under public order and terrorism legislation. Since 1996, the
first  full  year  of  recording of  all  street  powers,  each  one shows a  different  trajectory.
Section  60  remained  largely  stable  and  even  fell  in  the  latter  years,  primarily  due  to
reductions in the Metropolitan Police area (Home Office, 2000, 2001a). Interestingly, this
is despite the Conservative government’s loosening of regulations in the Knives Act 1997
which  reduced  the  rank of  authorising  officer  down from superintendent  to  inspector.
Further to the initial twenty-four hour maximum period an authorisation could last, it also
lengthened the additional period orders could be extended to from six hours to another
twenty-four hours. The relatively low and stable volume of section 60 searches shows that
32 'PACE searches' are known as such because they are governed by Code A of PACE 1984 despite falling
under a range of other legislation and introduced or amended at various times. These powers include
section 1, section 23, section 47 and also section 43, although the latter is now governed under a separate
code (see TSO, 2012).
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the requirement  for  prior authorisation  may have mitigated  against  it  being used more
routinely during this period. 
This  procedural  control,  however,  appeared  to  be  less  effective  against  suspicion-less
counter-terrorism searches. Sections 13A and 13B of Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) (“PTA”) 1989, a precursor to section 44, was used at far higher levels than
section 60, rising from 40,500 searches in 1996 to 43,700 in the following year (figure 4.1;
table  4.1).  The  'exceptionalisation'  of  terrorist  threats  relating  to  Northern  Ireland was
likely to have encouraged and justified the use of this power (Hillyard, 1993).33 However,
counter-terrorism  searches  then  fell  substantially  in  1998/99  to  3,300  and  again  in
1999/2000  to  only  1,900.  This  coincided  with  the  newly-elected  Labour  government's
achievement  of a  Northern Ireland  political  settlement  in April  1998 which resulted in
organised  violence  largely  subsiding.  The government's  subsequent  review of  counter-
terrorism legislation resulted in the PTA being phased out and replaced by the Terrorism
Act 2000 which introduced permanent powers to stop and search suspected terrorists. Just
as PACE had expanded general police powers to stop and search, so too had the Terrorism
Act by making permanent what was originally intended to deliberately wide-ranging but
only temporary counter-terrorism powers.
Arguably, this period represents a relatively straightforward episode in stop and search use.
PACE searches had increased substantially as stop and searches became a routine feature
of  British  policing,  joined  later  by  exceptional  powers  not  hamstrung  by  traditional
regulatory controls. The consistently low use of section 60 during this period shows that,
despite  its  weaker  regulations,  its  controls  had  mitigated  against  it  being  used  more
33 The conflict related to whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom or as part of a
united  Republic  of  Ireland.  Also  note  that  counter-terrorism street  searches  and  at  ports  were  only
published from 1995 despite their long existence prior to section 60.
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routinely,  particularly  in  comparison  to  the  far  higher  frequency  of  counter-terrorism
searches. It is this higher volume of counter-terrorism searches before their eventual repeal
that  is  most  notable  during  this  period  and  suggests  that  the  use  of  police  powers  is
influenced by the wider political environment within which police officers operate.
4.3.3. The Macpherson effect: 1999/2000-2000/01
By the turn of the twenty-first century, stop and search had again come under significant
public  scrutiny  but  this  time  revealed  a  more  complicated  picture  of  how  regulatory
controls  operate  in  practice.  Following the publication  of  Macpherson's  (1999) inquiry
report  into  the  racist  murder  of  teenager  Stephen  Lawrence  in  1993,34 section  1  fell
immediately  for  two consecutive  years  from a  peak of  1,080,700 in  1998/99 down to
857,200 and then 714,100 in 1999/2000 and 2000/01 respectively (table 4.1), an overall
reduction of 40%. This dip was predominantly confined to the Metropolitan Police area
(Home Office, 2000) where the murder took place and was also accompanied by a higher
search-to-arrest rate nationally from 11% in 1998/99 to almost 13% in 1999/2000 and then
to over 13% in 2000/01 (Home Office, 2001a). This was the highest rate since 1992 and all
subsequent years under Labour thus suggesting a more targeted use during this heightened
period of public scrutiny. 
Macpherson (1999) highlighted a number of failures in the Metropolitan Police's original
investigation of the murder and, as with Scarman (1981), had heard from ethnic minority
groups  across  the  country  who  complained  about  their  negative  policing  experiences,
particularly of a range of police-initiated stops. Unlike Scarman, Macpherson concluded
that  the  police  were  institutionally  racist  and  cited  police-initiated  stops  as  a  primary
34 The six-year delay was due to the Conservative government at the time refusing to establish an inquiry
until the Labour Government did so following their election in 1997.
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example of how this manifests itself into routine police practice. In response, the Home
Office  initiated  a  series  of  studies  into  these  encounters  and  piloted  Macpherson's
recommendation  to  record  the  broader  range  of  police  stops  before  extending  it  out
nationally. Those studies highlighted the severely negative impact of police-initiated stops
on the public, highly discriminatory practices, their marginal role in actually detecting and
preventing crime, and substantial police resistance to reforming their practices (e.g. Miller
et al., 2000; Quinton et al., 2000; Shiner 2010). Although Macpherson only exposed what
was widely suspected at the time, the heightened public scrutiny and government attention
made it harder for police officers to continue with the practices that had dominated since at
least the 1980s and most likely produced the reductions described above. 
Yet beneath the headlines, search rates of ethnic minorities had actually increased. Data at
the time shows that  whereas  black people were searched at  over 3.5 times the rate  of
whites  in  1998/99 and dropped to  three  times  in  1999/2000,  after  the  initial  shock of
Macpherson's findings, it  actually rose to four times that rate in 2000/01 (see Delsol &
Shiner, 2015:51). Asians were searched at just over the same rate as whites and this rose
marginally with more noticeable increases in subsequent years. This suggests that changes
to practice following Macpherson were largely presentational and, as Delsol & Shiner (also
Shiner, 2010) argue, this shows how successful police officers had been in averting more
fundamental reform.
Conversely,  both exceptional  powers  appear  to  have been unaffected  by this  enhanced
public scrutiny. Section 60 use rose to 6,840 in 1999/2000 and 11,330 in 2000/01 (Home
Office, 2001b; 4,000 of searches in 2000/01 was due to a West Midlands police operation).
Counter-terrorism  searches  under  the  newly  introduced  Terrorism  Act  2000  had  also
106
increased sixfold over this period from 1,900 in 1999/2000 to 6,400 in the following year
although it is unclear why it increased so much following the dissipation of British-Irish
hostilities. What is certain, however, is that despite reductions in serious and other crimes
at the time (Reiner, 2010), exceptional powers had nonetheless become a routine feature of
British policing.
In sum, this third period of crisis surrounding stop and search had produced significant
reductions in their volumes and a more focussed use at the start of the new millennium.
This progress in reigning excessive use can be explained by the heightened public scrutiny
and government  action  in  relation  to  those powers  following  the  Macpherson's  (1999)
inquiry. However, progress during these two years masked underlying police resistance to
more fundamental reform (Shiner, 2010) as they continued to target ethnic minorities and
more frequently invoked their exceptional powers neither subject to public scrutiny at the
time nor hamstrung by the usual  procedural  controls.  Further,  the reductions  in  search
volumes were concentrated in the Metropolitan Police, which accounted for only one-fifth
of all searches (Home Office, 2000, 2001b), thus demonstrating a lack of progress outside
of London despite Macpherson arguing that stop and search was a universal grievance
among ethnic minorities nationwide. Even progress with London proved short-lived as the
Labour  government  began  to  backtrack  on  its  commitment  to  improve  the  policing
experiences of ethnic minorities and even started to weaken regulatory controls.
4.3.4. Crime control: 2001/02 to 2008/09
Two years was all it took to reverse the progress made since Macpherson’s report. Whilst
better  recording procedures had contributed to some of the rise in the recorded figures
(Sanders et al., 2010; Delsol & Shiner, 2015), it still cannot account for the sheer increase
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of recorded use. Therefore, as this section argues, the significant expansion in stop and
search use and disproportionality between 2001/02 and 2008/09 is better  viewed as an
outcome of the Labour government's ruthless pursuit of crime control policies, particularly
with the emergence of new terrorist  threats,  and the impact  of its  performance regime
discussed in  chapter 3.
The year 2002/03 in particular marked a turning point in police governance. As chapter 3
argued,  the  Police  Reform  Act  2002  gave  the  Home  Secretary  substantial  powers  to
establish a National Policing Plan; set targets to measure police performance in meeting
those  objectives;  enforce  remedial  action  against  constabularies  and  police  authorities
failing to meet those targets; and even dismiss chief constables in the 'public interest'. Stop
and searches formed part of this performance framework and the Home Office (2005) gave
official  credence  to  a  myth  that  those  powers  were  an  effective  crime  fighting  tool,
contrary to its own research (e.g. Willis, 1983; Miller et al., 2000). With these pressures,
total recorded searches rose sharply by 26% that year and continued throughout Labour’s
term in office. Within six years, total recorded searches exceeded 1.5 million in 2008/09,
an increase of 56% since 2001/02, with PACE searches comprising the bulk of these (table
4.1, figure 4.1). As empirical research suggests, such were the pressures that police officers
felt to meet central dictates that many admitted to conducting legally dubious searches to
meet national targets (Loveday, 2006; Cockcroft, & Beattie, 2009), thus showing just how
weak regulations operate in practice. 
This permissive culture for stop and search use resulted in a number of patterns emerging
from 2002/03. For the first time, drugs searches accounted for the largest portion of PACE
searches (Home Office, 2003) and continued to do so, most likely due to the ease with
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which  ‘smell  of  cannabis’  could  ostensibly  justify  a  search.  Second,  as  in  the  pre-
Macpherson era, arrest rates continued to fall alongside increases in search volumes from
roughly 13% in 2001/02 and 2002/03 to an unprecedented low of under 10% in 2008/09
(Home  Office  2004,  MoJ  2010). Third,  racial  disproportionality  also  rose  during  this
period: whereas people from black and Asian backgrounds were searched at five and under
twice the rate of whites in 2002/03, respectively, it rose to over seven and twice that rate in
2008/09, respectively (ibid).
Further, whilst  PACE searches comprised the bulk of these volumes,  the proportion of
exceptional  powers  rose as  they were more  routinely used  from 2002/03.  Historically,
exceptional powers comprised no more than 6% of all recorded searches at their initial
height in 1996 and 1996/97. This was largely due to the scale of counter-terrorism searches
but shrunk to no more than 3% thereafter. In 2002/03, they comprised 8% of total searches
and rose to a staggering 24% at their height in 2008/09. Section 60 rose by over 238%
from 44,398 in  2002/03 to  150,174 in  2008/09 with  the  most  significant  year-on-year
increases occurring during those two specific years (table 4.1). Whilst the 135% rise in
2002/03 was primarily due to increased use outside of London (Home Office, 2003), the
181% increase in 2008/09 took place at a time of significant hysteria concerning so-called
‘black-on-black’ knife-related crime in London. Although studies of hospital records show
that knife crime and homicides were already in decline (Crewdson et al., 2009; Melling et
al., 2012), the significant media hysteria necessitated government-led action to reassure the
public that it was capable of addressing the problem.35 As section 60 searches increased,
arrest  rates  under this  power fell  from almost  6% in 2002/03  to under 3% in 2008/09
although  the  proportion  of  arrests  for  carrying  weapons  or  dangerous  instruments  has
35 Interestingly,  a Home Office review of its anti-knife crime initiative found that homicides and knife-
related crimes had reduced in seventeen forces across the country for reasons unrelated to its programme
(see Ward et al., 2011).
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always been low (Home Office,  2010). Disproportionality has been significantly higher
under  section  60  compared  to  PACE thus  suggesting  that  the  looser  regulations  lend
themselves  to  such  disparities.  In  2008/09,  compared  to  whites,  black  people  were
searched at almost 12 times that rate; Asians or Chinese and others at almost five times;
and mixed people at just over twice that rate (MoJ, 2010). 
Figure 4.2 - Stop and search under section 44 by ethnic appearance (indexed to 2001/02)
Notes: Figures are indexed to 2001/02 and represent ethnic appearance of persons searched as judged by
the searching officer and so may not reflect people's self-defined ethnicity.
Source: Quinlan & Derfoufi (2015:134).
Counter-terrorism searches in particular had become so routinely used since 2002/03 that it
soon eclipsed section 60 as the second most used power from 2005/06 onwards following
the London terrorist  attacks  (“7/7”)  in  July 2005.  The most  substantial  increases  have
occurred following key incidents, such as in 2001/02 when it rose by 59% after the New
York terrorist attacks (“9/11”) and then again by 215% in the following year; it rose by a
further 35% after 7/7; and 196% in 2007/08 following a failed car bomb attack in central
London.
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Although  there  was  a  temporary  fall  in  2006/07  (table  4.1),  most  likely  due  to  the
significant community backlash following claims of discriminatory practice against people
from Asian and Muslim backgrounds (e.g. MPA, 2007), this was very much the exception.
As figure 4.2 shows, the expansion in use since 2001/02 had disproportionately affected
ethnic minorities, all of whom experienced the greatest searches rates, particularly after the
key incidents just described. Notably, people of South-East Asian appearances-  narrowly
equated to being Muslim- have generally been subject to the highest search rates since
2001/02 with the tactic agreement of central government. This came in a frank admission
in 2005 by the-then security minister Hazel Blears who publicly stated:
“Some  of  our  counter-terrorist  powers  will  be  disproportionately
experienced by people in the Muslim community. That is the reality of the
situation, we should acknowledge that reality and then try to have as open,
as honest and as transparent a debate with the community as we can. There
is no getting away from the fact that if you are trying to counter the threat,
because the threat at the moment is in a particular place, then your activity
is going to be targeted in that way.” (HASC, 2005:para167)
As this  quote  shows,  the  message  from the  Home Office,  to  whom police  were more
responsive to than police authorities or their local populace, was that searching Muslims
was  not  only  inevitable  but  necessary  to  prevent  terrorism.  It  also  revealed  how  the
government had encouraged greater use of counter-terrorism stops as a reassurance for the
wider public (see Home Office, 2005) and at the expense of the ethnic minorities most
affected by these coercive powers. Black people had also experienced great increases in
searches, particularly in 2007/08 and 2008/09 when they eclipsed Asians in being searched
at the highest rates (figure 4.2). Other studies reinforce this  finding (Hallsworth, 2011;
Parma,  2011)  and  argue  that  the  lack  of  suspicion  required  to  use  the  powers  was
deliberately exploited by police officers for non-terrorism related purposes,  namely for
social  control  that  tends  to  particularly affect  young black  men.  Arguably,  the general
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disproportionate targeting of black people had become replicated under counter-terrorism
policing even if those powers were primarily targeted towards Asians and Muslims. 
Examinations and detentions at ports and airports also rose during this period. Schedule 7
data has only been routinely published since 2009/10 but some limited statistics predate
this and show that encounters at ports had doubled in just four years from 1,190 in 2004 to
2,473  in  2008  (table  4.2).  No  data  on  the  ethnic  composition  of  people  examined  or
detained during this period exists but the only figures to have ever been published on the
outcomes of schedule 7 have been produced for this period. Between January 2004 and
September 2009, 99 arrests arose from a schedule 7 encounter resulting in 43 convictions,
figures a later Home Office (2012d:3) review of the power admitted was “not large”. The
number of people actually convicted is likely to be far lower because this figure counts
every charge that person is convicted of rather than the number of people successfully
prosecuted.  Similar to other powers discussed, this suggests that the over-reliance upon
regulatory  controls  instead  of  also  greater  democratic  accountability  has  resulted  in
examinations  and  detentions  at  ports  being  used  at  higher  volumes  and  in  seemingly
ineffective ways.
Table 4.2 - Examinations under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 lasting over an hour, 2001 to 
2008
Year Examinations
2001-2004 2,868
2004 1,190
2005 1,430
2006 1,620
2007 1,918
2008 2,473
Note: Figures cover the calendar period for each reported year.
Source: ACPO, Freedom of Information Request.
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4.4. Conclusion
Having  analysed  data  on  police-initiated  stops  and  the  related  literature,  the  central
findings from this chapter is that the reliance upon regulation as the primary means of
police accountability  has provided little  to no controls  against  excessive practice.  This
appears  to  be  consistent  across  all  powers  regardless  of  their  intended  purpose(s).
Therefore, this chapter supports Sanders et al.'s (2000) assertion that regulation is largely
'presentational' and has had an 'enabling' rather than 'inhibitory' effect. It also reinforces
Klockar's  (1988)  claim  that  the  law,  police  professionalism,  internal  discipline  and
community policing are nothing more than circumlocutions to disguise the undemocratic
nature of modern police practices. Arguably, this is an inevitable outcome of a system that
has  relied  upon  the  police  to  regulate  their  own  extraordinarily  broad,  discretionary
practices and exacerbated by successive government who have produced an environment
conducive towards malpractice.
The data analysis in this chapter also supports recent claims that stop and search use is
intertwined with the wider socio-political environment that police powers operate within
(Delsol & Shiner, 2015; Murray & Harkin, 2016). This chapter suggests that this argument
can be extended to all other police-initiated stops. Reductions to stop and search in each of
the four periods analysed above arose from government action following significant crises,
particularly following major breakdowns in relations with ethnic minorities communities.
For  ethnic  minorities,  police  stops  have  served as  a  daily  reminder  of  their  collective
subordination despite their immense internal socio-economic and cultural diversity. Having
been forced to take action, both Conservative and Labour governments have opted for the
short-term  strengthening  of  the  regulatory  framework  rather  than  introducing  more
fundamental,  structural  reform that  gives  the  public  and  their  police  authorities  more
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powers to shape local police practice. Inevitably, this democratic deficit has meant that any
progress in addressing public concerns was always going to be temporary as both political
parties have vied to appear 'tough on crime' and paid lip-service to the concerns of ethnic
minority  groups whilst  simultaneously precluding them and their  local  policing  bodies
from any meaningful influence over police practice.
On the ground, the increased volume of searches has resulted in large numbers of people
coming into adversarial contact with the police and this has fallen disproportionately upon
ethnic  minorities.  This  is  despite  research  consistently  showing  that  these  powers  are
ineffective  and  undermine  the  positive  relations  necessary  to  combat  crime  more
effectively. The significance of this is highlighted by a great deal of research reinforcing
Skogan's  (2006)  theory  of  an  'asymmetric  relationship'  in  police  encounters.  Skogan
suggests that negative encounters with the police have a disproportionately adverse effect
upon people's confidence in and perceived legitimacy of the police compared to the largely
negligible impact of positive experiences. Research shows that this holds true for all types
of powers and encounters. Controlling for a range of factors, these primarily survey-based
studies have consistently found a statistically significant  relationship with people being
searched and a negative view of the police, especially among ethnic minority respondents
(e.g.  Bradford  et  al.,  2009;  Singer  et  al.,  2013;  HMIC,  2013;  Tyler  et  al.  2010).
Unfortunately,  the quantitative  nature of these studies  cannot  explain  why police stops
produce this effect but qualitative research has provided some answers to this question.
Qualitative research suggests that whilst people see some value in these powers, it is the
nature of the encounters that they are most concerned about i.e. police officers' lack of
respect;  dubious  justifications  for  the  stop;  and  perceived  racial  or  religious  profiling
(Miller et al., 2000; Hallsworth, 2006; Sharp & Atherton 2007; Norman, 2009; Choudhury
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& Fenwick, 2010; Parmar, 2011; Lewis et al., 2011; Blackwood et al., 2012; Wright et al.,
2013).  The  fact  that  these  findings  have  remained  constant  over  time  reinforces  the
inadequacies  of  regulatory controls  to  resolve local  concerns  and shows how little  has
actually  changed  at  the  structural  level  to  ensure  members  of  the  public  have  greater
powers to shape their own policing experiences.
As chapter 2 argued, equity,  responsiveness to the public,  and a greater distribution of
power are three core elements of what constitutes democratic policing. Chapter 3 applied
this to the institutional arrangements governing the police in England and Wales and this
chapter has shown that police-initiated stops are a primary example of how these structures
have produced undemocratic forms of policing and accountability. It is within this context
that  directly  elected  police  and crime  commissioners  were  introduced  and tasked with
reversing the local democratic deficit. The extent to which they have managed to do so,
particularly in light of operational independence and central government's historic control-
freakery, is an issue that this thesis investigates and is discussed in subsequent chapters.
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5. Methodology
This chapter evaluates  the methodology employed for this  study,  the many ethical  and
practical  challenges  encountered  during  fieldwork,  and their  potential  impact  upon the
findings.  Therefore,  it  provides  the necessary context  to interpret  the research findings
presented in subsequent chapters. Some of these challenges were typical to police research,
but others were unique to this study because no empirical research existed on police and
crime commissioners  (PCCs) to guide the current  study as it  is  one of the first  in the
country to investigate these new structures. The literature review (chapter 2 and 3) helped
to develop this  study's  research  questions and contributed  to  the decision to  employ a
multi-site,  mixed-methods  approach combining  quantitative  analysis  of  police  recorded
data  and  population  demographics;  semi-structured  interviews;  field  observations  and
documentary analysis.
This chapter starts with a discussion of the applied nature of the research to contextualise
the methods adopted and discussed in this chapter. It then discusses what 'mixed-methods'
research entails, its challenges and why it was employed, followed by an evaluation of
each method adopted. It then outlines the case study research design used to encapsulate
the mixed-methods approach and discusses the criteria used to select the three local case
study areas, all of which are introduced in the final section.
5.1. ‘Action research’
This PhD arose from a collaborative studentship funded by the Economic Social Research
Council in partnership with the University of Warwick and StopWatch, an independent
charity which campaigns for fair and effective policing. StopWatch is “a coalition of legal
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experts, academics, citizens and civil liberties campaigners” who aim “to address excess
and  disproportionate  stop  and  search,  promote  best  practice  and  ensure  fair,  effective
policing for all.”36
The applied nature of the research meant  that,  at times,  the researcher was engaged in
'action  research'.  Action  research  is  an  interdisciplinary  approach  that  recognises  the
subjectivity and unequal power dynamics of knowledge production, seeks to safeguard the
welfare of research subjects, and also promotes social justice (Brydon-Miller et al., 2003;
McNiff & Whitehead, 2006). However, the degree of 'action' the researcher engaged in
varied by the nature of the specific task and was mediated by a core concern to obtain a
truer account of how police accountability operates locally by minimising the researcher's
impact upon the research setting. McNiff & Whitehead (2006) argue that action research is
best suited to understanding power-relations within research settings rather than the cause-
and-effect relationships that this thesis also sought to understand. Yet considerable benefits
arose from undertaking such an approach because, as Brydon-Miller et al. (2003) argue, it
produces  more  'valid'  results  by interpreting  developments  through the  perspectives  of
local  actors  rather  than the typically  distant  academic  approaches.  Further,  this  greater
proximity  to  national  and  local  actors  provided  unparalleled  access  to  the  constantly
evolving environment that they operate within and helped to understand how national or
local stimuli affect the power dynamics in police governance. These nuances would have
been misinterpreted or missed entirely by conventional academic approaches.
As  part  of  this  collaboration,  political  hustings  with  prospective  PCC candidates  were
organised on behalf  of StopWatch and community groups in the three local case study
36 See www.stop-watch.org
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areas. These were held during the PCC elections right at the start of PhD and again at the
end.  These  events  were  chaired  by  the  local  groups  affiliated  to  StopWatch  and  the
researcher deliberately refrained from engaging in public discussions on the night. This
ensured that  the researcher  did not  distort  these proceedings  which formed part  of  the
fieldwork and fell purposefully short of what qualifies as action research. Outside of these
observations and throughout the research period, partner groups received constant support
in monitoring the implementation of PCCs' election pledges, interpreting Home Office data
regularly published on police-initiated stops, and receiving advice on wider developments
such as the police complaints system. Importantly, it was for these local groups to decide
what their policing priorities were and how they wished to be supported. Police-stops was
consistently raised as the most important issue affecting ethnic minorities, alongside hate
crime. 
Additionally,  the  author  also  contributed  to  the  highly  critical  HMIC  (2013,  2015a)
inspection  reports  that  produced  the  cross-political  party  consensus  discussed  in  the
findings. This had a significant impact upon the governance and use of stop and searches
but  would  have  occurred  without  the  researcher's  contribution.  This  is  because  the
inspection had been commissioned by the Home Secretary and the team responsible for the
report were already critical of its use; the author's role was to advise the inspection team on
interpreting the data and to develop recommendations. Also, the author was an adviser to
the College of Policing which developed standards to guide police forces for their use and
monitoring  of  these  powers.  This  gave  the  author  a  deep  insight  into  how  police
accountability is negotiated which would have otherwise been missed, and the researcher's
potential impact on the data analysed for this thesis is noted in the relevant parts of the
findings.
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5.2. Mixing methods for a changing environment
Reiner (2000, 2010) argues that policing is inherently political,  and the subject of this
thesis was a prime example of how politicised police practice could become. Soon after
fieldwork had started in 2013/14, the second year of this thesis, police-initiated stops came
under  significant  national  government  attention  and  resulted  in  substantial  changes  to
legislation and police practice. The sheer scale of activity meant that it was progressively
hard to keep pace with all of the national and local developments and assess how both of
these affect local police accountability. It also resulted in difficulties maintaining complete
consistency throughout data collection because its parameters had to be constantly revised
to capture this changing socio-political environment; data already gathered was revisited
for what it may reveal about these new developments.
A mixed-methods approach suited this study because it enabled multiple lines of inquiry to
be investigated simultaneously (Bryman, 2007; Morgan, 1998) to reveal common patterns
or outliers (Jick, 1979), and across multiple sites (Lamont & Swidler, 2014). Qualitative
and quantitative research methods were integrated at every stage but, surprisingly,  very
little guidance exists on how to fuse them together in light of the fundamentally different
assumptions each paradigm holds on the nature of knowledge (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie,
2004;  Morgan,  2007).  Unfortunately,  exemplars  from criminology  were  virtually  non-
existent (c.f. Miller et al., 2000) because most of the relevant literature were commentaries
on the PCC structures, exclusively relied upon qualitative interviews or observations, or
only analysed  survey data.  Bryman's  (2007:8)  suggestion  that  methods  should  only be
mixed  where  they  can  produce  “mutually  illuminating”  results  was  a  useful  guiding
philosophy but the current study was essentially experimental. 
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Quantitative analysis of population demographics and police recorded stops was a good
starting point to identify overall  trends in stop and search use and potential  case study
areas.  However,  it  lacked  power  to  explain  their  underlying  causes  or  how  well  the
arrangements for police accountability were working locally. To complement this, semi-
structured interviews were conducted  with key stakeholders  as  it  provided the greatest
depth for understanding these issues from the perspectives of those directly involved in
those arrangements (Barbour, 2007; Bryman, 2008). Field observations of public events
were  useful  for  exploring  how  senior  police  officers,  PCCs  and  communities  made
themselves accountable to the public and thus better understand the dynamic social world
often  presented  as  static  in  interviews  (Lamont  &  Swidler,  2014).  Each  method  is
discussed below.
5.2.1. Stop and search rates and racial disproportionality ratios
Racial disproportionality ratios were used to compare how stop and searches were used
against each major ethnic group in England and Wales, and analyse changes over time.
Disproportionality ratios help to identify whether any disparities exist in ethnic minority
experiences of the police but there is disagreement concerning whether any differences are
caused by police prejudice (Bowling & Phillips,  2002;  Delsol  & Shiner,  2006),  reflect
differential  patterns  of offending (Webster,  2007),  or is  the product  of socio-economic
factors that make ethnic minorities more likely to reside in areas where the police tend to
operate (Waddington et al., 2004). 
As a quantitative indicator, it reveals nothing about the quality of the encounter (Delsol &
Shiner, 2006) for which interviews and observations are more appropriate, as discussed
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below. Also, the results are sensitive to the population criterion used: 'resident population'
or  'street  availability'  (Bowling  & Phillips,  2002;  Waddington  et  al.,  2004;  Delsol  &
Shiner, 2006). The resident population is the standard criteria adopted and is calculated by
dividing  the  number  of  searches  for  each  self-defined  ethnic  group  by  its  respective
population size according to decennial census data (i.e. white, black, Asian, mixed, and
Chinese  and  other).  However,  this  does  not  account  for  the  constantly  changing
demographic profile of those 'available' in public places to be searched throughout the day
and night  (Waddington et  al.,  2004).  Street  availability  does  but  involves  categorising
people into broader ethnic groups that may not actually reflect their self-defined identity
(e.g. Waddington et al., 2004). It also falsely treats as neutral police officers' decision to
patrol public areas more likely to be inhabited by people from lower socio-economic and
ethnic minority backgrounds while similar crimes could be occurring in more affluent and
less  diverse  areas.  Practically,  street  availability  was  impossible  to  adopt  because  it
requires  a  tremendously long process of  physically  observing and recording the ethnic
composition of those available to be searched at various times of the day and night for
every town and city comprising the case studies. This is because no dataset exists for street
availability as the census does for the resident population. Therefore, notwithstanding its
limits,  the  resident  population  was  used  to  calculate  racial  disparities  as  it  is  still
considered by leading academics to be an important indicator of group-level experiences of
police stops (Bowling & Phillips, 2002; Delsol & Shiner, 2006). It was also found to hold
meaning for the actors interviewed or observed during this thesis, not least because it was a
core means by which the police were held accountable in the case studies and nationally.
Data  was  obtained  from  Home  Office  statistical  publications  and  complemented  by
requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. To ensure comparison across police
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forces and years, all data was standardised according to the accepted norms of stop and
search analysis by aggregating the figures on recorded searches and census data into five
broad ethnic categories: white, black, Asian, mixed, and Chinese & other. Unfortunately,
this assumed homogeneity of experience within the sub-groups considered to form these
broader categories, particularly within the white population against whom all other groups
are  compared.  Although  this  lost  some  nuance,  standardisation  enabled  the  necessary
comparisons  to inform case study selection,  and also for monitoring national  and local
trends over time. This standardisation process also required removing the small number of
persons below the age of 10 who were searched despite the codes of practice permitting
this  practice  (Home  Office,  2014i;  APPGC,  2014).37 Experimental  data  for  this  thesis
revealed that it only marginally increased disproportionality rates by well under 0.5.
Finally, due to the lack of statutory requirement to record all police-initiated stops, only the
main stop and search powers were analysed. Even those recorded by statute suffered from
under-recording due to selective recording of encounters; the historic time-lag in digitising
physical records; the ineligibility of officers' handwriting affecting accuracy; and search-
slips going missing until electronic recording was introduced in 2015/16. This means that
the  data  presented  in  the  findings  is  likely to  have  under-estimated  the  true  extent  of
searches and is therefore only indicative of group-level experiences. Microsoft Office and
OpenOffice  spreadsheet  software  were  used  to  explore  and  analyse  population
demographics, search rates and disproportionality ratios. Both packages provided all of the
necessary functions and, unlike specialist statistical  software, allowed tables and results
from multiple datasets to be brought together for easier analysis, thus ensuring a “good
overview of recorded data all the time” (Niglas, 2007: 298).
37 Ten years of age is the legal age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales.
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5.2.2. Documentary analysis
Documents published by PCCs, police forces, community groups and national government
were analysed to assess how issues of ethnicity and power were portrayed and what they
revealed about police accountability. This included campaign literature, police and crime
plans,  codes of practices,  research reports and material  produced by local  civic  groups
claiming to represent the interests of ethnic minorities.
Documents are used to establish a social reality and so are not transparent representations
of  the  actors  that  produce  them  (Atkinson  &  Coffey,  2004;  Prior,  2003).  This  is
particularly important because PCCs are political  actors and have an interest in placing
themselves in the best light,  particularly those seeking re-election.  Chief constables are
also likely to engage in presentation management as PCCs have more intrusive powers
than their predecessors to bring attention to issues that may have otherwise escaped public
scrutiny.  Thus documentary analysis  may provide some insight into how actors seek to
negotiate their roles in relation to each other, particularly as the boundaries of ‘operational
independence’  is  likely to become contested  (Lister,  2013).  In  this  sense,  Prior  (2003)
rightly argues that the context within which these documents are situated should also be
analysed and their effects, not just what they say. Doing so also helped to test the broader
applicability of the research findings to PCCs as a whole.
5.2.3. Interviews
A  total  of  42  semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  local  and  national
stakeholders who could provide an insight into the research topic (see Appendix B). These
lasted between fifty and ninety minutes. Interviews enabled access to participants' sense-
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making (Goodwin & Horowitz, 2002; Bryman, 2008) and therefore provided the greatest
depth for understanding how police accountability operates from the point of view of those
engaged  directly  within  and  around  those  structures.  Interviews  were  audio-recorded,
transcribed and then analysed using Nvivo. However, caution was required in interpreting
interview data because some interviewees may have engaged in presentation management
in order to place themselves in the best light rather than answer questions more honestly
(Goffman, 1959; Riach, 2009). Helpfully, analysis of statistical data, documentary analysis
and  field  observations  provided  ways  of  verifying  some  claims  made,  such  as  how
proactive and transparent police officers were in consulting the public.
Participants were granted anonymity by default unless explicitly opting to be named. Four
people wished to remain anonymous (two senior officers, one chief officer, and one public
appointee from a national policing body). However, the unique positions occupied by most
interviewees meant that they could have been easily identified by a process of elimination.
Therefore, a blanket policy of anonymity was applied to all participants. Organisational
affiliations  and  job  titles  were  stripped  away  and  categorised  into  the  following  four
groups: 
 ChiefOfficer: all interviewees of at least of the rank of assistant chief constable.
 Commissioner: elected PCCs and their appointed deputies.
 National: public appointees or staff (included warranted police officers) employed
by  the  following  national  policing  bodies:  Her  Majesty's  Inspectorate  of
Constabulary,  Independent  Police  Complaints  Commission,  College  of  Policing,
and the Equality and Human Rights Commission.
 Public: a category consisting of members of the public interviewed who were part
of local police-community scrutiny groups or community-led groups claiming to
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represent the interests of ethnic minorities, and elected councillors on the police
and crime panels. This final category of interviewees are attributed to their police
force area as doing so helps to reveal important differences and similarities in the
case study areas without revealing their identities.
This  blanket  anonymity  also  meant  that  the  findings  chapters  had  to  be  arranged
thematically rather than by a case-by-case basis.  Whilst  losing some ability to contrast
findings between each force, it meant that the full range of transcripts could be used to
evidence  the most  significant  findings,  particularly in  relation  to  how PCCs sought  to
negotiate their role with their chief constables (chapter 9).
Some  difficulty  was  experienced  in  negotiating  access  into  police  forces  to  conduct
interviews,  as  is  typical  of  police  research  more  generally  (Reiner,  2000).  Interview
requests were sent to key national and local stakeholders and while most were willing to
participate, accessing operational officers or chief officers was more difficult. For example,
Leicestershire police required prior authorisation from an internal research committee in
order  to  conduct  any interview  or  observation  even  with  the  PCC's  office  despite  the
latter's supposed independence of the police and duty to hold it to account. Three months
after the request was made, the committee rejected the application. Leicestershire was an
ideal contrast to Nottinghamshire and the West Midlands due to its historic policing issues
and recent changes to stop and search governance following legal action for potentially
discriminatory practice (see EHRC, 2010; 2013). This resulted in a significant amount of
time and work lost and the list of reserve cases re-examined for the second most suitable
alternative: Suffolk.
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The applied nature of the PhD meant that the researcher came into contact with a wide
variety of key national actors, all of whom were approached for interviews in addition to
local actors encountered during field observations. This familiarity appeared to engender
trust to facilitate frank discussions but occasionally required careful management to ensure
answers best reflected participants' views rather than any attempt to appease  StopWatch,
the  collaborative  partner,  whose  reputation  for  intensive  scrutiny  of  police  practice
preceded  it.  However,  this  only  appeared  to  be  a  problem with  some  senior  officers
interviewed rather than all participants, for example: 
“I get some of the arguments for it [re-recording stop and accounts] but our
force has made a decision that we’re not going to do it. I think for me- I
know you’ve got a different argument ((laughs))”
WestMids/Police/01 
WestMids/Police/01 was clearly conscious of the researcher's connection with StopWatch
which influenced his/her response and some other officers interviewed. To promote open
exchanges, interviewees were reminded that their participation would remain anonymous,
that the researcher retained full control over the direction and context of the thesis, and that
its semi-structured nature gave them the ideal opportunity to present alternative views or
challenge the nature of questioning, although no-one actually did this save for two chief
officers and a PCC. Interviews with chief officers was the most difficult to manage owing
to their  tendencies  to  deflect  questions  or  exaggerate  confidentiality  concerns  to  avoid
divulging  information,  particularly  in  relation  to  counter-terrorism  policing.  The
aforementioned  chief  officers  and  PCC  became  frustrated  after  being  presented  with
evidence gathered from other methods that contradicted their rather optimistic assessment
of how effective local arrangements were in facilitating public scrutiny.  One chief took
particular exception by complaining:
“I mean, it’s a different subject- I’m not sure where we’re going today. If
you want to talk about where we are with stop and search I’ll bring some
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people in who can talk you through in some more detail in relation to it.
[However] If you’re happy to talk about how we engage with the police
and crime commissioners and chief constable?”
ChiefOfficer/02
ChiefOfficer/02's  reaction  was  the  most  extreme  of  all  chief  and  senior  officers  who
become  frustrated  with  being  asked  questions  that  revealed  weaknesses  in  the  local
accountability structures that they were keen to present as effective. Stop and search was
controversial because chief officers appeared to be used to research interviews on more
general issues that they could speculate about their relationship with their PCCs rather than
specific areas of contention, as another more friendly chief officer indicated during their
interview. Fortunately, questions predicted to spark the most discomfort were left towards
the  end  of  interviews  and  interviewees  were  also  informed  that  any challenges  to  the
questions were welcomed as it would ensure that the research better reflects their social
reality.  However,  they  appeared  to  be  more  concerned  about  the  weaknesses  that  the
questions exposed in police accountability rather than the validity of the research focus,
particularly since every interviewee had themselves identified stop and search as one of the
most pressing local issues before they were asked a single question on it (see Appendix C).
Surprisingly, the most uncomfortable experiences for the researcher arose from interviews
with councillors and members of the public or 'community leaders' involved in scrutinising
the police.  Some interviews took an unexpected  turn when local  politicians  or citizens
launched politically motivated attacks against rival individuals or community groups, often
trying to solicit a response. In these cases, grievances were allowed to be aired where it
related to the research topic and any expectations to join in 'bashing' rivals was met with an
awkward, deafening silence used to move the conversation on. These moments were very
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revealing  of  how the  lacking  unity  amongst  local  leaders  and  community  groups  was
undermining more effective police accountability, as discussed in subsequent chapters.
A  core  line  of  questioning  related  to  the  relationship  between  race/ethnicity  and
experiences of the police but, unexpectedly, the researcher's own ethnicity became a topic
of  interest  and  this  may  have  influenced  some  participants.  Interviewees  from  ethnic
minority backgrounds were pleased to  see another  person from a minority background
research this topic and this appeared to have an endearing effect because they assumed a
sense of shared experience. This usually became apparent towards the end of the interview
or as part of a rich discussion immediately after audio-recording had stopped. Certainly,
these respondents appeared very supportive and forthcoming in their views. This openness
was interpreted as a positive sign that enough rapport had been built to facilitate frank
discussions about deeply personal issues. Whilst this bias was unavoidable, care was taken
to avoid directly  influencing participants'  answers by suspending discussions  about  the
researcher's ethnicity until the end of the interview. Non-ethnic minority interviewees were
to varying degrees also sensitive to this because some of their answers seemed constructed
to demonstrate awareness of a variety of ethnic groups beyond the usual discussion of
black people's policing experiences. Often, it appeared to be a genuine attempt to avoid
excluding the researcher’s presumed heritage from the topic. A typical way this manifested
itself  was  for  interviewees  to  speak  predominantly  about  black  people  (or  Asians  in
relation to counter-terrorism powers)- perhaps a reflection of how police-recorded data is
interpreted-  only to  then quickly throw in other  groups that  the researcher  might  have
belonged to but as an after-thought. This made it difficult to judge the extent to which the
policing experiences of these other minority groups feature so highly in routine decision-
making.
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Finally, the changing government rhetoric would have also influenced officers and PCCs
interviewed.  For  example,  one senior  officer  who extended an  invitation  to  meet  with
StopWatch right at the start of the PhD berated a certain study that had been extremely
critical of their force's use of stop and search. However, during an interview a year later,
s/he presented an entirely different view having apparently forgotten about this meeting.
Ultimately, it was hard to assess whether their later views 'toed-the-party-line' or was the
respondents' genuinely held belief, but interviewing a wide range of actors and undertaking
field observations and documentary analysis provided some means of verifying whether
what interviewees said reflected actual practice.
5.2.4. Observations
Observations of a range of events organised by PCCs, the police, and community groups
were carried out (see Appendix D). Observations were useful for obtaining an insight into
the everyday behaviour and culture of those studied ( Herbert, 2000; Bryman, 2008). Also
a means of triangulation (Herbert, 2000) by helping to verify claims made in interviews
and documents analysed. However, most police work is 'under-the-radar' (Reiner, 2000)
and  observations  were  restricted  to  public  events  and  how  counter-terrorism  officers
operate at airports.
Police-community  consultation  groups  or  events  organised  by community  groups were
extremely frustrating to observe because, as the findings chapters discuss, senior officers
were  highly  selective  in  reporting  issues  to  members  of  the  public,  had  successfully
‘massaged’  explanations  to  avoid  criticism,  and  even  misrepresented  national
developments that, unbeknownst to them, the researcher had participated in. Members of
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the public were typically unable to understand how to interpret statistical data to then probe
officers appropriately or lacked awareness of national developments to then scrutinise their
force's  progress  on  these  issues,  therefore,  producing  only  a  shallow  degree  of
accountability.  Examples  included  officers  over-exaggerating  the  limitations  of  ethnic
disproportionality ratios, narrowing the focus of discussion away from the broader range of
encounters  raised  at  meetings  to  those  they  felt  more  comfortable  discussing,  and
deliberately misleading scrutiny group members or the general public into thinking that
national  government  had prevented them from instituting  the reforms sought  by ethnic
minority groups, notably re-recording stop and accounts.  Despite  these frustrations,  the
temptation to intervene was abated by the desire to obtain the truest account of how police
accountability operates locally.  However, there were also occasions where officers were
self-critical about police practice but the affinity of scrutiny group members towards the
police prevented robust debate which would have been challenged elsewhere, such as the
low arrest rates or increased disproportionality.  Again, to observe a typical meeting, no
interventions were made here either.
5.3. Case study research and an introduction to the case study areas
A case study approach was adopted as it  enabled the encapsulation  of  mixed-methods
research  (Yin,  1994;  Hammersley  &  Gomm,  2000).  A  case  study  is  “the  intensive
(qualitative or quantitative) analysis of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases),
where the researcher's goal is to understand a larger class of similar units (a population of
cases)” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008:296). A case study approach was also useful for its
'expansionist'  and  'exploratory'  approach  which  suited  this  project's  aim of  developing
theories on a new area of social inquiry and one where the researcher could not exercise
control over the events studied (Stake, 2000; Yin, 2009).
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The  biggest  dilemma  faced  in  this  approach  was  balancing  the  number  of  cases
investigated  against  the  depth  of  study,  particularly  since  organisations  rather  than
individuals  were  being  studied  (Yin,  1994;  Hammersley  &  Gomm,  2000).  Most
researchers investigate very few cases- often just one but in great depth (Hammersley &
Gomm,  2000)-  and  these  are  usually  chosen  from a  wider  sample  pool  because  they
represent it best (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000) or the least (Seawright & Gerring, 2008;
Stake,  2000).  However,  this  PhD selected the three police force areas  that  deliberately
maximised differences. This was to test rival hypotheses and understand how the broad
range  of  national  and  local  stimuli  could  impact  upon local  police  accountability  and
identify common themes. 
The following three police force areas were chosen and are introduced in this final section
of  the  chapter  5:  the  West  Midlands,  Nottinghamshire  and Suffolk.  These  cases  were
chosen because  they  varied  on  the  following key dimensions:  historic  policing  issues;
population demographics; the political affiliation of the PCC, the extent to which ethnic
minority  issues  were  a  priority  for  commissioners;  and  any  innovative  proposals  to
enhance  public  scrutiny  over  police  practice  either  promised  by candidates  during  the
election campaign or adopted by the elected person.
5.3.1. Nottinghamshire
Nottinghamshire is a mixed urban and rural force with eight policing units: one covering
the  City  of  Nottingham  and  the  remaining  seven  covering  each  of  its  rural  districts.
Historically, the City of Nottingham has suffered extreme deprivation and ethnic minorities
have endured negative policing experiences, particularly in the St Ann's district which was
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the location of the first ‘race’ riot in England and Wales in August 1958 (Rowe, 2004).
This was just days before the infamous ‘Notting Hill Riots’ in West London. Nottingham
also experienced rioting more recently during the 2011 national disturbances where police
stations  were  deliberately  targeted  with  firebombs,  unlike  other  cities  which  saw  a
combination  of  vandalism  and  opportunistic  looting  (Riots  Communities  and  Victims
Panel, 2011). Stop and search and stop and accounts were consistently raised by members
of the public as core grievances throughout early observations of PCC hustings where all
prospective candidates pledged to re-record these encounters. The successful candidate,
Labour’s Paddy Tipping, commissioned a community-led research project into minority
ethnic experiences of the police (see Wright et al., 2013) and set up a citizens-led group to
monitor  the  implementation  of  its  recommendations.  Nottinghamshire  PCC's  strong
emphasis on civic participation in police accountability made it stand out as a good case
study area.
Ethnic minorities comprised 11% of Nottinghamshire's residents in 2011 (see table 5.1)
and  71% of  these  lived  in  the  City  of  Nottingham  (ONS,  undated).  The  bulk  of  the
remaining minority population was concentrated primarily in the districts  of Broxtowe,
Gedling and Rushcliff.
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Table 5.1- Ethnic composition of Nottinghamshire
White Black Asian Mixed Other Total
Count 969,501 27,287 48,248 30,981 15,465 1,091,482
Percentage (%) 89 2 4 3 1 100
Growth since 2001 (N) 13,715 12,472 23,126 17,290 9,372 75,975
Growth since 2001 (%) 1 84 92 126 154 7
Sources: ONS, 2003; ONS (undated)
As table 5.1 shows, Nottinghamshire’s population in 2011 showed relatively little variance
in the size of each main ethnic minority group, an average of 3%. Also, absolute growth
across all ethnic groups was relatively low averaging at an increase of 15,195 since 2001 (a
standard deviation of 5,263). Whilst the white population grew by only 1% the combined
growth across minority groups was 104%, substantially higher than the other case study
areas and partly due to their smaller population size.
In  2012/13,  4  searches  were  recorded  across  Nottinghamshire  for  every  1,000  of  its
resident population which was far lower than the national average of 20 per capita (Home
Office, 2014b). Disparities in searches of minorities was in line with the national average
where black people were searched at 5 times the rate of whites, Asians and mixed people
searched at twice that rate, and people from Chinese or other backgrounds were slightly
under-represented in searches. Nottinghamshire conducted only 10 searches under section
60 that year: three whites, six blacks and one person from a mixed background. This was
too  few  to  make  any  disproportionality  calculations  meaningful.  This  was  a  major
reduction on the previous years where 218 searches were conducted in 2011/12 and 270 in
2010/11. Interestingly,  whereas search rates fell  across most  of the country during this
study, it rose in Nottingham in response to a highly critical inspection (HMIC, 2013).
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5.3.2. Suffolk
Suffolk is  a largely rural  force with a population of under 730,000 and Ipswich as its
administrative  capital  wherein  only  20%  of  the  population  reside  (table  5.2;  ONS,
undated). It has a diverse economy with its fertile agricultural and livestock industry, the
port of Felixstowe which handles over 40% of the country's container imports and exports,
and  its  thriving  tourism  industry  drawn  to  its  historical  towns  and  coasts.  A  large
proportion of residents are retirees, but a sizeable number are aged between 40-49. Ipswich
stood out as having the youngest age profile of Suffolk's counties with the largest cohorts
being 20-34 years  of  age;  it  also contained 42% of  the constabulary's  ethnic  minority
residents. Suffolk contained the lowest number of ethnic minorities of all case study areas,
with the single largest group being mixed (table 5.2).
Table 5.2- Ethnic composition of Suffolk
White Black Asian Mixed Other Total
Count 693,195 6,854 10,972 12,472 4,670 728,163
Percentage (%) 95 1 2 2 1 100
Growth since 2001 (N) 43,092 2,551 7,051 5,423 1,539 59,656
Growth since 2001 (%) 7 59 180 77 208 9
Sources: ONS, 2003; ONS (undated)
Suffolk is one of the lowest users of recorded stop and search use but has had high rates of
ethnic  disproportionality.  In  2012/13,  6  searches  were  recorded  for  every  1,000 of  its
resident population, well below the national average but, as with Nottinghamshire, figures
rose in the immediate years following the HMIC (2013) inspection and contrary to the
national  trajectory.  That  year,  black people were searched at  4 times the rate  of white
people  and those  from mixed  backgrounds  were  searched at  almost  3  times  that  rate.
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Asians were searched at marginally higher rates than whites but, curiously, in 2013/14 they
replaced black people in experiencing the highest search rate of all groups standing at four
times that of whites whilst searches of blacks fell to double the rate of whites. 
Despite the comparatively low number of searches, most of these were targeted towards
drugs use and the police force had a number of on-going anti-drugs operations, supported
by  its  outspoken  Conservative  PCC  Tim  Passmore,  which  was  driving  racial
disproportionality  (Suffolk  PCC,  2014a).  Suffolk  police  was  the  only  case  study  to
maintain stop and account recording whereas others had disbanded it in 2011 (Bridges et
al.  2011). Since 2008, Suffolk has had a well-established and proactive community-led
scrutiny group of police  search records which is  nationally recognised as best  practice
(HMIC, 2013). For these reasons, Suffolk was an ideal contrast to Nottinghamshire and the
West Midlands.
5.3.3. West Midlands
The West Midlands was the final case study area and, with a population of over 2.7 million
people, is one of the most populated constabularies in the country (table 5.3). It covers an
expansive area consisting of seven metropolitan districts and former industrial heartlands,
notably Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton. Each of these cities has experienced
major  public  disturbances  and anti-police sentiment,  much of  which  has  related  to  the
policing  experiences  of  ethnic minorities  (Keith,  1993).  Birmingham is  split  into three
separate command units and the remaining six districts have a dedicated command unit.
West Midlands Police was one of five forces subject to the EHRC's (2010, 2013) threat of
legal action for what was considered to be potentially discriminatory stop and search use
and  the  force  was  judged  to  have  been  the  least  cooperative  with  its  programme.
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Candidates in the PCC 2013 elections pledged to reintroduce stop and account recording38
and  Labour’s  first  elected  commissioner,  the  late  Bob  Jones,  instituted  greater
opportunities for the public to participate in scrutinising police-stops. These were led by
his appointed deputy, Yvonne Mosquito, and were all analysed for this study.  Following
Jones'  death  in  July  2014,  his  Labour  colleague,  David  Jamieson,  was  elected  and
continued with these initiatives, again led by the deputy.
Table 5.4- Ethnic composition of the West Midlands
White Black Asian Mixed Other Total
Count 1,919,138 164,069 493,551 96,204 63,498 2,736,460
Percentage (%) 70 6 18 4 2 100
Growth since 2001 (N) -124,093 68,836 151,813 41,449 42,868 180,873
Growth since 2001 (%) -6 72 44 76 208 7
Sources: ONS, 2003; ONS (undated)
Of  the  three  local  case  studies,  the  West  Midlands  hosts  the  largest  ethnic  minority
population with 30% self-identifying as such in 2011 (table 5.4). It also has the greatest
variation in population growth and was the only case study where the white population had
actually  decreased since 2001. Whites  reduced by 6% whereas  Asians experienced the
largest  growth  comprising  18% of  the  population  in  2011,  55% of  whom resided  in
Birmingham (ONS, undated). Further, it was also the only case study where the minority
population  was  more  dispersed  across  the  region  rather  than  concentrated  in  certain
locations, although 55% of the West Midlands' minorities also resided in Birmingham. The
single largest minority group self-classified as Pakistani and Indians, 7% each. Pakistanis
were  concentrated  predominantly  in  Birmingham  where  72% resided  but  Walsall  and
Sandwell both contained sizeable populations at 7% each. Only 35% of Indians lived in
38 Observation 2012/10/18.
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Birmingham and they were the most dispersed of all ethnic minority groups. Fifty-nine
percent of the West Midlands' black population resided in Birmingham, over half of whom
were black Caribbean and sizeable numbers resided in Sandwall and Wolverhampton at
14%  and  12%,  respectively.  Therefore,  people  from  Pakistani  and  black  Caribbean
backgrounds  were  the  least  dispersed  of  all  ethnic  groups  and  were  concentrated  in
Birmingham.
Across the West Midlands in 2012/13, black people were searched at three times the rate of
whites, and Asians and mixed people were searched at twice the rate of whites. Chinese
and other people were slightly under-represented in searches. At the time, West Midlands
police had dramatically reduced its section 60 suspicion-less searches by 90% from 699 in
2011/12 to 70 in 2012/13 against the backdrop of the EHRC’s (2010, 2013) threat of legal
action and earlier criticisms of malpractice from the IPCC (2007). As a major urban police
force  with  significant  policing  issues,  it  was  a  good contrast  to  both  Nottingham and
Suffolk. Subsequent chapters now discuss the findings from these case study areas before
concluding on the impact of PCCs on local police accountability and future prospects.
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6. The Politics of Stop and Search Reform: Before the Commissioners
As this chapter illustrates, recorded stop and search use fell precipitously throughout the
period investigated by this thesis (i.e. 2009/10 to 2014/15) and these sustained reductions
represented a significant break from its historical trajectory (chapter 4). This new trend was
underlined  by  a  significant  politicisation  of  police-initiated  stops  that  preceded  the
introduction of police and crime commissioners (PCCs), although the greatest reductions
occurred throughout their first term in office. This chapter analyses the reductions since
2009/10 and then restricts itself to discussing the developments in police accountability
that produced these changes during the initial period 2009/10 to 2012/13 (data for 2008/09
is included for comparison as it  marked the zenith of stop and search use).  Chapter 7
analyses developments throughout PCCs' first term in office (i.e. 2012/13 to 2014/15) so as
to consider separately their potential influences on operational practice. As with the next
chapter, this one raises a number of questions about the distribution of power within the
arrangements for police accountability and the extent to which it affords local policing
bodies and ethnic minority communities meaningful opportunities to ensure a more locally
responsive service. Both chapters are important to understand the wider, national context
within  which  PCCs  operate  and  complements  chapters  8-9  which  assess  whether
commissioners have filled the democratic deficit in local police accountability.
This chapter begins by first describing the nationwide fall in recorded street searches and
port stops, highlighting the most significant developments to be analysed throughout the
findings. The latter and greater part of this chapter provides a detailed discussion of the
factors underlying those trends in the period leading up to PCCs' introduction, relying upon
data from interviews, observations and documentary analysis to illuminate those findings.
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6.1. Overall use of stop and search from 2009/10 to 2014/15
Figure 6.1 – Stop and search use, 2008/09 to 2014/15
Notes: (1) Figures exclude searches by the British Transport Police. 
(2) Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A).
Sources: Home Office (2015c).
Table 6.1 – Stop and search use and percentage changes, 2008/09 to 2014/15
Year Section 1 Section 60
Section
44/47A Total
Change to
previous year(%)
2008/09 1,159,374 150,174 210,013 1,519,561 23
2009/10 1,177,327 119,973 91,567 1,388,867 -9
2010/11 1,229,324 62,429 10,994 1,302,747 -6
2011/12 1,142,909 46,973 - 1,189,882 -9
2012/13 1,012,196 5,346 - 1,017,542 -14
2013/14 900,129 3,960 - 904,089 -11
2014/15 539,788 1,082 - 540,870 -40
Notes: (1) Figures exclude searches by the British Transport Police. 
(2) Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A).
Sources: Home Office (2015c).
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6.1.1. Street searches
Stop and searches began to decline in 2009/10 (figure 6.1), initially primarily driven by the
curtailing of exceptional powers (table 6.1). Use of section 44 fell by 56% in 2009/10 to
just  over  90,000 recorded searches  from over  210,000 encounters  in  the previous year
2008/09 (table 6.1). It continued to fall in 2010/11 as it was repealed that year following a
European Court of Human Rights judgement ruling that it was too broad to protect against
arbitrary detention.39 Coinciding with this  judgement,  section 60 use fell  moderately in
2009/10 to under 120,000 searches but declined precipitously from 2010/11 following its
own legal challenge.40 From thereon, volumes declined from the tens of thousands in the
years 2010/11 and 2011/12 to just over 5,300 in 2012/13, or by 89% on the previous year. 
Section  1  and  other  powers  requiring  reasonable  suspicion  (“PACE  searches”)  saw
comparatively fewer reductions over this initial period and even increased in 2009/10. It
increased again in 2010/11 such that it more than compensated for the reductions in section
60 use that year, or for 78% of the reductions in section 44. This suggests that there may
have been a displacement effect as officers resorted to invoking suspicion-based powers
where  they  would  have  otherwise  used  an  exceptional  power.  This  supports  previous
research  suggesting  that  the  threshold  of  reasonable  suspicion  operates  as  a  weak
procedural  safeguard due to officers'  widely divergent  interpretations  of what  it  entails
(Quinton, 2011; HMIC 2013; also chapter 4). It was only later from 2012/13 that PACE
searches fell more substantially following the significant national government scrutiny of
those powers discussed throughout the findings. In 2012/13, there were just over a million
searches representing a fall of 11% (or 130,000 fewer searches) and use fell by another
11% in 2013/14 to under a million for the first time since 2007/09 (see table 4.1), and
39 In the case of Gillan & Quinton v United Kingdom (2010); as discussed in the second part of this chapter.
40 In the case of Roberts v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, also discussed in this chapter.
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finally by another 40% in 2014/15 to over half a million searches (over 360,000 fewer
searches). 
Overall, the total combined volume of recorded street searches fell by 64% from over 1.5
million encounters during the peak year of 2008/09 to 540,870 in 2014/15, or by 58% since
the  Conservative-Liberal  Democrat  Coalition  government  took  office  in  May  2010.
Whereas over 30 people were searched per 1,000 of the population under any street power
during their peak in 2008/09, this declined from 2009/10 onwards leading to 11 persons
searched per 1,000 of the population in 2014/15 (table 6.2(a)).41 As table 6.2(a) shows,
these overall  reductions  arose from the curtailing of exceptional  powers but suspicion-
based  powers  had  remained  largely  stable  at  around  24  searches  per  1,000  of  the
population until 2012/13, at which point their use fell dramatically to a rate of 11 persons
searched per 1,000 of the population in 2014/15.
Table 6.2 - Rates of searches per 1,000 of the population, 2008/09 to 2014/15
(a) England and Wales
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Section 1 23.4 23.8 24.9 23.1 20.5 18.2 10.9
Section 60 3.0 2.4 1.3 1 0.1 0.1 0.02
Section 44/47A 4.2 1.9 0.2 - - - -
Total 30.7 28.1 26.3 24.1 20.4 18.3 10.9
41 Searches per 1,000 of the population is a widely used method for estimating the scale of police-initiated
contact but caution is required in interpreting those figures. Police data does not disaggregate repeat stops
of an individual and census data both overestimates the population size before the census day in 2011 and
underestimates it thereafter. For a good discussion of this in relation to arrest rates see Delsol (2015:86).
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(b) England and Wales, excluding London
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Section 1 15.8 16.1 16.3 15.6 15.2 14.3 8.7
Section 60 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02
Section 44/47A 0.2 0.5 0.03 - - - -
Total 16.9 17.2 16.5 15.8 15.3 14.3 8.7
Notes: (1) Figures include searches by the British Transport Police.
(2) Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A).
Sources: Home Office (2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 2014b) and ONS (undated).
Since these are national figures, they mask the significant regional differences between
forces  in  how these  powers  are  used  even amongst  comparatively  similar  forces  (see:
Willis, 1981; EHRC, 2010; HMIC, 2013). London accounts for a considerable portion of
searches to the extent that any changes in use within the capital distorts national trends.
Between the years analysed, London accounted for between 42% and 32% of total PACE
searches and also 76% and 22% of section 60 use. Once excluded, the data reveals that
whilst searches elsewhere were lower, they are still high and have remained remarkably
stable  since  2008/09,  particularly  under  PACE  which  only  fell  more  substantively  in
2013/14 and again in 2014/15 following an intensification of government scrutiny (table
6.2b). A number of police officers interviewed argued that stop and search was essentially
a  'London  problem'.  Staff  from national  policing  bodies  criticised  this  perception,  for
example: 
“Because one of the problems you get around stop and search is that this
belief is that it’s a London issue because some of the forces are like ‘well if
the  Met  get  it  right,  you  know,  the  problem  goes  away’.  They  don’t
recognise that it’s a national or even global issue around how these are
used. So that conversation isn’t always well accepted elsewhere outside of
London.  It’s  mixed,  I  mean,  some  people  accept  it  and have  made  big
progress in terms of how they use it others less so. It depends how attentive
or how important it is to the chief officer group if I’m honest.”
National/06
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National/06's view suggests that this perception may explain why search rates nationwide
are still consistently high outside of London. As s/he highlights, the organisational values
instilled  by  chief  officers  can  shape  the  operational  practice  of  their  officers  and,  as
discussed throughout the findings, may account for the regional differences found between
comparatively similar forces. Until very recently, exceptional powers do, however, appear
to be a predominantly ‘London problem’ due to the significantly higher search rates when
data from the capital is incorporated into the national figures compared to their exclusion
(tables 6.(a) and 6.2(b), respectively). Section 44 is a case in point whereby the capital- and
large  swathes  of  British  Transport  Police’s  jurisdiction-  were  placed  under  a  blanket
authorisation since the power was first introduced, irrespective of the threat assessment at
the time (HM Government, 2011; Lennon, 2013).
Levels of ethnic disproportionality,  a key focus of academic research on police-initiated
stops (Bradford,  2015),  increased initially  but then declined during the research period
although  ethnic  minorities  were  still  searched  at  comparatively  higher  rates  to  whites
(figures 6.2(a)-(b)). Nationally, under section 1, people from black backgrounds have been
consistently  searched  at  approximately  4.5  to  6  times  the  rate  of  whites,  Asians  were
searched at 1.5 to just over twice the rate of whites, and those from mixed backgrounds at
twice  the  rate  of  whites.  Excluding  London,  where  an  estimated  34%  of  all  ethnic
minorities  reside  (ONS,  undated),  the  rates  of  disproportionality  under  section  1  were
much lower for all ethnic groups particularly blacks and Asians (table 6.2(b)). Outside of
the capital, black people were searched at approximately three times the rate of whites with
only marginal changes year-on-year. These differences were less pronounced for Asians
and people from mixed backgrounds who have been searched at around twice the rate of
whites since 2009/10.
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Figure 6.2 – Racial disproportionality of street searches, 2009/10 to 2014/15
(a) England and Wales
(b) England and Wales, excluding London
Notes: (1)  The  figures  for  whites  stand  at  1.0  and  is  excluded  from  the  graph  because  racial
disproportionality is calculated by dividing the search rate of all groups against that of whites.
(2) Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A).
Sources: Home Office (2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 2014b) and ONS (undated).
144
Disproportionality  under  the  exceptional  powers,  however,  was  far  greater  than  under
section 1 despite the recent reductions in overall use (figure 6.2(a)) and again search rates
were lower outside of London (figure 6.2(b)). However, as with section 1, the volume of
searches  fell  alongside  the  greater  scrutiny  of  those  powers  from  2012/13  onwards,
particularly in 2014/15 after the Home Office (2014f) introduced a best practice scheme
discussed in chapter 7. Nationally, black people were searched at significantly higher rates
under section 60 compared to any other group. After initially increasing from 23 times that
of whites in 2009/10 to 34 in 2010/11, it fell thereafter until it stood at 7 times that of
whites in 2014/15. Outside the capital, search rates for black people also rose from 6 times
the rate of whites in 2009/10 to 13 in 2010/11 and then 14 in 2011/12 before then declining
until it stood at 4 times the rate of whites in 2014/15. Nationally, the section 60 rates for
mixed  people  fluctuated  throughout  this  period  from  over  5  times  that  of  whites  in
2009/10, rising to 7 in the following two years and then falling to 3 in 2014/15. Outside of
the capital, search rates of mixed people were far lower, rising initially from 2.5 times that
of whites in 2008/09 to over 4.5 times in the following two years, before declining to less
than 3 in 2014/15. Nationally, Asians were searched under section 60 at over 5 times the
rate of whites in 2009/10 rising to nearly 9 in 2010/11 before falling to twice the rate of
whites in 2014/15. Excluding London, Asians were searched at roughly the same rate as
whites in 2009/10 but this rose alongside rises in searches of all other groups reaching 3
times the rate of whites in 2011/12 before falling to twice the rate of whites in 2014/15.
The  greater  racial  disparities  under  section  60  was  raised  by  some  interviewees,
particularly national police leaders and staff who gave the following explanations for it:
“Now I think officers are probably understanding of their powers at a basic
level  but  I  think  introducing  powers  where  there  were fewer  regulatory
mechanisms in place meant that it gave the impression that doing more was
okay and that it might have blurred the boundaries of where their threshold
of suspicion needed to sit, or they had other tools to use if section 1 wasn’t
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an appropriate power to use they could use section 44 powers- certainly in
London.”
National/02
“It used to be overused on football  [supporters]: there was a section 60
[authorisation] for every higher category football match and now there’s
much more governance around authorisations to whether them takes place
or not but, yeah, I’ll be honest and say I’m not a fan of section 60. I think
it’s a without grounds powers that we can do without.”
National/04
These quotes reinforce the arguments in chapter 4 that the weak regulations governing the
use  of  exceptional  powers  has  resulted  in  them  being  used  far  more  frequently  than
originally intended and for routine crime problems. Such use is likely to have led to the
racial disparities indicated by figures 6(a) and 6(b) by exacerbating rather than inhibiting
the kinds of police practices that disproportionately affect ethnic minorities.
6.1.2. Searches at ports
Examinations and detentions at ports under schedule 7 also fell during the research period
as illustrated by table 6.3, although these figures do not capture the “substantial number of
people  who are  asked only  'screening  questions'”  (Anderson,  2011:para9.9;  also  2012,
2013,  2014).  Schedule  7  is,  essentially,  a  national  power  due  to  it  being  exercised  in
accordance with the Home Office's national assessment of terrorism and security threats42
and is governed by a dedicated code of practice separate from all other stop and search
powers (Home Office, 2014e).
42 Observation 2014/06/02.
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Table 6.3 – Examinations and detentions under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, 2009/10 to
2014/15
Examinations
Total detentionsUnder the hour Over the hour Total
2009/10 82,870 2,687 85,557 486
2010/11 63,396 2,288 65,684 913
2011/12 61,662 2,240 63,902 680
2012/13 53,992 2,265 56,257 667
2013/14 42,231 1,887 44,118 517
2014/15 29,871 1,898 31,769 1311
Sources: Home Office (2015b); Anderson (2015)
Table 6.4 – Percentage of people examined and detained under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 
by ethnicity, 2009/10 to 2014/15
(a) Examinations
White Black Asian Mixed Other
2009/10 44 7 25 2 20
2010/11 41 9 30 3 17
2011/12 43 9 28 3 18
2012/13 42 10 25 4 19
2013/14 45 9 22 5 18
2014/15 36 9 27 7 22
(b) Detentions
White Black Asian Mixed Other
2009/10 8 9 44 3 35
2010/11 8 22 46 2 21
2011/12 9 25 38 4 25
2012/13 10 26 36 3 25
2013/14 12 19 37 8 24
2014/15 12 13 39 7 29
Notes: (1) Figures exclude examinations where the ethnicity was recorded as 'not stated'. 
(2)  Figures  are  based  upon self-defined  ethnicity  besides  2009/10  which  uses  officer-defined
ethnicity.
Sources: Home Office (2015b).
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Nonetheless, use of the powers fell in every year since records were first made public in
2009/10 and by 63% over this period (or 52% during the Coalition government) against the
backdrop  of  increased  scrutiny  of  this  power,  discussed  later.  This  decline  was  led
primarily  by  reductions  in  the  number  of  examinations  lasting  under  an  hour  which
continued  to  decline  throughout  the  research  period.  The  sudden  rise  in  detentions  in
2014/15 is likely to be due to legislative changes coming into effect which now requires
ports officers to detain a person should they wish to continue questioning and/or searching
them beyond the first hour.43
Despite the scaling back of schedule 7, ethnic minorities constituted the majority of those
detained and, therefore,  subjected  to its  more  intrusive  provisions.  Whilst  people from
white backgrounds have consistently been the single largest group to be  examined under
the powers, followed closely by Asians (table 6.4(a)), most of these would have lasted for
no longer than 15 minutes (Home Office, 2012c:14).. But Asians were far more likely to be
detained for  up  to  nine  hours  in  every  year,  followed by black  people  or  those  from
Chinese and other ethnic backgrounds (table 6.4(b)). According to Hurrell (2013), these
figures  represent  a  racial  bias  in  port  stops,  particularly  against  Pakistanis  and  Black
Africans, even when differences in the ethnic composition of the travelling population is
taken  into  account.  Anderson  (2014,  2015),  however,  disagrees  and  argues  that  those
figures  reflect  the  composition  of  convicted  terrorists.  However,  most  terrorism
convictions do not arise from a port stop and since data on arrests and convictions from
ports is not routinely published, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which port stops
reflect ethnic profiling or an intelligence-led approach. 
43 As amended by paragraph 2 of Schedule 9 to the  Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Police Act 2014,
given effect by section 148 of the Act.
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Some limited data does exist on historic arrests and convictions from these encounters. As
table  6.5  shows,  of  the  11,499  examinations  carried  out  between  January  2004  and
September  2009,  99  resulted  in  an  arrest,  leading  to  43  convictions.  Furthermore,
according to Anderson (2015:26),  of the 31,769 total  examinations  and 1,311 resultant
detentions in 2014/15, 39 led to an arrest which was “more numerous... than in 2009/10”.
This shows a more focused use of the power since the increased public scrutiny but still
equates to a low arrest rate of only 0.12% of examinations and 3% of detentions. As the
number of people convicted remains unknown, it is impossible to judge how effective the
current targeting of these powers are in countering terrorism. However, the large number
of  ethnic  minorities  detained,  particularly  Asians,  and  the  historic  low  number  of
convictions suggest that the perceived ethnicity and religious affiliation does feature as part
of  examining  officers'  decision  to  subject  a  person  to  those  powers,  particularly  a
detention.  Either  way,  qualitative  research  shows  that  use  of  these  powers  have
undermined confidence in counter-terrorism policing among people examined or detained,
particularly  those  from  Muslim  and/or  south-east  Asian  backgrounds  who  feel
discriminated  against  (Choudhury  &  Fenwick,  2011;  Blackwood  et  al.,  2012;  also
Anderson, 2012).
Table 6.5 – Examinations under Schedule 7 and resultant arrests, charges and convictions, 1st January
2004 to 30th September 2009
Examinations 11,499
Arrests 99
Charges (Terrorism Act 2000) 17
Charges (other terrorism legislation) 31
Convictions 43
Notes: The data on charges and convictions reflect the total actions taken against individuals and so do
not represent the actual number of people charged or convicted. This is because people can be
charged and subsequently convicted for multiple offences.
Sources: Home Office (freedom of information request no. 15293)
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To conclude the first part of this chapter, street stop and searches and examinations at ports
fell  substantially over the research period (figure 6.1, tables 6.1 & 6.3).  Initially,  from
2008/09 to 2011/12, this was primarily due to the curtailing of exceptional powers as the
rest of this chapter explores. This initial period was also one where police-initiated stops
became significantly politicised and was the immediate context that PCCs were introduced
to; some PCCs even made pledges to reform these powers in recognition of its impact upon
their electorate (see chapters 8-9). Further substantial reductions in stop and search use
coincided with PCCs' first term in office- the second half of the research period. Unlike the
first period, PCCs could have influenced these developments and so chapter 7 discusses
them separately in order to assess the potential impact of commissioners in producing this
environment more conducive to reform. 
6.2. Stop and search reform
Having illustrated the dramatic reductions in stop and search use over the research period,
this latter section draws upon the fieldwork to analyse the range of inter-related factors
underlying those trends before PCCs were introduced. It opens with a discussion of actions
undertaken by members of the public which, arguably, provided the impetus behind the
reforms witnessed throughout the study. Following this, the analysis turns to the strong
role  of  national  policing  bodies  and  national  government  in  enhancing  police
accountability  in  ways  that  served  to  discourage  stop  and  searches.  As  will  be  noted
throughout, this reinforced the role of central actors in police governance whilst providing
scant opportunities for the public or police authorities to participate in this despite those
national actors purporting to seek policing styles more responsive to local populations.
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6.2.1. Litigation and national advocacy groups
Arguably, litigation, and the threat of legal action has provided one of the greatest impetus
to stop and search reform by raising the prospect of more fundamental restrictions to the
scope of police powers and discretion. This section outlines the main challenges to these
powers, both successful and unsuccessful, and their implications for police-initiated stops
more  broadly.  Surprisingly,  the  role  of  litigation  in  shaping operational  practice  rarely
featured in interviews, probably because these proceedings were too far removed from the
more immediate pressures applied by national government and national policing bodies to
change practice. Litigation was initiated by individual members of the public dissatisfied
with their experience and supported by two national pressure groups: Liberty, the leading
civil  liberties and human rights campaign group, and  StopWatch,  the leading campaign
group for stop and search reform. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC),
the U.K.'s equalities watchdog, was also a key party to those cases. As this section focuses
on civic action,  legal proceedings initiated by EHRC against a small  number of police
forces  is  discussed  later  in  this  chapter;  legal  action  initiated  by  Independent  Police
Complaints Commission's action is discussed in chapter 7.
Section 44 was repealed in 2010/11 following a successful challenge brought by Liberty in
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Gillan and Quinton v. The
United Kingdom (“Gillan”).44 Gillan, a protester, and Quinton, a journalist, were searched
at an arms fair in 2003 and sought a judicial review of the powers claiming that it had been
used beyond its intended scope. However, their case failed at every stage of the British
judicial system: in the High Court,45 the Court of Appeal,46 and the House of Lords47 (now
44 [2010] 50 E.H.R.R. 45 (ECHR) (case 4158/05).
45 [2003] EWHC 2545 (Admin).
46 [2004] EWCA Civ 1067.
47 [2006] UKHL 12.
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Supreme Court). With no restraints from the judiciary or national government, use of the
powers rose by over 550% from over 30,000 in 2002/03 to over 210,000 in 2008/09 (an
increase of almost 178,000 searches; table 4.1). As the tide began to turn during the ECtHR
hearing, use of the power fell by 59% to over 91,000 in 2009/10. The ECtHR upheld the
complainants'  assertion  that  the  powers  contravened  the  right  to  private  life  under  the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and that  it  was also a  deprivation  of
liberty. This resulted the power's repeal and demonstrates how powerful litigation can be in
providing  determined  members  of  the  public  with  redress. Following  a  government
initiated  review into the use of counter-terrorism powers (HM Government,  2011),  the
power was replaced with section 47A, a more strictly regulated power that has never been
used in England and Wales even during occasions where section 44 would have almost
certainly been used, such as a royal wedding in 2011 and the London Olympics in 2012. 48
But the judgement also had implications for section 60.
Following  Gillan,  the  future  of  section  60 became uncertain  in  the  case  of  Roberts  v
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (“Roberts”). Although it was also dismissed at
every stage of the British judicial system, it still contributed to significant reductions in
use. The case arose from a search of Ms. Roberts for a dangerous weapon within a section
60 authorised area after a police officer was called to the scene by a ticket inspector who
suspected her of evading a bus fare and she refused to give proof of her identity when
issued with a fine. The officer suspected Roberts of carrying a weapon in her handbag,
resulting in her being forcefully restrained by a number of officers as she attempted to
walk away from the search. Roberts later explained that she was a special needs assistant
and did not wish to be seen being searched by the children and young adults with whom
48 Section 47A has only ever been used once and in Northern Ireland (See: Anderson, 2014).
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she worked. No weapons were discovered but Roberts was arrested for handling stolen
goods after she was found to possess credit cards not under her name (these were later
found to be under her son's name and her maiden name and no further action was taken).
Roberts'  claim that  the  powers  did  not  contain  sufficient  safeguards  to  protect  against
arbitrary use and were discriminatory (Articles 5 and 8 under the ECHR, respectively) was
dismissed by the High Court,49 the Court of Appeal,50 and,  ultimately,  by the Supreme
Court.51 In its sweeping judgement, the latter declared that the power was compatible with
human rights  laws because,  unlike  section  44,  sufficient  safeguards  were found in the
suspicion  required  to  authorise  its  use,  the  accompanying  codes  of  practice  and  the
additional operating procedures produced by the Metropolitan Police. Oddly,  it  claimed
“the law itself is not to blame for individual shortcomings which it does its best to prevent”
(para47), thus ignoring the research evidence on just how weak the law and regulations
operate in practice (chapter 4). StopWatch unsuccessfully intervened in this case whilst it
was  being  heard  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  by  providing  an  analysis  of  ethnic
disproportionality and its causes (Shiner, 2012). However, this was dismissed by the Court
of Appeal and the Supreme Court both of whom deemed the statistics too controversial to
rely  upon.  Also  contrary  to  the  research  evidence,  the  Court  argued  that  “It  is  the
randomness and therefore the unpredictability of the search which has the deterrent effect
and also increases the chance that weapons will be detected” (para47). This, it continued
without citing evidence to support its claim, was particularly important in relation to anti-
gangs activity which it argued:
“are  largely  composed  of  young  people  from black  and minority  ethnic
groups...  Put bluntly,  it  is mostly young black lives that will be saved if
there is less gang violence in London and some other cities” (para41).
49 [2012] EWHC 1977 (Admin).
50 [2014] EWCA Civ 69.
51 [2015] UKSC 79.
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However, the fact that the challenge to section 60 had been brought in the first instance
resulted in dramatic changes to its use. Fearing the same fate as section 44, the ACPO lead
for stop and search warned chief constables in 2012 when the case was first heard that “the
potential  for a similar  scrutiny of Section 60 powers has always been anticipated” and
reassured them that he was “working with colleagues from the MPS to ensure that the
challenge is  appropriately addressed” (cited in  The Guardian,  2012).  The Metropolitan
Police and the West  Midlands Police,  the country's  largest  forces,  had also introduced
changes to the regulation of the power. In particular, they increased the level of authorising
officer to that of at least assistant chief constable and introduced more intrusive internal
monitoring which may have influenced the Court's judgement. It is within this context that
section 60 saw its greatest fall in use: down by 49% in the year of the Gillan judgement
2010/11, and another 89% in the year that  Roberts was heard in the High Court 2012/13
(see  table  6.1;  the  intermittent  year,  2011/12,  saw a  much  smaller  reduction  of  24%).
Arguably,  it  is  also this  challenge  that  produced the  restrictions  later  placed  upon the
power  by a  Home Office  (2014f)  best  practice  scheme,  discussed  in  the  next  chapter,
which increased the threshold required for section 60 authorisations and imposed greater
limits on its duration and geographical extent. (Some of these changes were based upon
those already made by the Metropolitan Police.) Explaining these requirements, the Home
Secretary stated to Parliament:
“Forces participating in the scheme will make it clear that they will respect
the case law established in Roberts by using no-suspicion stop-and-search
when it is 'necessary to prevent incidents involving serious violence', rather
than just 'expedient' to do so. They will raise the level of authorisation to a
chief  officer  and that  officer must  reasonably believe that  violence  'will'
take place, rather than 'may', as things stand now” (HC Deb (2013-14)  30
April 2014).
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The Home Secretary's introduction of stronger regulatory control in line with the  Gillan
judgement and scrutiny from Roberts despite its overall failure shows the significance of
litigation in providing the impetus to reform and citizens with considerable opportunities to
change operational practice. Yet, litigation has not provided all claimants with their desired
outcome.  Challenges  to  the  cessation  of  stop and account  recording and to  the  use of
schedule  7  examinations  at  ports  have  failed  to  produce  any  major  changes  to  those
powers. 
StopWatch unsuccessfully  sought  a  judicial  review  against  the  decision  of  the  Home
Secretary and three chief constables to cease stop and account recording in 2011 in the
case  of  Diedrick  vs  Chief  Constable  of  Hampshire  Constabulary,  Chief  Constable  of
Thames Valley Police, Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Constabulary and the Secretary of
State.52 The High Court rejected the appeal on the grounds that it deemed both the Home
Secretary and chief constables to be exercising their lawful discretion under PACE Code
A; neither were failing to adhere to their duty to eliminate racial discrimination; and that
such recording unnecessarily inconvenienced both the police and the public. It dismissed
StopWatch's evidence of racial disparities in stop and account (see Bridges et al., 2011),
claiming  that  those  statistics  were  unreliable.  The  Court  also  rejected  StopWatch's
compromise of recording only the ethnicity of persons accounted to ensure some basic
degree of public monitoring. Instead, the Court strongly supported devolving this decision
to  chief  constables  on  the  grounds  that  they,  rather  than  central  government,  better
understood their communities needs and wrongly assumed that they would keep it under
constant review. Surprisingly, although the Court noted that most forces continued to keep
fuller  records  despite  the  Labour  government  substantially  reducing  the  level  of
52 [2012] EWHC 2144 (Admin).
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information  required  to  be  recorded  since  2009  (also  Bridges  2015;  Young,  2016),  it
absolved them from any blame in wilfully perpetuating the very bureaucracy that they
claimed to be hampered by. The Court also failed to appreciate the lack of power enjoyed
by members of the public to ensure their chief constables do record stop and account where
concerns justify doing so, as Code A requires (Home Office, 2014h:20). Essentially, what
Diedrick illustrates most clearly is the unpredictability of litigation in providing remedies
against the awesome discretionary powers of the Home Secretary and chief constables,
particularly in the domestic courts.
Schedule 7 has proven to be particularly resilient against legal challenges. This is despite a
wide number of challenges53 and the Supreme Court's initial concerns over the “possibility
of serious invasions of personal liberty” owing to what it considered to be a power “not
subject  to  any  controls.”54 In  the  case  of  Beghal  v  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions55
(“Beghal”), the Supreme Court dismissed her claim that the powers infringed her right to
liberty, right against self-incrimination and her right to private life (Articles 5, 6, and 8 of
ECHR,  respectively)  as  it  judged  the  powers  necessary  for  countering  terrorism  and
proportionate to achieving those aims. However, its non-binding judgement still prompted
some constraints to police discretion although, as Anderson (2015:para6.36) observes, her
case was “less than ideal” because she was the wife of a convicted terrorist and she did not
challenge the more intrusive aspects of those powers. The Court agreed with Anderson's
repeated  criticisms  that  detaining  individuals  for  longer  periods  or  downloading  and
retaining data from electronic items may only be lawful if some degree of suspicion was
introduced  to  invoke  these  provisions.  It  also  argued  that  the  codes  of  practice  was
“potentially confusing” (para50) in its advice against discriminatory practice. It suggested
53 For a good summary, see Anderson (2014, 2015).
54 R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 (para64; p.22).
55 [2015] UKSC 49.
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amending the codes to state that ethnicity or religion could actually be justified but only if
used in connection with other factors present in a terrorist profile. In response, the Home
Office  issued  a  circular56 to  ports  officers  abrogating  the  relevant  paragraphs  in  the
schedule 7 code of practice to give effect to the Court's advice. However, it also warned
officers that the decision to detain a person should not be “arbitrary” and, therefore, despite
Beghal's failure to introduce fundamental changes to the law, the case may serve to narrow
police officers' discretion in so far as it relates to who can be examined or detained under
the power.
In the case of  Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“Miranda”), the
lawfulness and proportionality of schedule 7 was also reaffirmed by the High Court57 and
the Court of Appeal.58 David Miranda, the partner of the journalist who exposed the extent
of  the  U.S.  mass  surveillance  programme,  challenged  the  lawfulness  of  his  nine  hour
detention in 2013. He alleged the power was used beyond its intended purpose to obtain
top secret files that  he was transporting to his  partner;  that  it  contravened the right  to
freedom of expression (Article 10 of the ECHR); and that the ECHR protected journalistic
material from such infringements. Whilst both courts dismissed the first two grounds, the
Court of Appeal ruled that exercising schedule 7 in relation to journalistic material was
incompatible with the ECHR as it risked being used arbitrarily and without an explicit
exemption by U.K laws. Although, Miranda produced some restriction to the scope of port
officers' discretion, this narrowly relates to journalists affects rather than the general public
and schedule 7 remains fundamentally intact.
56 Home  Office  Circular  001/2016;  see:  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/circular-0012016-
schedule-7-to-the-terrorism-act-2000
57 [2014] EWHC 255 (Admin).
58 [2016] EWCA Civ 6.
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As these cases show, litigation since Gillan has made it increasingly difficult for the police
to operate their legal powers as they have done so historically by narrowing their scope of
discretion  or  raising  the  prospect  of  more  substantial  changes.  With  little  meaningful
opportunities to influence operational practice at the local level, including the lack of trust
in the police complaints system (Waters & Brown, 2000; Smith, 2013), it is perhaps not
surprising  that  members  of  the  public  and  civic  groups  have  sought  redress  through
litigation.  However,  as  demonstrated  by  most  of  the  cases  analysed,  litigation  is
unpredictable and the domestic courts have more often than not ruled against claimants,
thus also limiting the prospects of future challenges. Litigation also involves substantial
time and costs which limits access to it and disincentivises claims. 
As the rest of this chapter and the next one argues, litigation alone cannot fully account for
other changes to operational practice illustrated by the first section of this chapter, namely
the reduction in PACE searches; the greater scrutiny of strip-searches, traffic stops and
searches  of  young  people;  and  also  the  introduction  of  greater  procedural  controls
surrounding schedule 7.
6.2.2. Large scale public disorder
As  police  officers  and national  interviewees  pointed  out,  the  public  disorders  of  2011
brought  to  their  attention  long-standing and neglected  frustrations  of  ethnic  minorities'
everyday policing experiences. As this section argues, the riots were a second key impetus
behind the various reforms introduced by national government and analysed throughout the
findings. The disturbances occurred over five days in August 2011 and were triggered by
the fatal police shooting of Mark Duggan in Tottenham, North London, a place no stranger
to police fatalities or anti-police disorders. As news channels presented live coverage of a
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violent breakaway protest from an initially peaceful vigil  held by Duggan's family and
friends aggrieved at perceived failures in the police investigation, at least 15,000 people
across the country engaged in their own anti-police violence or opportunistic looting as the
police appeared unable to maintain control (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012).
Apart  from chief  officers,  all  other  interviewees  drew parallels  with  historic  unrest  to
interpret  the  2011  disorders  as  a  form  of  public  restitution  against  excessive  police
practices. This was particularly the case with members of the public interviewed, many of
whom knew rioters or worked with the same socially alienated groups associated with the
disturbances.  Scarman  (1981:para3.110)  argues  that  the  1981  riots  was  essentially  an
“outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police”, although he
acknowledged rioters were not exclusively black, and cited stop and search experiences as
a key motivating  factor.  Thirty  years  later,  the official  inquiry into the 2011 disorders
argued  that  the  underlying  causes  are  “strikingly  similar  [to  1981]”  and  explicitly
highlighted public grievances with stop and search as producing the anti-police sentiment
fuelling the riots (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011). Similarly, Lewis et al.'s
(2011:19) large-scale study of 270 young rioters cited stop and search as a key motivating
factor  having  found  “73%  of  people  interviewed  in  the  study  had  been  stopped  and
searched at least once in the past year” and highlighted “the frequent complaint of a sense
of harassment by those interviewees on the receiving end of stop and search was made in
every city the research took place and by interviewees from different racial groups and
ages.” As these reports and interviewees argued, stop and searches was a daily reminder of
the  subordinate  position  of  young  people,  particularly  for  ethnic  minorities,  and  was
essential in explaining the sheer scale of the 2011 disorders, the violence directed towards
police property and personnel, and the underlying mistrust in the police.
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However, official acknowledgement of the role of such encounters in producing anti-police
sentiment only came years later as the Coalition government's attitudes towards the police
underwent a dramatic shift and the Labour Party also started back-tracking from its related
policies  when  in  government.  Whilst  the  immediate  shock  of  the  2011  disturbances
provoked a cross-party unity strongly supporting harsh sentences for rioters, in the longer
term  it  led  to  a  dramatic  shift  in  this  consensus.  This  followed  mounting  evidence
suggesting  that  police  practices,  particularly  stop  and  searches,  were  responsible  for
producing  the  underlying  anti-police  and  anti-government  attitudes  that  fuelled  the
disorders (see:  Riots  Communities  and Victims  Panel,  2011, 2013; Lewis et  al.,  2011;
HMIC,  2013).  By  July  2013,  the  Conservative  Home  Secretary  began  to  reverse  her
government's prior determination to weaken regulatory controls over stop and search in the
name of reducing 'unnecessary bureaucracy' (see Bridges, 2015; Young, 2016) towards one
which  sought  enhanced  controls  of  these  and  other  types  of  police-initiated  stops
previously ignored.
Just how drastically the cross-party consensus had changed can be seen from contrasting it
with the immediate reaction to the disorders during which the police gained sympathy and
unconditional support in managing the riots and the (somewhat confused) denial of any
root causes. Prime Minister David Cameron characterised the riots as “criminality,  pure
and simple”, “mindless violence and thuggery”, an “excuse by opportunist thugs in gangs”
and  that  “it  is  completely  wrong  to  say  there  is  any  justifiable  causal  link”  to  Mark
Duggan's shooting (HC Deb (2010-11) 11 Aug 2011). Threatening to do “whatever it takes
to  restore  law and  order  and to  rebuild  our  communities”,  including  bolstering  police
numbers in the capital and potentially authorising the deployment of baton rounds, water
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cannons and army personnel, he warned “the lawless minority,  the criminals who have
taken what they can get, I say: we will track you down, we will find you, we will charge
you, we will punish you. You will pay for what you have done.” Rt Hon Edward Miliband,
then leader of the opposition, stood “shoulder to shoulder, united against the vandalism and
violence we have seen on our streets” and agreed there was “no excuses, no justification”
for the disturbances. He called for “swift progress” in prosecuting the “horrendous criminal
acts” and “tough sentences” for “those found guilty of such disgraceful behaviour.” Whilst
agreeing with the Prime Minister's assessment that “crime has a context, and we must not
shy away from it”,  he disagreed with the government's  refusal to commission a public
inquiry into the causes of the riots, arguing it was necessary to seek “to explain” and “to
ask ourselves why there are people who feel they have nothing to lose and everything to
gain from wanton vandalism and looting”, a position supported by many parliamentarians
across  the  political  spectrum.  What  this  debate  shows is  just  how strongly  supportive
political parties were of the police at the time who were seen to be under huge strain and
almost the victims of the riots. By labelling all rioters as opportunistic 'thugs', 'vandals' and
'criminals',  the  legitimacy  of  any  underlying  grievances  were  denied  and  this  had  a
suppressing effect on attempts to understand why relations with the police had deteriorated
so much.
Within weeks, the government's initial refusal to establish an inquiry gave way to a cross-
party inquiry established by the prime minister, deputy prime minister and leader of the
opposition (each leaders of Britain's three main political parties). The Riots Communities
and Victims Panel (2011:10, also 2012:24) report found a number of causes but cited stop
and search “as a major source of discontent with the police. This concern was widely felt
by young Black and Asian men who felt it was not always carried out with appropriate
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respect. We were told that, in at least some instances, this was a motivating factor in the
riots,  including  some  of  the  attacks  on  the  police.”  Henceforth,  and  with  mounting
evidence since, political  parties could no longer deny that there were in fact legitimate
grievances  with  certain  police  practices,  particularly  from  July  2013  following  the
publication  of  a  damning  national  inspection  report  which  highlighted  the  lack  of
governance surrounding stop and search (HMIC, 2013), discussed later. 
As this section has argued, the 2011 disturbances had forced a new cross-parliamentary
consensus to emerge, unprecedented since the immediate post-Macpherson era (see chapter
4). Wright (2002:155) argues that “levels of crime and disorder are widely regarded by the
public  and  politicians  alike  as  an  important  measure  of  the  competence  of  an
administration” and the growing recognition of how excessive policing styles, typified by
stop and search, can produce such disorders contributed to a new political agreement that
appeared  to  break  away from the ‘crime  control'  consensus  described in  chapter  4.  In
2011/12,  the  year  of  the  riots,  overall  stop  and  search  use  fell  by  9%  (table  6.1).
Significantly,  PACE searches fell for the first time since 2003/04 and by 7% to almost
1,143,000, representing 86,000 fewer searches. Section 60 use also fell  by 25% to just
under 47,000 which resulted in 15,000 fewer searches and the lowest absolute reduction in
the three years since the immediate  year  before the  Gillan  judgement in 2009/10. This
suggests that the immediate police response to the riots, supported by a favourable cross-
party consensus, had prevented greater reductions from occurring that year.  Far greater
reductions  occurred  in  the  following years  as  the Conservative  Home Secretary began
reversing her government's policies of weakening regulatory controls following the results
of the aforementioned inquiries into the riots and the Labour Party also started distancing
itself  from its twenty-year  history of doing so whilst  in government  (chapter 3-4). The
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sheer scale of ensuing reforms analysed in the findings suggest that the disturbances had
played  a  crucial  role  in  prompting  an  environment  more  critical  of  stop  and  search
practices and conducive to the later reductions in use, particularly following a damning
national inspection of these powers.
6.2.3. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary   (HMIC)
No national policing body has played a greater role in producing the political consensus
favouring  stop  and  search  reform  than  the  HMIC  (2013)  and  its  first  highly  critical
inspection report into the use of those powers.59 Commissioned by the Home Secretary six
months after the 2011 riots, it has been definitive in providing her with an evidence-base to
introduce greater regulation and scrutiny of those powers. For chief officers, senior officers
and  staff  from  national  policing  bodies  interviewed,  this  inspection  and  its
recommendations has been instrumental in guiding their work, although this thesis also
uncovered evidence to suggest that this has been overstated. 
The inspection focused on three particular issues, all of which it judged forces to be failing
on:  using  their  powers  fairly  and  in  ways  that  promote  police  legitimacy;  adequate
leadership and front-line supervision; and an evidence-based approach to targeting crime.
Drawing upon its statistically representative survey of over 19,000 members of the public,
the inspection found strong public support for those powers. However, this diminished in
areas  where respondents  felt  the  powers were used most.  A quarter  of all  respondents
believed that it  was used more often on young people and ethnic minorities- a third of
59 For transparency, the author declares involvement in both HMIC (2013, 2015) inspections as an external
advisor to the core inspection team. Although the report was published in July 2013, eight months after
PCCs were elected, the inspection had started well before the election. Once elected in November 2012,
PCCs were primarily occupied with consulting on and drafting their first police and crime plans which
they were legally required to publish by April 2013. As they had little scope to input into the main
inspection activities, it  is discussed in this chapter whilst the next one discusses the ensuing political
fallout and later follow up inspections, both of which were open to PCCs' influence by then.
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whom blamed discriminatory police practice. Ethnic minorities were far more likely to cite
discriminatory practice and, together with urban populations more generally, feel that those
powers  were  overused.  The  HMIC  (2013:47)  found  “worrying  gaps”  in  front-line
supervision and a lack of effectiveness in its  use. It concluded that there was “notable
slippage” in leadership and supervision since the Macpherson (1999) report, pointing to the
varied “levels of attention” afforded to it by police leaders. Drawing on discussions with
chief constables, they challenged the dominant perception that stop and search was not a
priority merely because of high overall public satisfaction in the police and the low number
of complaints. On effectiveness, they argued “with a few exceptions, forces were not able
to  demonstrate  an  approach  to  using  stop  and  search  powers  that  was  based  upon  a
foundation of evidence of what works best to fight crime” and found “little evidence that
police leaders were focusing stop and search activity towards priority crimes in their areas”
(p.47). This finding supported the conclusions of previous Home Office funded research
(Willis, 1983; Miller et al., 2000; also EHRC, 2013) and shows the lack of progress over
the  decades  in  ensuring  that  those  powers  were  used  efficiently  and  effectively-  two
criteria that police authorities (now PCCs) have a legal duty to hold their chief constables
to account for. 
The HMIC made ten recommendations aimed at remedying the problems identified but
their sole mention of PCCs was made in relation to improving public transparency and
scrutiny by proposing the following narrow role for commissioners:
“Chief Constables should, in consultation with elected local policing bodies,
ensure  that  they  comply  with  the  code  of  practice  by  explaining  to  the
public the way stop and search powers are used in their areas and by making
arrangements for stop and search records to be scrutinised by community
representatives.  This should be done in a way that involves those people
who are stopped and searched, for example, young people.” (p.34)
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This emerged from its finding of “an alarming 27% (2,338) of [over 8,700] stop and search
records examined by HMIC did not contain reasonable grounds to search people,  even
though many of these records had been endorsed by supervisors” and so, they argued, were
potentially illegal (p.6). But this limited participatory role is unlikely to introduce stronger
local  democratic  controls  over  practice  because  it  relies  upon  what  Marshall  (1978)
describes  as  'explanatory  and  cooperative'  forms  of  accountability,  particularly  in
explaining practice rather than introducing more robust scrutiny. It also still relies upon
police officers to incorporate any recommendations into practice rather than giving PCCs
or the public a stronger role to ensure changes occur. Essentially,  despite the inspection
having been commissioned in response to the concerns of people from minority ethnic
backgrounds, it only provided them and their commissioners with a narrow, retrospective
role  in  accountability  by  reaffirming  an  activity  already  required  under  the  codes  of
practice. It did not propose any more robust processes that could empower the public or
PCCs to ensure more fundamental changes to police culture and discretion could arise as
Brogden et al. (1988) and Shiner (2015b) argue is necessary to ensure more democratically
accountable police service.
Finally, the HMIC also criticised the inadequacies in data recording standards by arguing:
“Rather than improved processes and better use of technology, forces had
simply stopped recording some of the data which we believe is necessary to
allow a good assessment of the effectiveness of the power. For instance, too
many forces did not record whether a stolen or prohibited item was found–
perhaps one of the fundamental factors in testing whether the grounds for
suspicion were reasonable.” (p.47)
The example given was significant, for it was one element of data recording previously
required but removed by the Conservative Home Secretary and the HMIC criticised for the
“unintended consequences” of hampering adequate accountability. The government's later
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endorsement of the HMIC's recommendation to re-record this and other data signalled a
significant change in Conservative policy because it reversed their key manifesto pledge of
reducing ‘police bureaucracy’, continuing on from the previous Labour government. The
Labour government had commissioned a review to modernise the police (Flanagan, 2011)
and fully endorsed its recommendations to ‘free up’ police time by introducing a reduced
and  streamlined  process  of  stop  and  search  and  stop  and  account  recording.  The
Conservative  government,  however,  went  much  further  than  Flanagan  suggested  by
scrapping  the  recording  of  stop  and accounts  entirely  and  it  substantially  reduced  the
amount of data required from stop and searches, including whether the item was found.
This  ignored  Flanagan's  appeal  for  any  enhancement  of  police  discretion  to  be
accompanied  by  a  concomitant  increase  in  accountability.  Following  the  damning
inspection,  the  Home Secretary cleverly adapted the report’s  concerns  to  suit  her  own
reform agenda by complaining: 
“Since the election, I have made it a priority to cut red tape and free up
police time... There is no point in making all those changes if police officers
then spend their time conducting pointless stops and searches, with all the
bureaucracy that goes with them.” (HC Deb (2013-14) 2 July 2013)
This occurred during her first Parliamentary statement on stop and search, pre-empting the
publication of the HMIC inspection. For the first time since the crime control period (see
Reiner, 2010), a Home Secretary had publicly acknowledged that the concerns raised by
police officers about bureaucracy hampering their work, to which successive governments
had been so obliging, was essentially a false pretext. Such was the HMIC’s impact that the
Home Secretary used this same parliamentary statement to announce a public consultation
into the use of those powers aimed at addressing the deficiencies that the inspection had
identified (see chapter 7). 
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As this section has argued, the HMIC played an important role in encouraging a new cross-
party political consensus to emerge that favoured stop and search reform. It also provided
the  government  with  an  evidence  base  to  justify  its  strong  challenge  towards  police
practice in addition to prompting the Labour Party to rethink its policies that had led to
these practices when it was in government. However, as the next chapter argues, there was
ample evidence to suggest that the HMIC's influence was far more limited than initially
appears to be the case, contrary to interviewees' suggestions. 
6.2.4. Equality and Human Rights Commission (E  HRC)
Rarely  acknowledged  within  the  documents  analysed  and  people  interviewed,  was  the
impact of the EHRC's (2013; also 2010) eighteen month programme of action in producing
reductions to stop and search volumes and disproportionality in five forces. At a time when
the overall  volume of searches  nationally  had reached its  peak in  2009/10, the EHRC
threatened the following five constabularies with legal action against what it considered to
be  potentially  discriminatory  stop  and search  practices:  Dorset,  Leicestershire,  Thames
Valley, the Metropolitan Police and the West Midlands. This resulted in major reductions
in volumes and disproportionality within those constabularies without reversing the trend
of declining crime. Therefore,  as one interviewee closely involved in the project stated
when reflecting on the programme's significance, it was the first “social experiment” to
undermine the conventional wisdom that stop and search was an effective crime fighting
tool (National/03). The EHRC concluded that disproportionality and search volumes were
both the product of police policies rather than patterns of crime, thus suggesting that the
use of the powers is determined by chief officers' own attitudes rather than other factors.
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The EHRC (2013) also reported finding the greatest improvements made by the forces it
was more intrusively involved in monitoring,  thus highlighting the potential  of external
oversight  bodies  to  influence  operational  practice.  This  raises  the  prospects  of  greater
involvement of local policing bodies such as PCCs. Leicestershire & Rutland and Thames
Valley constabularies proposed a package of measures,  for which the EHRC was most
actively involved, and included a formal aim to reduce disproportionality; the removal of
quantitative  performance  targets  encouraging  unnecessary  searches;  the  greater
involvement of community groups to provide a critical view on its use; and assigning a
chief officer the responsibility for implementing and assessing these changes. Dorset and
the Metropolitan Police were already engaged with the National Policing Improvement
Agency (now College of Policing) and the EHRC undertook to monitor these activities
rather  than  being  directly  involved.  The  West  Midlands,  however,  proposed  its  own
measures including the abolition of quantitative targets but, as the EHRC highlighted, was
the most  distant  and least  cooperative.  Although the EHRC had intended to take legal
action  against  the  West  Midlands,  this  threat  did  not  materialise  and,  according  to
National/03  this  had  enabled  the  force  to  “call  our  bluff”  and  successfully  resist  the
externally imposed reform. As already discussed earlier, credible threats of legal action
appear to provide a powerful means for external actors to negotiate changes to the kind of
operational practice that usually excludes them from any meaningful influence. Certainly
in relation to the five forces, this appears to be the case.
6.3. Conclusion
This  chapter  analysed  a  relatively  straightforward  period  of  police  accountability  with
regards to stop and search, even as other types of encounters were ignored. As this chapter
argued, public action arising from litigation and large scale disorder provided the impetus
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for stop and search reform and a heightened public scrutiny that produced the inhibitory
effect on those powers that regulation alone has historically failed to ensure (chapter 4).
This suggests that the political environment within which police officers operate plays an
important  role  in  shaping  police  practice  and  how  well  officers  abide  by  regulatory
controls.  It  also  validates  Jefferson  &  Grimshaw’s  (1982)  argument  that  democratic
accountability is complementary to chief officers’ legal accountability as it can set police
priorities  without impinging upon their  operational  independence,  although this  chapter
shows the two are more interdependent than the authors suggest.
National policing bodies, namely the EHRC and particularly the HMIC, have played a key
role  in  promoting  a  new  socio-political  environment  that  has  discouraged  inequitable
practices and favoured greater accountability, albeit not unproblematically. Their influence
reinforces Jones et al.’s (1994) finding that power is more dispersed within the institutional
arrangements for police accountability than is usually suggested, and the Home Secretary
and her office appeared to exercise the greatest  influence during this  period.  This also
means that PCCs may have considerable influence over stop and search, and indeed other
practices,  by virtue of their  public profile and priority setting duties.  Yet despite these
national  bodies  purporting  to  act  in  the  public  interest  and  seeking  to  enhance  police
responsiveness to local populations,  particularly towards ethnic minorities backgrounds,
their activities reinforced the primacy of regulatory controls and the role of central actors
in  governing  the  police.  They  provided  scant  opportunities  for  the  public  or  police
authorities/PCCs to participate in police accountability.
Whilst this chapter shows how strongly influential the politics of police powers has been in
promoting  greater  police  accountability  during  this  first  period,  the  next  chapter
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significantly complicates this by discussing the second phase of stop and search reform
coinciding with the introduction of PCCs. This next period saw an enhanced cross-political
party  consensus  favouring  more  fundamental  reform to  stop  and search  and  provoked
increasing  resistance  from  chief  constables.  This  was  more  revealing  of  the  power
dynamics  concerning how police accountability is negotiated and the next chapter  also
discusses the potential role PCCs had in influencing this environment to ensure that police
officers were also accountable to their local population.
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7. The Politics of Stop and Search Reform: After the Commissioners
As the previous chapter argued, the period immediately before the introduction of PCCs
was  one  where  the  institutional  arrangements  governing  the  police  had  produced
significant changes to stop and search practice, particularly in response to the concerns of
people from ethnic minority groups. However, the period analysed in this chapter was one
in which the expanding political consensus that encouraged further reform was met with
substantial resistance from chief officers, thus frustrating their implementation. It therefore
shows how incredibly complicated changes to operational practice are negotiated within
the  structures  governing  the  police  in  Britain  and  also  challenges  the  assumption
underlying most police studies that suggest the Home Secretary is more powerful than may
be the  case  (e.g.  Jones  et  al.  1994;  Millen  & Stephens,  2011).  This  chapter  starts  by
discussing the expanding political consensus that underlined this period and gave rise to
the developments subsequently analysed.
Unlike the previous chapter, all of the developments discussed here coincided with PCCs'
first term in office and so represent a range of activities that they could have influenced or
participated in. As will be argued, PCCs and their electorate were given little opportunities
to  participate  in  this  enhanced  scrutiny,  thus  questioning  the  extent  to  which  the
institutional  arrangements  in  Britain  is  conducive  to  local  police  accountability.
Subsequent chapters analyse how PCCs sought to negotiate their own role in what remains
a highly centralised governance structure.
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7.1. A new political consensus
In July 2013, a week before the HMIC (2013) was due to publish its damning inspection
report on stop and search, the Home Secretary convened a Parliamentary debate where she
announced a public review of those powers aimed at addressing the deficiencies the report
highlighted.  The details  and results  of the review,  public  response and ensuing second
Parliamentary  debate  in  April  2014,  where  the  Home  Secretary  proposed  a  series  of
reforms,  are  discussed  later.  This  section  analyses  the  announcement  and  first
Parliamentary debate which signalled a new cross-party agreement conducive to greater
public scrutiny of stop and search and later resisted by chief constables.
During the first Parliamentary debate, Theresa May became the first Home Secretary to
characterise  the policing practices  that  dominated the previous two decades  and tacitly
encouraged  by successive  governments  (see  chapter  4)  as  a  “dreadful  waste  of  police
time”,  and  blamed  officers  for  “conducting  pointless  stops  and  searches,  with  all  the
bureaucracy that goes with them” (HC Deb (2013-14) 2 July 2013). Questioning “whether
stop  and  search  is  always  used  appropriately”,  she  also  adopted  language  typically
associated with the Labour Party by expressing concern over the disproportionate searches
of black people warning “if anybody thinks it is sustainable to allow that to continue, with
all its consequences for public confidence in the police, they need to think again.” She
ended by outlining her clear expectation to see the powers “used only when it is needed...
higher  search-to-arrest  ratios...  better  community  engagement;  and...  more  efficient
recording practices across the country.” Labour expressed similar sentiments as its then
Shadow Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, and key proponent of its crime control agenda,
sought  to  distance  herself  and  her  party  from  their  policies  when  in  government.
Welcoming the consultation, she raised similar “concerns about... the scale of use [of stop
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and search], the lack of intelligence-led approaches and the disproportionate use against
ethnic  minorities  and the  potential  waste  of  money”,  thus  projecting  denial  about  her
government's role in encouraging these very practices. The rest of the debate saw various
members  of parliament  welcome the consultation.  A sign of how sentiment  within the
Conservative party was beginning to change came in the words of its MP for Croydon
Central,  one of the worst hit constituencies during the August 2011 disorders, when he
argued “In the past my party has not taken seriously enough the concerns of London’s
black and minority ethnic communities about the way in which they are policed. It reflects
huge credit on the Home Secretary that she is addressing this ongoing concern”.
As these quotes suggest, a new cross-party political consensus had begun to emerge. Both
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government and Labour opposition were now
in agreement  that  stop and search use was excessive,  particularly  in  relation  to  ethnic
minorities,  and  that  the  police  were  to  blame  for  these  ineffective  and  provocative
practices. This contrasted with the decades beforehand where both the Conservative and
Labour parties had pursued 'crime control' policies designed to enhance police powers and
discretion whilst also weakening the regulatory mechanisms intended to prevent misuse
(Reiner, 2010; Sanders et al., 2010), including in relation to stop and searches and other
types of stops (chapter 4; Bridges, 2015; Delsol & Shiner, 2015). It is within this consensus
that the first sustained reduction in use had occurred since the immediate post-Macpherson
period,  falling  by 11% in 2013/14 to  under  a  million  searches  for the first  time since
2006/07 (see figures 4.1 & 6.1, and tables 4.1 & 6.1). It is within this context that PCCs
were  newly introduced  and  their  first  collective  act  was  to  strengthen  this  cross-party
consensus by endorsing the HMIC's dedicated inspection report into their constabulary and
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indicate that they would ensure their chief constable complied with its recommendations
(see Appendix E for the list of PCCs who responded).
7.2. A deepened political consensus and 'comprehensive package of measures'
Later that day, the Home Office (2013c:3) published the details of its public review on stop
and search seeking “to understand how the use of these powers is viewed by the public and
by those involved in policing.” The consultation only covered the main powers to stop and
search  having  excluded  those  under  counter-terrorism  legislation  as  they  had  already
undergone an earlier review (see: HM Government,  2011), and also excluded road and
traffic stops. However, since section 43, the with-suspicion counter-terrorism street power,
was excluded from either consultation, this power has never been subject to any public
review.
Within a matter of weeks, the consultation deadline was extended from an initial six weeks
to twelve following intense lobbying by local community and national pressure groups to
facilitate  more  time for  people  to  respond,  including  StopWatch.  This  appears  to  have
worked because over 5,000 responses were received, 69% of which were from members of
the public  (Home Office,  2014c).  The heavily framed questionnaire  solicited views on
whether the powers were perceived to be effective, applied fairly, and achieved the right
balance between tackling crime but also protecting civil liberties. It also sought agreement
for  its  proposals  to  “reduce bureaucracy”  by requiring  police  officers  to  replace  paper
forms with the electronic recording of the basic details arising from a search. PCCs were
only mentioned in passing as one mechanism for holding chief constables to account but
there were no proposals made in relation to enhancing their role.
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In April 2014, the government published its response to the feedback on the same day the
Home Secretary convened a second parliamentary debate on stop and search, eight months
after the consultation was first announced. According to a front-page article in the Times
Newspaper and also Newsnight, the BBC's (2014) flagship current affairs discussion show,
the delay was blamed on “regressive attitudes” in the Prime Minister's Office concerned
about how the Home Secretary's reforms would make the Conservative Party appear 'soft
on crime', particularly as its main rival, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP),
was  making  significant  gains  in  a  number  of  local  council,  UK  Parliamentary,  and
European  Parliamentary  elections.  Nonetheless,  the  consultation  response  highlighted
extremely divergent views among participants, particularly when the age and ethnicity of
respondents were taken into account. People from younger age groups and ethnic minority
backgrounds were the least likely to believe that the powers were effective, used fairly, or
correctly  balanced  fighting  crime  against  protecting  civil  liberties.  According  to  the
document a “substantial number” of people had also made use of an optional, open-text
field to elaborate their answers by arguing that they felt the police were using their powers
in discriminatory ways.  These groups were also less likely to feel that the explanation
given to them by searching officers was justified and far more likely than whites to agree
with the government's proposals to strengthen the public's role in “deciding” how stop and
search is used (older participants were the least likely to agree with the latter). 
The consultation was important for the government to ensure that its proposals appeared to
be  responsive  to  public  demands.  A  good  example  of  this  was  the  later  inclusion  of
recommendations concerning the use of strip-searches and road and traffic stops following
appeals  from consultees  and  despite  these  being  outside  of  the  original  scope  of  the
consultation. This also shows the potential influence of coordinated civic action in pressing
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the  government  to  make  changes  without  resorting  to  the  lengthy and costly  types  of
litigation discussed in chapter 6. However, given that previous Labour and Conservative
governments  had  previously  ignored  long-standing  concerns  on  these  very  issues,  the
electoral uncertainties in the looming 2016 general election may have played a significant
role in producing this political environment conducive to reform. This was given added
importance  by an influential  report  which estimated  that  ethnic  minority  voters  “could
easily decide over 160” out of the total 573 parliamentary seats and that in “168 marginal
seats the BME [black and minority ethnic] electorate is larger than the majority in which
the  seat  was  won”  (OBV,  2013:3).  Although  this  report  wrongly  assumes  that  ethnic
minorities vote as a unified block, it still ignited considerable debate amongst the political
elite  concerning how to win those seats and it  was soon after  this  publication that the
Conservative  party  began  talking  more  explicitly  about  race  and  the  broader  range of
issues affecting ethnic minorities.
This second parliamentary debate saw another extraordinary performance by the Home
Secretary who levelled even harsher criticisms of police practices, particularly in relation
to racial  disproportionality (HC Deb (2013-14) 30 Apr 2014).  She also announced the
following 'comprehensive package of measures' analysed in the remainder of this chapter
and, at the time of writing this thesis, most of these proposals are still ongoing:
a) Revise the codes of practice to “make it clear what constitutes reasonable grounds
for suspicion” and also introduce “formal performance or disciplinary proceedings”
where officers were found to not use “their powers properly”. 
b) Commission the College of Policing to design new national training for officers in
exercising their powers, including “unconscious bias awareness training to reduce
the possibility  of prejudice informing officers’  decisions” and undergo biannual
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accreditation to carry on using their powers. This, she explained, would “send the
clearest possible message: if officers do not pass this assessment, if they do not
understand the law, or if they do not show they know how to use stop-and-search
powers appropriately, they will not be allowed to use them.” 
c) Commission the HMIC to conduct annual inspections into police force's use and
governance  of  stop  and  searches  as  a  means  of  ensuring  constabularies  were
regularly scrutinised for these practices. Also, in response to public concerns raised
during  the  consultation,  the  Home  Secretary  would  commission  an  additional
thematic inspection into the use of strip-searches and road and traffic stops “with a
view to eliminating any unfair or inappropriate use of those powers.”
d) Ensure police forces regularly publish stop and search data onto online crime maps,
including  the  broader  range  of  outcomes  beyond  an  arrest,  to  enable  public
scrutiny.
e) Ensure  chief  constables  and  PCCs  provide  the  public  with  opportunities  to
scrutinise  the  quality  of  search  records  otherwise,  so  threatened  the  Home
Secretary, she would impose this upon them as a legislative requirement.
f) Finally, all police forces in England and Wales were invited to join a 'Best Use of
Stop  and  Search  Scheme'  (BUSSS)  which  would  ensure  better  recording  of
searches, give members of the public opportunities to scrutinise stop and search
practice, and place greater restrictions on the use of section 60 (see Home Office,
2014f).
Three themes are apparent from these proposals. First, the sheer breadth of the proposals
demonstrated that the government 'meant business' for, as the Home Secretary warned: 
“if  the numbers  do not  come down,  if  stop-and-search does  not  become
more targeted, if those stop-to-arrest ratios do not improve considerably, the
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Government  will  return  with  primary  legislation  to  make  those  things
happen, because nobody wins when stop-and-search is misapplied.  It is a
waste of police time. It is unfair, especially to young, black men. It is bad
for public confidence in the police” (HC Deb (2013-14) 30 Apr 2014).
As this shows, the Home Secretary had become more brazen in criticising police practices
and adopting language typically associated with the Labour Party. In response, Labour's
Yvette Cooper characterised the measures as “limited”, perhaps in her attempt to maintain
her party's appeal to its traditional voters now sought after by the Conservatives.60 It was
this debate that more than any other demonstrated how politicised stop and search had
become since the 2011 riots as the country's main political parties were now competing to
show their competence to govern ahead of the 2016 general election. One conservative MP
even  declared  that  the  government's  proposals  made  “the  Conservative  party,  and  not
Labour,  the  real  party  of  the  reform  of  stop-and-search”.  Cooper  argued  that  these
proposals could have gone further and introduced much earlier than had been the case, also
blaming “regressive attitudes” in the prime minister's office for not only forestalling the
Home Secretary's announcement but also weakening them.61 Using her right of reply, the
Home Secretary launched an extensive attack on Cooper for “playing party politics” and
criticised Labour's record on stop and search, pointing to how they had “extended” those
powers and “weakened” regulations when in government. Clearly, the Home Secretary had
forgotten about her own role in scrapping stop and account recording and reducing the
amount of information required to be recorded from searches (chapter 4). Nonetheless, this
debate had deepened the political consensus and placed even greater pressures upon police
officers and their chief constables to change their operational practices, thus contributing to
the reductions in stop and search use in 2014/15 (table 6.1). 
60 The  Home  Secretary  also  developed  a  reputation  for  dealing  with  a  range  of  other  issues  that
disproportionality affect ethnic minorities, such as deaths in police custody and hate crime.
61 The Home Secretary was widely expected to introduce legislative changes although the specifics were
never known. This is a personal observation arising from the many committees, conferences and meetings
attended as part of the applied aspect of the PhD, as well as some interviews with national policing staff.
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Unfortunately, the proposals largely ignored the role of the public and PCCs. In relation to
the  public,  only  BUSSS  had  granted  them  any  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  new
accountability  arrangements,  albeit  limited,  a development  discussed separately in this
chapter  due  to  its  importance  to  the  case  studies.  For  PCCs,  whilst  the  consultation
response had envisaged them a role (Home Office, 2014c), this did not feature in the Home
Secretary's agenda going forward- nor in the response of the Labour party which remained
opposed to their introduction in the first place. The consultation response proposed that
they  would  be  involved  in  supporting  the  College  of  Policing,  the  national  body
responsible for setting police standards, in developing training for police officers. But it
envisaged PCCs' main role to be a more general one of developing local solutions to stop
and search recording and to also ensure that these records were scrutinised by the public,
an activity already required by the code of practice (Home Office, 2014h).
Aside from this, it is clear that the Home Secretary had failed to incorporate PCCs into the
enhanced  governance  arrangements  for  stop  and  search  which  remained  centralised
throughout this study. Perhaps one reason for this was the growing scepticism directed
towards PCCs and their  ability to hold chief constables  to account,  including from the
Home Secretary herself who appeared to have cooled towards her flagship police reform
model. In an earlier speech marking their first anniversary, the Home Secretary admitted
that  the  introduction  of  PCCs  was  “messy”  and  that  the  election  turnout  was  too
“disappointingly low” to ensure PCCs enjoyed democratic legitimacy (May, 2013). More
importantly, she judged PCCs' overall ability to hold chief officers to account as “mixed”,
having also  criticised  a  number  of  commissioners  for  establishing  performance  targets
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against her advice and others for rushing to defend their chief constables in moments of
crisis.
Finally, the proposals failed to progress police accountability beyond the explanatory and
retrospective forms criticised by police scholars as unlikely to address the local democratic
deficit (Marshall, 1978; Brogden et al., 1988; Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984). Much of it
involves enhancing regulation which itself relies upon police officers to change their own
practices,  including  the  supposedly  clearer  definition  of  what  constitutes  reasonable
suspicion,  the lessons learned from unconscious  bias  training,  and supervising officers
being  more  proactive  in  ensuring  their  officers  are  not  misusing  their  powers.  Other
proposals relate to providing the public, particularly for those on police-public consultation
groups, with more information on how stop and search is used but denies them the power
to effect any desired changes. Therefore, despite the Home Office (2014c:29-32, emphasis
added)  consultation  response  proposing  that  “local  communities  should  have  direct
involvement  in  deciding how the  police  use  their  stop and search powers”,  the  Home
Secretary's package of measures fell considerably short of this. At best, it appears only to
reproduce the explanatory and retrospective forms of accountability that has dominated
since at least the 1960s (chapter 3). 
In sum, despite the breadth of reform the Home Secretary proposed in her 'comprehensive
package of measures' and the deepened cross-political party consensus conducive to more
fundamental reforms, the government appeared reluctant to devolve greater responsibilities
for police accountability towards local actors. The package of measures are still ongoing
and serve to reinforce the primacy of central actors in holding the police to account. Even
the threat of making the public scrutiny groups that PCCs are responsible for organising a
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legislative requirement fails to address the more fundamental issue of ensuring that these
groups are representative of people impacted by stop and search and that they can exercise
enough influence to ensure that operational practice is more responsive to their demands
(Morgan, 1987; Brogden et al. 1988; Rowe, 2004). Finally, the voluntary nature of most of
these  measures  also  means  that  they  are  dependent  upon  the  whims  of  future  Home
Secretaries who can either support or revoke any of these measures at will.
7.3. 'Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme' (BUSSS)
Of all  of  these  reforms,  BUSSS stands out  as  being  the only mechanism to introduce
additional opportunities for the public to participate in police accountability, as this section
discusses. Issues around its implementation were also extremely revealing of the politics of
police powers and the still powerful role of chief constables in resisting pressures from the
very governance arrangements that they are supposedly accountable to.
In operation since summer 2014, BUSSS aims to “improve public confidence and trust”
through ensuring “greater transparency,  community involvement  in the use of stop and
search powers and to support a more intelligence-led approach, leading to better outcomes,
for example, an increase in the stop and search to positive outcome ratio” (Home Office,
2014:2).  The  scheme  is  voluntary,  but  as  one  interviewee  stated  capturing  the  view
amongst other officials and police officers interviewed:
“I  really  like  this  line,  look,  on  its  own:  'I  invite  all  forces  to  join  the
scheme'.  And  I’ve  written  after  it:  'this  isn’t  an  invitation,  it’s  an
instruction'.  I’m sure it  is  an instruction....  she’s given some impetus  to
[police  officers]  to  get  your  act  together  otherwise  you’re  gonna be  in
trouble and she’s really, like, pointed the figure in their faces and said sort
it out or else.”
National/04
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As National/04 states, despite forces being permitted to depart from its requirements under
exceptional circumstances, the expectation is that they would be fully compliant with the
scheme.  To reinforce  this,  BUSSS asserts  the  Home  Secretary's  right  to  exclude  non-
complying forces from the scheme as a way of building public pressure upon them in
addition to her previous threat of introducing legislation to enforce compliance.
BUSSS  requires  constabularies  to  record  and  publish  data  on  the  broader  range  of
outcomes  arising  from  a  stop  and  search;  provide  the  public  with  opportunities  to
accompany  officers  out  on  patrols  to  witness  how they  conduct  searches;  introduce  a
'community trigger' whereby a higher than usual number of complaints would necessitate
an  explanation  to  police-public  consultation  groups  about  their  use  of  those  powers;
introduce better monitoring of the impact of searches upon ethnic minorities; and placing
greater restrictions on section 60 authorisations and use. Following BUSSS’s introduction
in 2014/15, recorded stop and search usage fell by a staggering 40% that year to under half
a  million  and the  lowest  since 1993 (tables  6.1 and 4.1,  respectively).  As National/04
indicates,  this  signifies  how important  the  Home  Secretary  has  been  in  providing  the
“impetus” to reforming operational practice and, as the last chapter argued, the significance
of credible threats of legal action in stimulating changes. 
However, a later HMIC (2016) inspection revealed that only 11 of 43 police forces were
fully compliant with BUSSS and 13 had failed to abide by at least three of its 5 main
requirements.  Astonishingly,  this  was eighteen  months  after  all  forces  had 'voluntarily'
joined the scheme and demonstrates how powerful chief officers are in shaping the extent
to  which  government  reforms  translate  into  operational  practice,  just  as  they  had
previously  done  so  with  adapting  stop  and  account  recording  to  their  own  purposes
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(Shiner,  2010;  Young,  2016)  and  increasing  drugs  searches  despite  a  temporary
declassification of cannabis (Shiner 2015a). Further, the uneven compliance with the five
main requirements  across forces (HMIC, 2016) shows how chief officers could 'cherry
pick' what reforms to implement to suit their own purposes, similar to their response to the
HMIC’s first inspection (see HMIC, 2015a). In response, the Home Secretary adopted the
HMIC's recommendation to suspend the 13 non-compliant forces from the scheme and re-
inspect them within three months to assess compliance; she also issued a warning to the
other 19 non-fully compliant forces. Unfortunately, the details of any permitted departures
from BUSSS for operational reasons, rather than the flagrant disregard just described, are
not published to enable this study to assess daily compliance with the scheme.62
Only the requirement to reduce section 60 volumes fared well, with 41 of 43 constabularies
compliant.63 BUSSS singles this power out for substantially greater restrictions and most
likely in recognition of the potentially serious threat to the power by the-then impending
Supreme Court hearing on Roberts. Participating forces are required to raise the level of
authorising officer to at least assistant chief constable, following the precedent already set
by  the  West  Midlands  and  Metropolitan  police  forces;  reduce  the  initial  maximum
authorisation period down from 24 hours to 15 hours, but with a possible extension to an
additional 9 (i.e. up to the initial upper legal limit of 24 hours) and then a further extension
of 15 hours; and raise the threshold required so that an authorisation is made only when the
power  is  deemed  necessary to  prevent  violence  rather  than  expedient and  there  is  a
'reasonable belief'  that  serious violence  will rather  than  may take place.  Finally,  where
practicable, forces must ensure that the public is given advanced notice of a section 60
62 All attempts to obtain this information were unsuccessful owing to a lack of clarity among the Home
Office,  College  of  Policing  and  HMIC  concerning  who  should  be  responsible  for  collating  this
information and whether it should then be published.
63 The two non-compliant forces were Gloucestershire and Greater Manchester.
183
authorisation, but certainly afterwards, to enable them to judge the purpose and success of
the  operation.  As  the  last  chapter  explained,  references  were  made  to  the  Gillan and
Roberts cases  with  regards  to  raising  the  authorisation  threshold,  thus  showing  the
influence of litigation in providing the public with opportunities to shape police practice.
Yet private misgivings about the depth of reform became public throughout 2015 when the
Commissioner  of the Metropolitan Police became a spokesperson for other  disgruntled
chief  and senior  officers.  In a series  of  media  interviews  ahead of the  Supreme Court
hearing on  Roberts,  he claimed that  increases  in  knife  crime were partly  due to  those
reforms and indicated he would advise his officers to scale up its use, contrary to the Home
Secretary's demands. In October 2015, after the hearing but before the court's judgement,
the Home Secretary used a speech to the National Black Police Association, an association
of ethnic minority police officers and staff, to fight back. She criticised the Commissioner
for his “knee-jerk reaction on the back of a false link” and indicated that the government
would be continuing its reforms because “there is still a long way to go” (May, 2015).
However,  the police did receive a small  compromise when the Home Secretary stated:
“The message from this Government is clear: we want the police to use stop and search
properly, not to stop using it altogether” once again showing how successful chief officers
have been in slowing the pace of reforms and obtaining concessions. 
Coincidentally  that  afternoon,  the  Greater  London  Assembly's  Police  and  Crime
Committee64 held  its  monthly  public  meeting  where  the  Metropolitan  Police's  Deputy
Commissioner,  who is also the former ACPO lead for stop and search,  was answering
questions (GLA, 2015). When questioned about the exchanges between the Commissioner
64 The capital's equivalent of a Police and Crime Panel.
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and the Home Secretary, he presented a more critical view of the supposed link between
knife  crime  and  stop  and  search  activities.  One  senior  officer  and  two  chief  officers
interviewed for this study made similar comments, for example:
“Knife crime is one manifestation of violence and violence itself is a wicked
problem. There's so many variables that influence levels of violence that to
pick on stop and search I don’t think is a very intelligent way of analysing
it.”
WestMids/Police/03 
Altogether, the exchanges above show how incredibly politicised stop and search reform
had become. Whilst the Metropolitan Police Commissioner may have represented some of
his colleagues around in the country in challenging the validity of being forced to change
their practices, his own deputy and also WestMidsPolice/03 appeared to capture a more
widespread view amongst officers interviewed for this study acknowledging the “many
[other]  variables  that  influence  levels  of  violence”  beyond  police  interventions.  This
suggests that chief officers' own values and leadership style continues to be important in
determining the extent to which stop and search and national reforms are incorporated into
operational practice, an issue pursued further in the case study findings (chapter 9). 
Another area of significant progress made in implementing BUSSS was the recording and
publishing of the broader range of outcomes arising from a search.  All  police officers
interviewed particularly welcomed this development:
“Obviously the Best Use of Stop and Search requires us to measure more
broader outcomes now which is  a good thing 'cause whether you arrest
someone or not is a rubbish measure 'cause as you know when you find a
bit of cannabis you can give them a fixed penalty notice and avoid the need
to arrest them. So actually our conversion rate- positive outcomes rate- is
no different from anyone else’s including the Met's.”
Suffolk/Police/01 
“The  whole  definition  of  a  positive  outcome  is  [good]  in  our  thinking
because people are very narrow on it aren’t they? I mean, the Home Office
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only used to say an arrest is the only positive outcome so, you know, that’s
evolved.”
ChiefOfficer/04 
As these quotes indicate,  recording 'positive outcomes'  has been very well  received by
forces as they had long been campaigning for it. This is most likely because it enables
them to demonstrate the greater effectiveness of their powers when compared the more
narrow criteria  of arrests. Because of this  obvious benefit,  the bureaucracy involved in
recording, monitoring and publishing this wider data was deemed worthwhile whilst other
additional processes were met with resistance. This is similar to police force's stagnation
over  the  HMIC's  (2013)  ten  recommendations  aside  from  the  electronic  recording  of
encounters with its obvious benefits of reducing paperwork and better linkage with police
intelligence databases. An impressive 37 forces had recorded positive outcomes although
the HMIC (2016) judged only 16 to be fully compliant because the rest were not submitting
this data to public scrutiny; and it is on public engagement that forces generally fared worst
on.
Unlike  all  the  other  national  developments  analysed  in  this  thesis,  BUSSS is  the  only
initiative to date to provide members of the public with opportunities to scrutinise police
practice. The public may accompany officers on patrol to observe how stop and searches
are conducted and forces are also required to introduce a 'complaints trigger' which would
necessitate police-public consultation groups to receive an explanation if an unusually high
number of complaints is received (for most  rural  forces, this would occur even after a
single  complaint  is  made).  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  14  forces  had  not  sufficiently
implemented the observation scheme (HMIC, 2016) which is, arguably, the most intrusive
measure of all as it is most able to subject officers' decision-making to immediate, external
scrutiny.  The  HMIC  also  expressed  concerns  over  the  lack  of  understanding  among
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consultation group members to ensure stop and search forms are properly scrutinised, an
issue returned to in the case studies (chapter 9). 
Overall,  what  BUSSS shows is  the potential  for  the  Home Office  to  apply significant
pressures upon police forces to change their operational practice. It also highlights how
powerful chief officers are in light of their selective adherence to a scheme championed by
the  Home  Secretary  herself  and  supported  by  a  cross-party  consensus.  Finally,  it
emphasises  the  Home  Office's  ability  to  inject  greater  civic  participation  in  police
accountability by offering the public with structured opportunities to be involved in its
reforms,  albeit  one  that  can  only  produce  additional  explanations  from police  officers
rather than more fundamental reform sought by ethnic minority groups. Curiously, BUSSS
has completely  neglected  the  role  of  PCCs in ensuring  chief  officers  comply  with the
scheme and that they are scrutinised for any departures from it. As the next and final two
sections discuss, this neglect of PCCs has been replicated by other important central actors.
7.4. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
Thus far,  the findings suggests that the HMIC has played a key role in  producing the
information necessary for cross-parliamentary scrutiny of stop and search and prompting a
political consensus favouring the greater accountability of those powers. Senior officers
and chief officers interviewed argued that the HMIC had in fact directly effected changes
to operational practice. However as one interviewee from a national policing body stated:
“It’s mixed, I mean, some people [chief and senior officers] accept it and
have made big progress in terms of how they use it others less so. It depends
how  attentive  or  how  important  it  is  to  the  chief  officer  group  if  I’m
honest.”
National/06 
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As  National/06  indicates,  the  mixed  implementation  of  the  HMIC's  recommendations
suggests  that  the  Inspectorate's  role  in  changing  police  practice  has  been  overstated,
particularly  since  subsequent  inspections  have  revealed  that  most  chief  officers  were
ignoring most of its recommendations (HMIC, 2015a, 2016). 
Along with a further commission by the Home Secretary to look at the use, governance and
impact  of  traffic  stops  and also strip-searches,65 the HMIC (2015b) found forces  were
making  “disappointingly  slow  progress”  in  adopting  its  original  ten  recommendations
because chief officers were “failing to understand the impact of stop and search.” It also
reinforced the need to “to comply fully with the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme” thus
showing how interdependent the activities of the national actors have been, again, largely
to the exclusion of PCCs and local communities. Interestingly, all of the HMIC’s (2015a)
additional ten proposals to remedy chief constables' failures to implement their original
recommendations  and to  rectify the problems identified  in  relation  to  traffic  stops  and
strip-searches were aimed at chief constables or other central  actors, namely the Home
Office and the College of Policing. 
With no powers to sanction non-compliant forces, the HMIC has had to rely upon both its
moral voice to incentivise changes and upon other central actors with direct powers over
the  police  to  push  for  such  measures,  notably,  the  Home  Secretary  who  endorsed  its
recommendation  to  suspend  the  worst  offenders  from  BUSSS  and  re-inspect  their
compliance. Surprisingly, no recommendations were directed towards PCCs despite their
statutory  obligation  to  hold  chief  constables  to  account  and their  better  grasp  of  their
65 A strip-search is where police officers require a person to remove their clothes to enable a search for
illegal items. As the codes of practice state, this can range from removing outer layers of clothing, such as
a jacket or shoe, to exposing skin or intimate parts of a person's body, such as removing a t-shirt or
underwear (Home Office, 2014h).
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force's day-to-day progress in complying with the Home Office and HMIC's proposals.
Whereas 22 PCCs responded to the first inspection report,  only 9 had done so for this
follow-up inspection which suggests a lack of connectivity between the national  actors
involved in police accountability and local PCCs (see Appendix E for list of responding
PCCs).
7.5. Other influences
A range of other  actors also demonstrated  varying degrees  of influence in holding the
police  to  account  as  this  final  section  discusses.  Following  the  HMIC's  (2015a)
recommendation that every police force in the country should published an action plan
detailing how they intend to incorporate its recommendations into practice, each one has
done so using a template produced by the Police-Public Encounters Board (PPEB).66 The
PPEB is a collection of police force leads on stop and search who share best practice,
chaired by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC, formerly ACPO [Association of
Chief Police Officers]) national lead for stop and search and deputy chief constable of the
British Transport Police Adrian Hanstock. This template also includes what steps forces
will take to introduce greater procedural safeguards for searches of children and young
people after this was thrust into the spotlight by an inquiry of the All Party Parliamentary
Group  for  Children (APPGC,  2014)  into  young  people’s  experiences  of  the  police.
Together  with  the  specific  references  to  BUSSS,  this  shows  how  interdependent  and
mutual reinforcing activities from a wider range of national bodies and actors has been,
and beyond those whose statutory role it is to govern the police. 
66 For transparency,  the author declares membership of this group. The original statement is based upon
observations of this group which also publishes its minutes to the public, and the plans are available on
each police force's website.
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As a  cross-party  scrutiny  group,  the  APPGC has  no  legal  responsibility  or  powers  in
relation to government, parliament or the police. As with other parliamentary committees
and groups, it can act as a moral voice by raising attention to various issues and shape the
wider  socio-political  environment  within  which  police  officers  operate  by  proposing
legislative changes to their  fellow lawmakers,  in this case with regards to children and
young people's policing experiences. As argued earlier, the threat of legislative changes in
constraining police powers and discretion has operated as a key motif for police officers to
take heed of directives and may partly explain why the APPGC's recommendations were
incorporated into police force's action plans. Another likely reason is due to the proactivity
of  the  PPEB's  chair  in  devising  a  national  template  that  included  the  APPGC's
recommendations, thus supporting suggestions that ACPO (now NPCC) has come to play
an important role in coordinating policing issues nation-wide (e.g. Loveday, 1986; Reiner,
2000; Rawlings, 2002).
The  Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) successfully undertook legal
remedies to ensure that all police forces were complying with its investigations, having
won a judicial  review against the Metropolitan Police (see High Court, 2015). Initially,
between 2009 and 2015, the commission used its ‘calling in' power to legally oblige all
police forces to refer onto it any complaint made in relation to examinations and detentions
at ports under schedule 7. This itself arose from the IPCC sharing concerns over potentially
discriminatory  practice  after  it  was  approached  by  a  group  of  young  Muslim  men
supported by the pressure group Cage.67 However, the Metropolitan Police had refused to
give  the  IPCC access  to  the  classified  material  that  it  required  to  properly  investigate
whether  complainants  were  stopped  on  the  basis  of  intelligence  or  unlawfully
67 According to its website, Cage (formerly known as CagePrisonsers) is an independent advocacy 
organisation working to empower communities impacted by the global 'War on Terror'.
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discriminated  against.  Ultimately,  the  High  Court  (2015)  ruled  in  the  IPCC's  favour,
resulting in an agreement reached whereby the commission would be granted access to
classified material, including the background information used by port officers to inform
their decision to examine or detain people, although the police could appeal to the Court
against any disclosures. Once again, litigation appears to have produced a better result than
voluntary compliance, particularly in relation to counter-terrorism powers.
Despite the reductions in schedule 7 use over this period (table 6.3), it  is unclear what
influence  this  intervention  may  have  had  upon  port  encounters,  particularly  as  the
proportion  of  ethnic  minorities  detained  remained  high  (table  6.4)  and  the  complaints
process can only provide an individual-level, retrospective form of redress. Further, the
IPCC's lack of enforcement powers means that forces are not obliged to incorporate any of
its recommendations into practice, as interviewees from the IPCC conceded. Nonetheless,
this  development  had  introduced  an  additional  layer  of  scrutiny  surrounding  a  highly
secretive  power  and  may  ensure  that  complainants  have  better  access  to  redress  or
confidence in externally managed investigations, although broader public concerns about
the IPCC's overall independence from the police still exist (e.g.  Waters & Brown, 2000;
Smith, 2003).
Finally,  the  College  of  Policing was  commissioned  by the  Home  Secretary  to  design
training  intended  to  be  delivered  to  every  police  officer  country-wide  on  the  role  of
unconscious biases in producing discriminatory practice. More immediately, the College
set up a stop and search scrutiny group to oversee its work and consists of key stakeholders
from national policing bodies, civic groups and members of the public. It also established a
definition of what constitutes a 'fair and effective stop and search encounter' in consultation
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with these key stakeholders and in response to a HMIC (2013) recommendation, but not
before being criticised for taking a whole eighteen months to do so (HMIC, 2015a). This
definition is  reproduced in table  7.1,  which also highlights  its  probable influences  and
ahead of a discussion of its subsequent revision.68
Table 7.1 – College of Policing (2015) definition of a 'fair and effective stop and search', and probable
influences
Definition Primary influence
“A stop and search is  most  likely  to  be fair  and effective
when
1. the  search  was  a  justified  and  lawful  use  of  the
powerA that stands up to public scrutiny;B
2. the officer genuinely believes the person has an item
in their possession;A 
3. the member of the public understands why they have
been searched and feels that they have been treated
with respect;C D E 
4. the search was necessary and was the least intrusive
method  a  police  officer  could  useF to  establish
whether  a  member  of  the  public  has  a  prohibited
article or an item for use in crime with them and
5. more often than not the item is found”F
A Home Office (2014h)
B NPCC
C IPCC (2009) 
D EHRC (2010)
E HMIC (2013)
F StopWatch
Source: College of Policing (2015)
As table  7.1  shows,  this  definition  drew upon a  wide  range of  central  influences  and
reinforced the primacy of these national bodies in holding police officers to account for
their  use of stop and search. For members of the public and their  PCCs, only the first
standard on ensuring that searches “stand up to public scrutiny” could provide them with
possible opportunities to interrogate police practice albeit indirectly through scrutinising
stop and search records and soliciting retrospective explanations. Further hampering this
was the failure of many forces to even establish the necessary scrutiny groups throughout
68 For transparency, the author declares membership of the College of Policing's Strategic Stop and Search 
Scrutiny Group and involvement in the creation of the definition analysed and subsequent revision.
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most of this study (HMIC 2015a, 2016). Whilst the third criteria introduces some degree of
immediate, individualised accountability by encouraging officers to explain to individuals
why they had searched them, the mere provision of such an explanation is unlikely to
facilitate more robust forms of accountability given that many individuals searched do not
agree with the justifications given (HMIC, 2013; Home Office, 2014c), and also without an
effective means to seek redress for any perceived injustice,  an important  dimension of
democratic police accountability (chapter 2). 
Ultimately, these standards were short-lived as this definition was watered down only six
months later to secure the voluntary compliance of all police forces. This serves as another
example of how successful some chief and senior officers are in loosening the standards by
which they are held accountable. The current definition is: 
“A stop and search is most likely to be fair and effective when: 
1. the search is justified, lawful and stands up to public scrutiny; 
2. the officer has genuine and objectively reasonable suspicion they will find a
prohibited article or item for use in crime;
3. the person understands why they have been searched and feels that they
have been treated with respect; 
4. the search was necessary and was the most proportionate method the police
officer could use to establish whether the person has such an item.”
(College of Policing, 2016)
As the revision shows, there was considerable discomfort in the original expectation that
the item searched for would be found “more often than not”, resulting in its retraction.
Related  to  this,  the  measure  of  a  successful  outcome  reverted  back  to  the  traditional
standard  of  finding  any “prohibited  article  or  item  for  use  in  crime”  rather  than  the
formerly higher standard of linking this directly to whether or not the original object of the
search was found. Notably, these revisions concerned issues not proscribed by legislation
or the codes of practice and shows how constrained more robust police accountability may
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become  when  narrowly  reduced  to  legal  compliance  rather  than  also  attending  to  the
organisational policies and environment that grant police officers their wide discretion.
As the work of the College relates to better  decision making of police officers and its
training was being trialled during the course of this research, it was difficult to identify
what  their  influence  may  have  been  on  the  use  of  police-initiated  stops  without
interviewing and monitoring  the  constables  who took part  in  the pilots.  Its  work was,
however, revealing of some of the tensions between national statutory organisations who
sought  to  change police  practice  and improve the quality  of the encounters,  and some
police  forces  who successfully  resisted  the  more  demanding  aspects  of  those  reforms.
There were also more practical concerns preventing the implementation of training. These
issues became apparent during a public, national conference observed near at the end of
this research:
A police force lead questioned the ability to deliver two day training in his
force  where  he  said  stop  and  search  is  not  perceived  to  be  a  problem-
although he distanced himself from that view- and his force only has five
allotted  days  of  training  a  year.  A  chief  officer  from  another  force
interrupted  to  say  that  this  is  an  issue  concerning  leadership  because
“leadership will define what gets seen as a priority”. He acknowledged that
the issues are “more germane to the Big Six, you know, London, Greater
Manchester and Birmingham [etcetera]” but the chief officers who do not
perceive  this  to  be an issue must  be reminded that  stop and search is  a
“flash-point in community relations.” A stop and search lead from another
police force welcomed the training but expressed disappointment that it fell
short  of  the  Home  Secretary's  proposal  of  ensuring  that  only  accredited
officers could use the power, thus showing differences between officers and
forces across the country in how the reforms are received. Later, a lead from
another force welcomed the training but said his force would struggle to fit
a two day training into a police force which only has three days allocated to
training, and requested a “light version”.
Observation 2016/01/26'
As can be seen, despite some best intentions from the College and some stop and search
leads country-wide, the varied police organisational policies hampered the ability to ensure
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that  unconscious  bias  training  would  be  incorporated  across  the  country  without  a
mandatory requirement to do so. Whereas some forces had volunteered to participate in the
pilot, others refused to do so and exploited the College's lack of enforcement powers to
resist  incorporating  the  final  training  package  into  their  own  programme.  As  another
officer  suggested,  the Home Secretary had backtracked on her threat  to remove police
officers'  right  to  conduct  searches  due  to  malpractice,  despite  its  already  successful
implementation in Northamptonshire Police. These issues are exemplary of how successful
some chief and senior officers have been in limiting the scope of reform even in the face of
intense pressures by those they are supposedly accountable to.
7.6. Conclusion
In conclusion, police governance had remained strongly centralised throughout the entire
research  period  and  despite  the  introduction  of  PCCs.  Compared  to  the  relatively
straightforward  period  discussed  in  chapter  6,  the  events  outlined  here  shows  how
incredibly complex and difficult police accountability is negotiated in practice. As with the
previous chapter, a whole range of actors had produced an environment favourable towards
greater police accountability and resulted in significant reductions to the operational use of
stop and search. This shows how operational practice remains open to external influences
but also how powerful chief constables are in resisting these pressures and deciding which
reforms are implemented locally and to what extent. 
This chapter also supports Shiner & Delsol's (2015) argument that the politics surrounding
the use of police powers is  key to understanding the developments  to stop and search
governance and use.  Successful  litigation and large-scale  disorders (chapter  6) made it
seem that the police had lost control and necessitated the government intervening to prove
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its competence to govern. Electoral uncertainties surrounding the impending 2016 general
election  and  the  large  number  of  ethnic  minority  voters  residing  in  parliamentary
constituencies  considered  crucial  in  deciding  which  party formed the next  government
(OBV,  2013)  produced  a  political  environment  amenable  towards  greater  police
accountability.  It  necessitated  the  Conservative-led  coalition  government  pay  better
attention to issues affecting ethnic minorities, and this also applied to the Labour Party
which was no longer able  to take those votes  for granted.  For the Conservatives,  now
occupying  a  space  traditionally  associated  with  Labour  and  becoming  increasingly
confident in discussing issues of 'race', stop and search became an important example to
demonstrate their willingness to listen to ethnic minorities and ensure better outcomes than
a  discredited  Labour  Party.  Needless  to  say,  the  government  was not  shy in  not  only
frequently reminding voters of its achievements in rectifying Labour's mistakes on stop and
search as the general election drew closer, but to also then capitalise upon its subsequent
electoral  success  to  declare,  in  the  words  of  the   Prime  Minister  of  the  first  majority
Conservative government in 25 years, that  “The Conservatives have become the party of
equality” (Cameron, 2015).
The Home Secretary and her department has played the greatest role in shaping operational
practice during both periods (chapter 6 and 7) but, as this chapter has argued and contrary
to the suggestion underling police research,  national government's  influence was not as
determinant  in  shaping policing  as  previously thought.  While  national  government  has
proven 'virtuous' by using its unique access to state resources to make police practice more
responsive  to  communities'  expectations  (Loader  &  Walker,  2007),  chief  constables
retained a determinant role in deciding the extent to which any stop and search reforms
translated into operational practice.  What makes this extraordinary is that chief officers
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have collectively managed to successfully frustrate these reforms despite the sheer scale of
pressures  applied  by  the  various  institutions  that  they  are  supposedly  accountable  to:
national government, Parliament, national policing bodies and concerned members of the
public whose consent is essential to ensure policing in Britain remains democratic. This
suggests that chief officers remain the most powerful actor within the structures for police
governance, even if the potential to influence that practice is dispersed across a wider set of
actors than is usually considered.
Ironically,  despite  central  actors  claiming  to  seek  a  police  service  more  responsive  to
ethnic minority communities,  they have collectively failed to provide these groups,  the
public or PCCs any meaningful opportunity to participate in their programme of enhanced
police  accountability.  Whilst  BUSSS  appears  to  provide  some  role  for  the  public,  it
appears only likely to reproduce the explanatory and retrospective form of accountability
that has dominated police governance and been criticised for failing to introduce more
robust local democratic controls (Marshall, 1978; Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; Brogden,
1988). This is because it fails to give the public a greater say over operational practice and
relies upon chief constables to adopt the more intrusive forms of scrutiny which they have
largely  resisted  (HMIC,  2016),  namely  the  opportunity  for  citizens  to  accompany  the
police out on patrol. But the greatest irony belongs to the government itself for failing to
enhance the role of its flagship PCC reform in introducing the greater local democratic
accountability  that  it  purportedly seeks to  achieve.  Therefore,  Reiner  (2010),  Newburn
(2012) and Lister (2013) were right to predict  that the government  would refrain from
devolving greater powers to PCCs, at least in relation to the governance of police powers.
197
Although PCCs were largely ignored, some still sought to carve out their own role and in
response  to  concerns  by  their  electorate.  The  next  two  chapters  discuss  their  role  in
enhancing local police accountability. This is followed by the overall conclusion for this
thesis  which  summarises  the  main  research  findings  and  considers  the  potential  of
additional  measures  proposed  by  the  government  towards  the  end  of  this  study  in
improving local police accountability.
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8. Police and Crime Commissioners and Stop and Search in the Case
Study Areas
Thus far, the findings have argued that the enhanced scrutiny concerning stop and search
use and governance remained heavily centralised throughout this research and precluded a
stronger role for the public and PCCs. As this chapter discusses, some PCCs also took
interest in enhancing their police's accountability to their ethnic minority electorate, albeit
to varying extents. As such, this chapter acts as a bridge between the previous two which
analysed the wider political environment that PCCs operate within, and the next one which
analyses the local context for which they have significant powers to shape.
First, the police and crime plans of all PCCs country-wide are analysed to assess the extent
to which police-initiated encounters have featured as a priority and, therefore, places the
three case studies into their broader context. These plans are important because they set out
the policing activities that chief constables are legally required to have regard to and so act
as  a  primary  vehicle  for  PCCs to  ensure  that  the  police  are  more  responsive  to  their
electorate. The second half of this chapter then analyses the use of stop and search in the
three case study areas and what it reveals about the ongoing influence of central actors in
shaping police priorities and practice. The next chapter complements this by analysing how
three PCCs sought to negotiate their role in what appears to remain a highly centralised
structure for police governance.
8.1. Police and crime plans
PCCs demonstrated  a  general  lack  of  interest  in  scrutinising  police-initiated  stops  and
instituting  greater  accountability  of  these  encounters,  despite  the  substantial  national
government attention it received (chapters 6-7). PCCs played a marginal role in relation to
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these developments and were only able to respond to major reports, although this was as
individuals rather than through collective action (see Appendix E). As argued previously, it
may have been the politics surrounding the use of those powers that prompted individual
PCCs to respond so as to appear authoritative in dealing with what was perceived to be
major historic failures within their force. Even then, fewer commissioners responded to
each follow-up inspection (Appendix E).
Table 8.1 - PCCs who prioritised police-initiated stops in their crime plans, 2013/14-2015/16
PCC area (and affiliation) 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Nottinghamshire (Labour) ✔ ✔ ✔
West Midlands1 (Labour) ✔ - ✔
Suffolk (Conservative) ✔ - ✔
Dyfed-Powys (Conservative) ✔
Greater Manchester (Labour) ✔ ✔
Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime1 
(Conservative)
✔ - -
Thames Valley1(Conservative) ✔
South Wales (Labour) ✔
West Yorkshire (Labour) ✔ ✔
Leicestershire (Conservative) ✔ ✔
Derbyshire (Labour) ✔
Cumbria (Conservative) ✔
Northamptonshire (Conservative) ✔
Dorset2 (Independent) ✔
Hertfordshire (Conservative) ✔
Notes: (1) Forces subject to the EHRC (2010, 2013) programme of action to address disproportionality.
(2) No commitments made but a substantive reference was made to stop and search.
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Only 10 of the 42 total PCCs69 were proactive in featuring police-initiated encounters as a
priority in their first police and crime plans in 2013 (table 8.1). As table 8.1 shows, they
represent the full political spectrum and their number rose marginally to 15 alongside the
increased national scrutiny, representing a third of all commissioners. The most common
association between them is that they preside over the country's most populous areas with
large enough ethnic minority populations to impact upon who wins the PCC election. The
overall lack of interest is inevitable given that the formulation of policing priorities is now
defined  by  a  singly-elected  individual,  thus  amplifying  regional  differences.  As  PCCs
argued: 
“rather  than having a  one-size  fits-all  from Whitehall  you are  as  I  say
would  accustomise  policing  to  reflect  the  needs  of  your  own  particular
communities and I think that is a huge change from where we were before.
We tended to have Whitehall deciding everything that was done in policing
and I think it’s a lot better- oh, well, I would say that wouldn’t I? But it is!”
Commissioner/04
“I think they’re all different anyway. So every office of police and crime
commissioner seems to work slightly differently. There are similarities but
there are differences and that’s why they were elected so that there would
be local differences.”
Commissioner/02
Clearly,  commissioners  welcomed this  localism and saw it  as a strength as these local
differences  would  ensure  that  they  could  better  reflect  the  needs  of  their  electorate.
However,  interviewees  from  national  policing  bodies  held  a  different  view.  These
interviewees were keenly aware of PCCs lack of gender and racial diversity and felt  it
resulted in the under-appreciation of issues affecting ethnic minorities. For example:
"Cos it’s [stop and search] seen as being an individual officer activity, at
the aggregate they don’t see it as representing a significant organisational
risk and so I don’t think it necessarily gets fair hearing against some of
those more pressing and perhaps issues that  often get a lot  more media
attention, unless something goes wrong like a riot and people start taking
notice.”
69 Forty-one, plus the Mayor of London who appoints a deputy to act as the capital's PCC.
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National/02
Given National/02 and other national interviewees' level of interest in stop and search, it is
inevitable they cited it as an example of PCCs incapacity to appreciate minority issues.
They nonetheless felt that it did serve as the best example due to its societal impact and
scale  of  use.  In  fact,  a  documentary  analysis  of  police  and crime  plans  revealed  that
broader  issues  affecting  ethnic  minorities  were  also  missing  from  those  plans.  This
supports  predictions  that  electoral  reform  could  promote  less  equitable  policing
experiences  by  incentivising  PCCs  to  prioritise  populist  demands  at  the  expense  of
minority  groups  (Millen  &  Stephens,  2011;  Lister  &  Rowe,  2015),  contrary  to  what
constitutes as democratic policing (chapter 2).
Interestingly, four of the five PCCs whose forces were subject to the EHRC (2010; 2013)
programme of action to tackle racial  disproportionality had prioritised this  as an issue:
Leicestershire,  Metropolitan Police,  Thames Valley,  and the West Midlands (table 8.1).
Dorset PCC (2015), on the other hand, only made reference to stop and search in the more
recent  police  and  crime  plan.  However,  it  features  more  substantively  within  the
constabulary's 'equalities objectives' whereby a force lead on stop and search is responsible
for  ensuring  “activity  is  intelligence  led”,  “is  legal  and  proportionate”  and,  more
concretely, is responsible for “monitoring the number of stop / searches and stop / accounts
carried  out  to  identify  any adverse trends  and identify  preventative  /  remedial  action”
(Dorset Police, 2015). This highlights the strong two-fold influence that national bodies
can have in not only shaping the priorities of some PCCs but, where unsuccessful, their on-
going pressures upon chief officers. 
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Revealingly, 37 constabularies responded to the Home Office (2013c) public consultation
on stop and search compared to only 19 PCCs despite the HMIC (2013) inspection which
inspired  that  exercise  finding  significant  failings  in  every  force  (Appendix  E).
Leicestershire  PCC  (2013:19)  also  provided  another  good  example  of  the  ongoing
relevance of national policing bodies in shaping local activities: 
“Stop and Search continues to be a useful tool used by the police in the
prevention and detection of crime and terrorism. However, I recognise it
can have a detrimental impact on confidence if it is used in an unfair and
ineffective  way.  Leicestershire  Police  continue  to  work  closely  with  the
Equality and Human Rights Commission to ensure stop and search is used
fairly. It is my intention to continue to hold the Chief Constable to account
for the use of stop and search and to make sure it is used both fairly and
effectively to keep the people of Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland safe.”
(Leicestershire PCC, 2013:19, 2014:32; emphasis added)
As  this  shows,  the  EHRC  continued  to  provide  an  important  oversight  role  in
Leicestershire  and  present  the  PCC  with  some  sort  of  standards  to  assess  his  chief
constable by. As with most other PCCs, stop and search was referred to only briefly and in
relation to their expectation to see the powers used ‘lawfully’, ‘fairly’ and ‘transparently’
(emphases added):
“We will also ensure that this age group continues to be informed about
their rights, as those aged 18-25 are statistically most likely to be stopped
and searched. Young men in this age group are also at the greatest risk of
becoming the victims of violence. We will seek to increase mutual respect
and understanding between the police and this age group.” 
(South Wales PCC, 2013:23)
“To maintain a focus on the appropriate and effective use of Stop & Search,
to  ensure  its  use  is  understood  & communicated  to  the  communities of
Thames Valley [...] Maximise the effectiveness of the use of stop and search
whilst minimising its negative impacts.” 
(Thames Valley PCC, 2013:24&40)
“As such  it  should  only  be  applied  where  it  is  operationally  necessary,
within due process and used appropriately. With the police I will ensure stop
and  search  activity  is  used  appropriately,  proportionately  and  when
necessary  to  do  so, working with  communities  to  assess  the  impact  this
activity has had on them and better explain why.” 
(West Yorkshire, 2013 18-19)
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“Ensure  that  stop  and  search  is  carried  out  lawfully,  and  is  not
disproportionate,  discriminatory,  or  damaging  to  relations  within  and
between our communities” 
(Dyfed Powys PCC, 2013:08).
“Ensure that policing services are accessible and responsive to the needs of
service users, police powers (such as stop and search) are used fairly and
proportionately and people are treated with dignity and respect” 
(Greater Manchester PCC, 2013:10).
As can be seen from these excerpts, some PCCs were keen to show their electorate that
they understood the impact of those powers upon their electorate, particularly on ethnic
minorities. However, the lack of detail surrounding how they would achieve those aims
and their lack of reference to the potential role of their electorate in scrutinising operational
practices suggests that commissioners lacked the expertise to do so unless supported by a
national programme such as the EHRC in Leicestershire. Instead, PCCs sought to provide
this accountability themselves primarily through the traditional means of analysing police-
recorded data. Even where PCCs indicated involvement of the public, this was constrained
to raising awareness of people's legal rights if searched and to understanding how those
powers are used. Essentially,  these limited public engagement  activities  show just  how
narrow PCCs have interpreted their role and their reproduction of explanatory forms of
accountability rather than stronger opportunities for members of the public to influence
operational  practice.  Whilst  this  may have been inevitable  in  the  initial  year  of  PCCs,
particularly given the pressures they faced to consult and produce their first police and
crime plans within six months of assuming their role, their overall reactionary activities
and  lack  of  participatory  opportunities  for  ethnic  minority  groups  remained  constant
throughout this research.
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Initially,  only Labour's PCCs for Nottinghamshire,  West Midlands and West Yorkshire
made substantive commitments to provide their electorate with opportunities to scrutinise
the  police  and  enhance  their  responsiveness  to  ethnic  minorities  concerns.  Doubting
whether  recent  reductions  in  use  and  disproportionality  had  led  to  better  quality
encounters,  West  Yorkshire's  PCC  (2014:33)  pledged  to “undertake  a  programme  of
consultation with the public to assess the current impact this activity has had on them and
assess whether the perceptions around stop and search of all kinds reflect the changing
figures.”  They were later joined by their Conservative peers: the Northamptonshire PCC
(2015a), who commissioned a public attitudes survey to help devise a new policy on stop
and search use,  and the Leicestershire  PCC who established a youth commission from
which  stop  and  search  emerged  as  a  key  concern  which  he  agreed  to  address
(Leicestershire YCUK, 2015). These activities are discussed in more detail in chapter 9
which analyses their potential impact upon local police accountability.
Scrutiny of counter-terrorism searches remained as just elusive as in the national activities
with the exceptions of, once again, the West Midlands PCC (2015; also 2014b) and West
Yorkshire’s PCC (2014:33) who demonstrated a rare understanding of the various legal
powers amongst his peers by calling for greater scrutiny “where the powers used have no
safeguard  of  reasonable  suspicion  such  as  those  available  under  the  relevant  counter-
terrorism legislation.” Both of these commissioners preside over cities with huge South-
East Asian populations and so suggests that the size of the minority electorate  and the
politics of how those powers impact upon those communities can influence how PCCs
formulate their priorities. 
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Despite  police-initiated  stops  not  featuring  in  his  crime  plan,  Gloucestershire  PCC
(2014b:8) focussed primarily on the retraining of officers on stop and search  “where the
emphasis  is placed on the ethical  use of [the] powers and understanding of reasonable
suspicion. Officers are given an increased understanding of, and the ability to explain, the
use of their powers to people affected.” This contrasted with his earlier reports where stop
and  search  was  used  as  a  benchmark  to  evidence  successful  police  operations
(Gloucestershire PCC, 2013, 2014a). It followed the HMIC's (2013) damning inspection
report which, amongst other things, criticised front-line officers' lack of understanding of
their legal powers and what constitutes reasonable suspicion. Once again this shows the
capacity of central actors to influence local priorities. Once complete, his focus on stop and
search had reverted back to evidencing how, under his watch, the police had successfully
met his strategic priorities, particularly road and traffic operations (Gloucestershire PCC,
2014c,  2014d).  Notably,  Gloucestershire  Police  was  one  of  the  thirteen  forces  later
suspended from the Home Office (2014f) best practice scheme for its non-compliance and
this seemingly permissive culture towards police stops may have contributed to this (see:
HMIC, 2016).
8.1.1. Summary
In summary, a documentary analysis of PCCs' plans and other key documents since 2013,
shows their collective disinterest in police-initiated stops despite the long-standing inter-
generational concerns surrounding their use and the increased national scrutiny over the
research period.  This shows how disjointed the local  and national  structures for police
accountability  are  and  the  competing  influences  upon  chief  constables.  Overall,  PCCs
appeared  to  be  too  unresponsive  to  the  needs  of  their  ethnic  minority  communities  to
ensure that  their  police force's priorities  better  reflected their  concerns.  Those who did
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prioritise stop and search undertook a narrow range of similar activities which aimed to
provide  the  public  with  better  information  rather  than  a  stronger  participatory role  in
redefining their policing experiences. Further, their activities excluded the wider range of
police-initiated encounters such as those under counter-terrorism and traffic  legislation;
enhanced opportunities for redress was also missing. This all reinforces Lister & Rowe's
(2015) broader assessment of PCCs as having a narrow interpretation of their role.
Just  as  the  HMIC  (2016)  found  a  lack  of  leadership  among  chief  officers  on  police
encounters and their failure to understand its impact upon the public, so too can this be said
of PCCs overall. For example, according to South Wales PCC (2015:22; emphasis added),
“The inspection on 'Stop and Search'  appears likely to result  in positive comments  for
South  Wales  but  those  involved  in  the  inspection  acknowledged  that  while  there  are
problems in some parts of England and Wales they have not detected specific issues in our
area".  The PCC even  went  as  far  as  criticising  the  HMIC's  inspections  for  taking  an
“enormous amount of time for operational officers and sometimes pull against the grain of
local  priorities.”  Ironically,  similar  to  Gloucestershire,  the  HMIC (2016)  found  South
Wales to be one of thirteen forces least compliant with the Home Office's best practice
scheme,  resulting  in  its  suspension  from  the  programme  by  the  Home  Secretary  and
reinspection. This contrasted to the generally positive inspections of those forces whose
commissioners  held a more critical  stance towards their  force's use of stop and search,
including this research's three case study areas (see chapter 9). Whilst it was difficult to
link better  operational practices with greater scrutiny from PCCs, particularly given the
strong  national  influences  previously  discussed,  commissioners  do  enjoy  significant
powers  to  enhance  local  police  accountability  (chapter  3).  However,  only  a  small
proportion attempted to did this in relation to police-initiated stops. As is discussed next,
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an analysis of stop and search trends in three different forces shows how important the
political environment within which police and chief officers operate can influence their use
of those powers locally, the limitations of national stimuli, and the potential for PCCs to
play a key role in facilitating greater public accountability should they choose to do so.
8.2. The case studies
Nottinghamshire, Suffolk and the West Midlands were three of the most proactive PCCs
on stop and search. This section analyses data on stop and search trends in those forces to
understand  how  the  national  and  local  influences  interacted  to  produce  changes  to
operational  practice.  Whilst  many  of  the  themes  identified  show  the  strong  ongoing
influence of central actors, the role of PCCs is less clear. For analytical advantages, cases
were chosen to maximise differences between them so as to identify any consistent themes
from the  varied  contexts  that  PCCs  operate  in  locally  (see  methodology).  Differences
between cases shed light on the broader range of influences upon police practice but also
their limitations and, therefore, shows the complicated nature of how democratic police
accountability is negotiated locally. The West Midlands police is discussed first because its
stop and search data showed a relatively simple trajectory whereas Nottinghamshire and
Suffolk were both more complicated and revealed limitations in the influence of central
actors.
208
Table 8.2 – Stop and search use and percentage change, 2009/10-2014/15 
(a) West Midlands
Year Section 1 Section 60 Section44/47A Total Change (%)
2009/10 19,407 815 0 20,222
2010/11 20,149 319 0 20,468 1
2011/12 36,763 699 0 37,462 83
2012/13 33,265 70 0 33,335 -11
2013/14 23,940 21 0 23,961 -28
2014/15 15,579 10 0 15,589 -35
(b) Nottinghamshire 
Year Section 1 Section 60 Section44/47A Total Change (%)
2009/10 5,856 366 0 6,222
2010/11 4,811 270 0 5,081 -18
2011/12 3,158 218 0 3,376 -34
2012/13 3,657 10 0 3,667 9
2013/14 5,604 65 0 5,669 55
2014/15 4,166 0 0 4,166 -27
(c) Suffolk
Year Section 1 Section 60 Section44/47A Total Change (%)
Stop and
account
2009/10 4,530 13 0 4,543 -
2010/11 3,529 0 0 3,529 -22 -
2011/12 3,440 4 0 3,444 -2 7,663
2012/13 3,721 8 0 3,729 8 6,182
2013/14 5,327 0 0 5,327 43 8,406
2014/15 4,414 1 0 4,415 -17 -
Notes: Section 1 figures include other powers that require reasonable suspicion (see Appendix A).
Sources: Home Office (2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).
West Midlands Police is comprised of seven metropolitan districts and conducted more
searches  than  Nottinghamshire  and  Suffolk  combined.  The  city  of  Birmingham,  the
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region’s  administrative  capital,  typically  accounts  for  at  least  half  of  those  searches
(EHRC, 2013). Section 1 and other powers requiring reasonable suspicion rose during the
initial period investigated by this thesis. Over 19,000 searches were conducted in 2009/10
rising to over 20,000 in 2010/11 and then to nearly 37,000 during its peak in 2011/12 (table
8.2(a)). Following the government scrutiny (chapter 6-7), section 1 volumes fell in each
subsequent year down to over 33,000 in 2012/13 during the HMIC (2013) inspection, less
than 24,000 during the subsequent fallout in 2013/14, and then again to under 16,000 in
2014/15 as the Home Office (2014f) introduced its best use scheme (BUSSS). Overall, this
represents a fall of 58% since the start of government scrutiny. Section 60 use generally
fell during this period, from over 800 searches in 2009/10 to over 300 in 2010/11 but then
rose sharply by approximately 120% to almost 700 in 2011/12, the year of the 2011 riots.
However, use declined substantially from 2012/13 onwards until only 10 searches were
recorded in 2014/15. Interestingly, the latter reductions took place a year after it had done
so nationally  (table  6.1 & figure 6.1).  Therefore,  2011/12 may have been a  temporary
change in response to the riots since the general trend in West Midlands was one of longer-
term decline in section 60 use since 2007/08 (table 8.2(a), also Home Office, 2009, 2010).
The declining trends in stop and search use across the West Midlands pre-date both the
government's reforms and the introduction of PCCs and can be explained by a number of
factors. In relation to section 60, an IPCC (2007) investigation severely criticised the force
for misusing the power after it uncovered evidence that officers were using it for routine
crime problems rather than serious violence, similar to a previous investigation. This may
have accounted  for the reductions  in its  use since 2007/08 and at  a  time when it  had
increased  in  other  major  urban  areas.  Also,  from  2011/12,  the  EHRC  (2010,  2013)
threatened  the  force  with  legal  action  if  it  did  not  address  what  it  deemed  to  be  the
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excessive  and  disproportionate  use  of  its  searches  under  section  1  and  other  such
legislation. This resulted in the retraining of front-line officers, the introduction of better
supervision  and monitoring  of  the  powers  and also a  more  explicit  aim of  decreasing
volumes.  As the EHRC argued,  this  had produced reductions  during the course of the
programme seen from 2011/12, although it conceded that disproportionality, the primary
target of its  activities,  had remained largely unchanged. However,  the more substantial
reductions from 2012/13, particularly 2013/14, occurred at a time when the accountability
of those powers were at  its  height  following the results  of the damning HMIC (2013)
inspection, the introduction of BUSSS in 2014, and pressures from national government to
reduce search volumes during this period, particularly in relation to section 60 which was
threatened by the Roberts litigation. Ultimately, the changes in stop and search use across
the West Midlands during the research period could be explained by national developments
irrespective of the introduction of PCCs.
Nottinghamshire and Suffolk demonstrated a more complicated picture of how operational
practice is negotiated locally.  Both are a mixed rural/urban police force with a similar
volume of recorded searches (tables 8.2(b) and 8.2(c), respectively). These relatively low
volumes  have  made  them consistently  amongst  the  lowest  searching  forces  nationally
(HMIC, 2013), although Nottinghamshire used section 60 at far higher levels compared to
Suffolk’s  rare  use.  After  an initial  fall  in  section 1 during  the  first  three  years  of  the
research 2009/10 to 2011/12, use rose in both forces in 2012/13 and 2013/14 alongside the
greater national scrutiny. Significantly, these increases contradicted the national trend and
their comparatively similar forces, and only declined in the last year 2014/15. Suffolk’s use
of stop and account appeared to have an inverse relationship to recorded searches where it
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reduced  as  officers  conducted  more  searches  and increased  as  searches  were  curtailed
(table 8.2(c)).
The  year  2014/15  was  significant  because  that  was  when  the  Home  Secretary  placed
significant  pressures  upon  all  constabularies  through  BUSSS to  reduce  their  searches.
Senior officers from both forces blamed their  staggered use on 'mixed messages'  from
national government concerning whether to increase or curtail those encounters:
“It's come back down this year. So in 2013 the HMIC came along and said
‘Suffolk you’re not using stop and search enough’ so we went ‘well,  we
better use stop and search more’ so we did a lot of stop and search which
was  then  bled  into  the  2013-14  figures  ….  So  by  the  time  we  got  the
message  through  to  the  workforce-  so  2014  we  did  loads  of  stops  and
searches right up until probably Christmas time when they brought in the
Best Use of Stop and Search [Scheme] when they said ‘oh, you’re doing too
many  stop-searches’.  And  that’s  half  the  problem:  the  message  is  so
disjoined from the government and I’m not criticising them cos it’s coming
from the HMIC but if you have a HMIC inspection in 2013 saying do loads
more right before you have one in 2014 that says you’re doing too many the
workforce is gonna go ‘I’m confused here, what is it you want me to do?”
Suffolk/Police/01
“I think the view has been nationally that we need to increase the volume of
stop and search in Nottinghamshire because I’m not sure we’re the lowest
searching but we’re one of the lowest searching” 
Nottinghamshire/Police/01
As both officers indicated, the messages received from national government can play an
important  role  in  shaping  operational  practice  by  influencing  police  officers'  levels  of
confidence in using their powers. However, the mid-term increases just described occurred
against  the backdrop of a growing cross-party consensus that  discouraged use in  other
forces, including the West Midlands, and suggests that there were other factors that could
explain the changes in Nottinghamshire and Suffolk. As some interviewees stated: 
“You can put a lot of the rise up to one chief officer who’s not around here
any more who did think it was a really effective tool to use and promoted it
a lot and we sat there saying actually you’re not getting that much out of it
so why would you, you know.” 
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ChiefOfficer/03
“It’s mixed, I mean, some people accept it and have made big progress in
terms of how they use it others less so. It depends how attentive or how
important it is to the chief officer group if I’m honest.”
National/06 
As these interviewees suggest, some chief officers were more amenable to external reform
than others. They highlight just how powerful chief officers' own values are in determining
the extent to which external reform translates into operational practice. Suffolk provided
another good example of this at a public meeting held by the PCC where the assistant chief
constable explicitly stated “that he was encouraging greater use of the power and indeed in
the new financial  year  numbers had increased” (Suffolk PCC, 2013d:para3.2).  But this
goes beyond Suffolk as successive HMIC (2013, 2015a, 2016) inspections have criticised
most chief constables countrywide for failing to implement reforms, thus suggesting that
national government has less power than previously thought. Despite the major reductions
in stop and search use in 2014/15, the year of BUSSS, a HMIC (2016) inspection found
that  only  11  of  the  43  Home  Office  sponsored  forces  were  fully  compliant  with  that
scheme almost two years after it was first announced. Nottinghamshire and Suffolk were
judged to be fully compliant whereas the West Midlands faltered on the requirement of
publishing the broader outcomes of searches (ibid:47).
What was missing from most interviews was the impact of PCCs on stop and search use.
Whilst operational independence presents them with the same legal barriers that the Home
Office faces in actually determining the exercise of those powers, commissioners' priority
setting and budgetary duties gives them considerable influence over the overall direction of
policing  and  its  responsiveness  to  local  priorities.  However,  police  records  show  that
searches for drugs rather than any other priorities set by case study PCCs accounted for
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greatest  use of the powers and this  proportion rose during the research period even as
absolute numbers eventually fell by 2014/15 (tables 8.3(a)-(c)). This is as an unintended
consequence of the Home Secretary's pressures on police officer to increase the outcomes
from  searches  (HC  Deb  (2013-14)  30  April  2014),  and  an  example  of  how  national
priorities can still override those set by local policing bodies. Across the West Midlands,
the proportion of searches for drugs had reduced by the end of the EHRC programme from
49% in 2010/11 to  44% in 2012/13,  although the  absolute  number  had risen by then.
However, this returned to 49% in 2013/14 as national pressures mounted and rose to a
further  56% in  2014/15  despite  the  lower  absolute  volume  of  searches  overall  (table
8.3(a)).  Nottinghamshire's  drugs  searches  had  been  in  decline  from  almost  3,000  in
2009/10, half of all recorded encounters, to over 1,400 in 2012/13 (table 8.3(b)). This rose
as Nottinghamshire police increased searches in response to its HMIC inspection report to
over 1,700 searches in the following year (48%) and 2,421 in 2014/15 equating to 58% of
all searches. Finally, in Suffolk, drugs searches were particularly high and rose in almost
every year from over 1,800 in 2010/11 equating to 53% of all searches (a 24% reduction
on the previous year) to under 3,400 in 2013/14 or 64% of all searches (table 8.3(c)). It
rose again in the year of BUSSS to 69% although absolute numbers fell  to over 3,000
alongside  searches  more  generally.  Throughout  this  period,  Suffolk  Constabulary  was
engaged in a number of anti-drugs operations against London originating gangs, a priority
of Suffolk PCC (2013e & 2015:06) who encouraged a “pro-active programme of drug
operations,” which the force acknowledged was a key driver of its ethnic disproportionality
(Suffolk PCC, 2014a). The PCC did not appear to challenge these operations and may have
provided  the  constabulary  with  some  political  counterweight  to  the  Home  Secretary's
demands.
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Table 8.3 – Stop and search by reason, 2009/10-2014/15 
(a) West Midlands
Stolen
property Drugs Firearms
Offensive
weapons
Going
equipped
Criminal
damage Other
2009/10 2,596 8,570 128 1,891 6,203 - 19 
2010/11 3,168 9,833 248 2,204 4,692 - 4 
2011/12 6,821 15,625 434 4,043 9,840 - - 
2012/13 5,661 14,748 339 3,380 9,056 5 76 
2013/14 4,402 11,611 335 2,381 5,062 23 126 
2014/15 2,699 8,790 276 1,405 2,256 85 68 
(b) Nottinghamshire
Stolen
property Drugs Firearms
Offensive
weapons
Going
equipped
Criminal
damage Other
2009/10 864 2,914 55 311 971 - 741 
2010/11 851 2,174 66 204 837 - 679 
2011/12 584 1,413 35 139 510 - 477 
2012/13 624 1,756 28 260 629 41 319 
2013/14 564 3,145 32 394 1,255 55 159 
2014/15 387 2,421 34 271 915 46 92 
(c) Suffolk 
Stolen
property Drugs Firearms
Offensive
weapons
Going
equipped
Criminal
damage Other
2009/10 921 2,457 78 318 464 80 212 
2010/11 831 1,861 77 219 376 63 102 
2011/12 751 1,999 48 213 282 31 116 
2012/13 780 2,291 49 188 281 38 94 
2013/14 1,105 3,384 33 248 477 38 42 
2014/15 761 3,057 34 232 255 47 28 
Sources: Home Office (2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).
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Table 8.4– Searches by ethnicity per 1,000 of their population size, 2009/10-2014/15 
(a) West Midlands
White Black Asian Mixed Other total
2009/10 5 18 14 15 3 8
2010/11 6 19 12 13 4 9
2011/12 11 38 23 23 9 16
2012/13 10 31 20 21 8 14
2013/14 7 20 15 17 7 10
2014/15 5 14 9 12 1 7
(b) Nottinghamshire
White Black Asian Mixed Other total
2009/10 5 19 8 13 3 6
2010/11 4 19 6 10 1 5
2011/12 3 12 5 7 2 3
2012/13 3 14 6 6 2 4
2013/14 5 21 7 9 3 6
2014/15 4 15 5 6 3 4
(c) Suffolk
White Black Asian Mixed Other Total
2009-10 6 29 8 16 13 7
2010-11 5 21 5 13 2 5
2011-12 5 23 7 11 2 5
2012-13 5 22 7 13 0.5 6
2013-14 7 13 27 19 17 8
2014-15 6 51 6 22 3 7
Notes: (1) 'Total' column provides an overall search rate per 1,000 of the population residing within the
police force area
(2) 'Other' ethnic category includes searches of Chinese people
(3) Disproportionality figures are calculated by dividing the rates per 1,000 of each group by the
figure for whites.
Sources: Home Office (2011a, 2012a, 2013a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c); Nomis (2011)
Racial disproportionality of searches, a key focus of case study PCCs, is another area they
could have potentially influenced by representing the views of their minority populations
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and providing them with meaningful opportunities to shape their group-level experiences.
Ethnic  minority  groups  were  searched  at  higher  rates  per  1,000  of  their  respective
population sizes across all three case study areas but data for each force showed a different
pattern (tables 8.4(a)-(c)). 
West  Midlands  showed  an  overall  reduction  in  disproportionality  following  mid-term
increases (table 8.4(a)). At the start of the research period, total search rates across the
West  Midlands  had  increased  in  2009/10  from  8  searches  per  1,000  of  its  general
population to 16 p/1,000 in 2011/12. At this point, there were 11 searches p/1,000 of the
white population and 9 p/1,000 of Chinese or other ethnicities, meaning that both of these
groups were under-represented in searches. By contrast, per 1,000 of their population sizes,
there were 38 searches of black people, 23 of Asians and 23 of mixed people. This equated
to black people being searched at four times the rate of whites and people from Asian or
mixed backgrounds were both searched at twice the rate of whites. However, following the
national scrutiny the overall search rate and rates for each major ethnic group had declined
such that, by 2014/15 there were 7 p/1,000 searches of West Midlands' resident population.
In 2014/15, there were 5 white people and one person from a Chinese or other ethnic group
searched p/1,000 meaning they were again under-represented in searches. However, people
from black,  Asian  or  mixed  ethnicities  were  searched  at  higher  rates  at  14,  9  and 12
searches p/1,000 thus equating to a disproportionality rate of three, twice and again twice
the rate of whites, respectively.
Nottinghamshire's search rates recorded a general decline interrupted by a short-term two-
year increase between 2012/13 and 2013/14 (table 8.4(b)). This coincided with the HMIC
inspection but fell in 2014/15 as BUSSS was introduced. During the initial period, searches
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declined from 6 per 1,000 of Nottinghamshire's total resident population in 2009/10 to 3
p/1,000 in 2011/12. With the exception of 'Chinese and other' ethnicities, ethnic minorities
were searched at  higher  rates than whites throughout  the research period.  By 2011/12,
search rates had fallen to 3 p/1,000 for whites; 12 p/1,000 for blacks (4 times the rate of
whites); 5 p/1,000 for Asians (twice the rate of whites) and 7 p/1,000 for mixed people (3
times the rate of whites). As already noted, the constabulary sought to raise their volume of
searches in response to the HMIC inspection and, unsurprisingly, their overall search rates
returned to 6 per 1,000 of the total population by 2013/14, with increases across all ethnic
groups, particularly of blacks. Following BUSSS in 2014/15, the longer term decline in
search rates had resumed such that there were 4 searches p/1,000 of Nottinghamshire's
residents.  Asians  and  people  from  Chinese  or  other  backgrounds  were  searched  at
approximately  the  same  rate  as  whites  at  5  and  3  times  p/1,000  of  their  respective
population sizes compared to 4 for whites. However blacks and mixed were searched at 15
and 6 p/1,000 of their populations, equating to a disproportionality rate of four and twice
the rate of whites, respectively. In sum, ethnic disproportionality over the research period
fluctuated and correlated to national pressures faced by the constabulary.
Suffolk  stood  out  from  all  of  the  case  studies  in  that  its  disproportionality  rate  was
extremely erratic, particularly in the final years 2013/14 and 2014/15. Suffolk started in
2009/10 with 7 searches conducted per 1,000 of its entire population size and this fell to 5
in the following two years, led primarily by reduced searches of whites (table 8.4(c)). By
the end of the research period, the figure returned to 7 p/1,000 and disproportionality for
blacks and mixed people remained high throughout.70 Initially in 2009/10, people from
black  or  mixed  backgrounds  were  searched  at  a  rate  of  29  and  16  p/1,000  of  their
70 Searches of 'other' ethnicities, including Chinese, are excluded from this analysis as the figures were so 
small that no meaningful comparisons could be made. 
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population size, equating to a disproportionality rate of 5 and 3 times the rate of whites,
respectively.  By 2014/15,  this  had  risen  significantly  to  51 p/1,000 for  blacks  and 22
p/1,000 for mixed people resulting in a disproportionality rate of 9 and 4 times the rate of
whites, respectively. Asians were searched at an average of 7 p/1,000 meaning that they
were  searched  at  a  marginally  higher  rate  than  whites.  However,  in  2013/14  Asians
replaced black people in being searched at the highest rate of 27 p/1,000 (or almost 4 times
the rate of whites) while black people were searched at 13 p/1,000 (or double the rate of
whites).  This  coincided  with  heightened  scrutiny  by  the  Home  Office  but  also  the
appointment of a new (then temporary) chief constable. Disproportionality was also a key
focus of Suffolk PCC's scrutiny of stop and search and data from the fieldwork, including
interviews with police officers, showed a lack of understanding concerning what caused
these dramatic shifts in disparities. As discussed earlier, anti-drugs operations had a major
impact upon search volumes and was a key crime-reduction priority of the PCC and the
constabulary. This can explain some of the disparities, particularly the on-going ‘Operation
Volcanic’ across Ipswich where, according to the force, “it is recognised from the start of
this operation that a significant proportion of individuals from these London [based drugs]
businesses are predominantly from non-white ethnic backgrounds which have impacted on
proportionality rates with stop search” (Suffolk PCC, 2014b:para1.13; also 2014c:para1.11
and  2015:para3.1).  However,  as  these  operations  have  been  targeted  towards  what  is
believed to be predominantly ‘black gangs’ originating from London, it remained unclear
why searches for mixed people were high, and what led to the surge in recorded searches
of  Asians  in  2013/14,  particularly  as  senior  and  chief  officers  interviewed  could  not
explain these disparities.
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In conclusion, an analysis of police-recorded searches and targeting within each case study
area  reveals  similar  findings  despite  different  trajectories.  Each  force  had  produced
dramatic  changes  to  their  search  volumes  following  intense  pressures  from  national
government, particularly in 2013/14. These changes in volumes and targeting appeared to
coincide with, rather than be caused by, the introduction of PCCs. Police recorded data,
supported by interview data, reveals that national scrutiny on police-initiated stops was
negotiated  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  but  also  highlights  some  organisational  resistance
towards  external  pressures.  Suffolk  was  a  primary  example  of  this  where  it  took  the
appointment of a new chief constable for the force to be more responsive to the Home
Secretary's demands and local concerns. West Midlands Police had produced reductions in
their use of stop and search since the IPCC’s (2007) complaint and the EHRC's (2010,
2013) threat of legal action, and accelerated following the Home Secretary's reforms. As
Nottinghamshire  and  Suffolk  were  lower  using  forces,  their  volumes  of  searches  had
increased  in  response  to  their  assessment  of  the  HMIC  inspection  even  as  national
government had begun its programme of reforms. Volumes fell once the Home Secretary
had  dispelled  any  'mixed  messages'  after  introducing  BUSSS.  However,  as
Nottinghamshire  and particularly  Suffolk  illustrate,  there  is  no  simple  cause-and-effect
between  government-led  reform  and  changes  to  police  practice  as  chief  constables
appeared to retain considerable powers to resist these pressures and determine how they
were implemented locally.
8.3. Conclusion
Despite PCCs being introduced to inject greater local police accountability,  this chapter
has shown that a democratic deficit continues to exist at the local level, certainly in relation
to police-initiated stops.  The previous chapter argued that PCCs' potential  to strengthen
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local accountability in relation to such operational practices was ignored by the central
actors that also govern the police. As the first part of this chapter suggests, this ongoing
local deficit  is one that PCCs appear to have largely acquiesced to.  Although stop and
search became increasingly politicised throughout their  first  term in office,  PCCs were
largely disinterested  in  these  encounters  and this  reflects  their  wider  neglect  of  issues
concerning  the  policing  experiences  of  ethnic  minorities  (Lister  & Rowe,  2015).  This
supports the existing literature which warns that electoral reform does not automatically
lead to greater democratic controls of the police, particularly for ethnic minorities (Jones et
al., 2008; Millen & Stephens, 2011; Lister & Rowe, 2015). 
However, a small number of PCCs went against this grain and sought to address the wider
use  of  police-initiated  stops  than  the  national  activities  focused  on.  The  PCCs  for
Nottinghamshire,  Suffolk and the West Midlands are three such commissioners  and  an
analysis  of data from their  police forces shows that stop and search volumes and most
ethnic disproportionality declined by the end of the research period, albeit with some mid-
term increases. However, the end result appears to have been produced through a highly
complex and inter-related set of negotiations with senior and chief officers that involved a
wider range of actors than just the Home Secretary.  For example,  changes in the  West
Midlands had already been underway following the IPCC's (2007) earlier criticisms and
the EHRC's (2010, 2013) threat of legal action, although reductions accelerated during the
national  reforms.  Nottinghamshire  and  Suffolk's  staggered  use  demonstrates  a  more
complicated picture of how changes to operational practice is negotiated in the face of
conflicting views between the wider range of national actors that the police are accountable
to: namely, the HMIC and the Home Office. This suggests that power is dispersed more
widely  within  the  structures  of  police  governance  (Jones  et  al.,  1994)  but  nonetheless
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remains centralised. However, as Suffolk most graphically shows, the extent to which stop
and search reform translates into operational practice is determined by chief officers, thus
highlighting how powerful they remain. Yet commissioners are far from powerless and the
three  case  study  PCCs  initiated  their  own  activities  intended  to  enhance  local  police
accountability. The next and final chapter analyses how they sought to negotiate changes to
police-initiated stops before this thesis ends with a conclusion of its key findings.
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9. Pivot or a Spare Wheel? How Commissioners Negotiate Operational
Practice.
Previous  chapters  have  argued that  national  government  and other  central  actors  have
retained a strong influence over stop and search practice. Police and crime commissioners
(PCCs) have largely acquiesced to this despite being introduced to ensure that the police is
more responsive to their electorate, including ethnic minority communities. This chapter
analyses the activities of three of the most proactive PCCs in attempting to enhance local
police accountability. Drawing upon these findings, this chapter analyses how they sought
to  negotiate  their  role  vis-a-vis  their  chief  constables,  but  also  how  the  latter  have
successfully resisted any fundamental  reforms promised by commissioners  just  as they
have done so with other central  actors. The related activities  of other PCCs across the
country are also discussed for analytical comparisons and to test the broader applicability
of these findings.  This chapter  concludes by assessing the extent  to which PCCs have
improved local police accountability. 
PCCs and their deputies, chief and senior officers, staff from national policing bodies, and
members of the public involved in scrutinising the police were interviewed. They were
unanimous in believing that PCCs have an important role in monitoring and governing the
use of police-initiated stops due to its significant societal impact. However, an analysis of
data  from interviews,  official  documents  and observations  of  public  events  revealed  a
number  of  constraints  facing  their  ability  to  do this,  plus  it  also  provided a  means  of
assessing the depth of accountability introduced by PCCs. These can be grouped into two
dimensions  and both of which help to explain why PCCs were found to exercise little
influence  over  police-initiated  stops.  This  chapter  starts  with  discussing  the  first:
operational  independence.  It  then  discusses  the  more  significant  finding  that
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commissioners were constraining their own influence by narrowly interpreting their wide
range of responsibilities and legal powers, each discussed separately.
9.1. Operational independence
What  constitutes  operational  independence  became  a  fascinating  discussion  during
interviews because it  concerned legal  constraints  to how far PCCs could exercise their
powers to ensure operational practice is more responsive to their electorate. As this section
argues,  stop  and account  was  particularly  revealing  of  how chief  constables  remained
powerful and could resist pressures from their PCC and electorate to change their practices.
Lister (2013:7) argues that PCCs' governance and executive duties would inevitably result
in them interfering into operational matters. On the contrary, this study found that PCCs
were not “too powerful” for their chief constables, at least in relation to police-initiated
stops. Both PCCs and chief officers were well aware of the potential for conflict to arise
concerning what constitutes operational independence but minimised its prospects locally:
“Well, there's the point I was making earlier on that …, what's operational
and what's policy? And sure the day-to-day use on the streets of stop and
search is  an operational  matter;  relationships  with  the black and Asian
community is a policy matter. The two overlap and fortunately we've got a
pragmatic  and sensible  chief  constable  here who is  prepared to  discuss
these things with us, so we've never got into a fundamental row about 'you
can't say that because that's my bag'.”
Commissioner/01
“[Stop and search is] both: it’s a strategic issue in that it’s about if PCCs
are about putting the voice of the people across to the police then it’s a
strategic issue: ‘we need this to change, we need it to stop’. The police have
then got  to  think how they  manage that.  And I  think in  this  area that’s
happened.”
Commissioner/02
“Well, of course there’s always a bit of give-and-take... and obviously we’ve
both got a certain amount of leverage...  There’s areas which I think are
crucial to our community which I believe I should have a significant say
on…  the  acts  of  stop  and  search  is  a  case  in  point:  whilst  it  is  an
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operational decision as to how you do it, it clearly has a major influence on
our communities. So I’ve said … we do need to respond to that and the chief
constable has acknowledged that and sought to get his officers to respond.”
Commissioner/05
“...of  course  operationally  they  [PCCs]  cannot  interfere.  So  politicians
cannot interfere with operational incidents but you define operational... I
can tell you that my PCC will have a different view to the XXXXX PCC
about what’s operational, will have a different view to the YYYYY PCC, will
have  a  different  view  to  the  ZZZZZ  PCC  and  all  will  have  different
definitions as to what is operational.”
ChiefOfficer/03
“Stop and search is an operational police power, the impact of the use of
those powers on minority communities where that is shown to be potentially
discriminatory,  certainly  disproportionate,  is  very  much  the  PCC issue.
And,  actually,  isn’t  it  a bit  of  an artificial  separation that  thing  around
anything that’s operational is the chief’s?”
National/04
As  these  excerpts  show,  the  role  of  PCCs  vis-a-vis  chief  officers  on  police-initiated
encounters  is  one  negotiated  locally  between  the  two  actors (Lister,  2013).  Most
interviewees emphasised the highly ambiguous nature of operational independence, with
stop and search serving as a good example of how highly interdependent the roles of PCCs
and chief constables  have become.  Commissioners  were keen to  suggest that  they had
successfully achieved changes to stop and search use or scrutiny, particularly through their
pragmatism.  However,  National/04  reflected  the  views  of  national  policing  staff
interviewed  by  agreeing  that  any  separation  of  operational  and  policy  issues  were
“artificial” but also their criticism of PCCs inability to robustly scrutinise chief constables.
As s/he continues:“it’s not a working together thing because the PCC’s job is not to work
together it’s to hold to account so maybe [stop and search] crosses the line there but you
can’t not cross that line and hold the chief to account can they?” PCCs were perceived to
be 'too cosy' to their chief constables on these issues rather than being more forceful in
asserting their role in holding their chiefs to account. Despite the positive image presented
by  PCCs,  it  was  clear  that  they  were  facing  tremendous  difficulties  in  fulfilling  the
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demands of their local communities, as national policing staff were keen to highlight. Only
one commissioner was forthcoming in acknowledging this:
“I want to know what’s going from a personal context but I want to know
the justification, the rationale as to why you take the actions that you do.
Now  I  actually  don’t  care  whether  people  think  that’s  interfering  in
operational issues or not, because it’s very much in the public interest, and
I think if you have certain constabularies that don’t agree with that, well
they’re wrong. But you do need to be quite resilient for some of this stuff.
Sometimes getting changes implemented will take months because of their
… inward looking culture. So you have to be persistent and resilient but
that’s how the role of the PCC fits in.”
Commissioner/04
Commissioner/04's frustration at the pace of change was something echoed by other PCCs,
although  only  s/he  was  as  open  in  discussing  the  amount  of  internal  resistance  they
received from the police.  The quote also suggests that not only does the boundaries of
operational independence limit their reach but also requires greater resilience from PCCs to
ensure that any desired changes are implemented into practice. The recording of stop and
accounts was the most fascinating example of this. 
Stop and account emerged as a long-standing issue concerning ethnic minority experiences
of  the  police  in  all  three  case  study  areas.  Therefore,  it  was  deliberately  raised  with
interviewees  to understand how far PCCs' could exert their powers and this contrasted
with  discussions  on  stop  and search  which  interviewees  raised  themselves  before  any
questions were asked on it  (see Appendix C for interview questions). Indeed, all  three
PCCs and their fellow candidates pledged to reintroduce its recording, or maintaining it in
the case of Suffolk.71 Throughout the research period, Suffolk Police maintained recording
these encounters but it remained unrecorded in Nottinghamshire and the West Midlands. 
71 Observations 2012/10/18, 2012/11/01 and 2012/11/05.
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Nottinghamshire's  PCC commissioned research  into  ethnic  minority  experiences  of  the
police which involved focus groups and surveys with a cross-section of its ethnic minority
residents.  Wright  et  al.  (2013)  found stop  and  account  to  be  a  major  issue  raised  by
participants and thus recommended re-recording those encounters. Nottinghamshire's PCC
(2014:8) fully “commit[ted] to implementing the recommendations from the independent
research”,  including  in  relation  to  stop  and  account  but  was  unsuccessful.  As  one
interviewee remarked:
“It’s  gonna  really  take  the  PCC  to  be  radical.  It’s  gonna  take  the
communities along with political power to change the police [to record stop
and account].  But  I  don’t  think  we’ve  got  the  ability  to  do  that  at  the
moment. ”
Nottinghamshire/Public/03
Similarly, two national interviewees stated:
“Well, I think the decision to reintroduce it would be the chief but I think the
catalyst for that decision being made would be the PCC.”
National/04
“Well, the legal position as I understand it is that when police authorities
were  disbanded,  their  legal  responsibilities  of  monitoring,  checking  and
governance that surrounds stop and search passed to the elected policing
bodies. So they have a legal responsibility in terms of oversight. And this is
where I come back to, you know, if they want stop and account I’m a bit
concerned that… as the elected policing body… the chiefs aren’t listening
to them in terms of recording that.”
National/06
As with all non-police officers interviewed, those quoted above felt that while PCCs do not
have the powers to directly reintroduce stop and account recording, they retain enough
influence to pressure their chief constables into doing so. However, local campaigners such
as Nottinghamshire/Public/03 were aware of the difficulties PCCs face in achieving this
and the need for more creative and “radical” strategies. As the Home Office (2014h:20)
code of practice states: 
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“22A Where there are concerns which make it necessary to monitor  any
local disproportionality,  forces have discretion to direct officers to record
the self-defined ethnicity of persons they request to account for themselves
in a public place or who they detain with a view to searching but do not
search. Guidance should be provided locally and efforts made to minimise
the bureaucracy involved.” 
As paragraph 22A states, stop and account recording is an operational matter  for chief
constables who maintain responsibilities for directing and controlling their force. This has
enabled  Nottinghamshire  and  the  West  Midlands,  alongside  most  other  constabularies
across the country, to successfully resist pressures to re-introducing these records despite
the  existence  of  local  concerns  that  the  same  paragraph  stresses  would  justify  its
reintroduction. This difficulty emerged in interviews with commissioners who reluctantly
admitted experiencing problems due to opposition from their chief constables, someone
they  had  appointed  themselves  and  were  elected  to  hold  to  account.  During  these
conversations,  commissioners  spoke  around  the  issue  rather  than  directly  answer  the
question.  Chief  officers  also  became  visually  uncomfortable  and  instead  used  the
opportunity to repeat well-rehearsed arguments exaggerating the difficulties in recording
these encounters. Two of the most revealing conversations are presented below, one from a
commissioner and a longer quote from their chief constable: 
“commissioner: we’re working on it ((laughs)).
  interviewer: but how are you working on it?
  commissioner: well, it’s a conversation that’s happening all the time. As
you say, you can’t always tell the police what to do, so
it’s a conversation that‘s going on and, yeah, it’s going
on.”
Commissioner/02
“so the difficulty we have around stop and account is where does ‘hello
mate, how are you doing today?’ Is that a stop and account? ‘Did you have
a good time last night’, is that a stop and account? Is that ‘just been around
the back there’, is that a stop and account? Where does all that- when you
pull somebody over because their brake-light’s not working on their car, is
that a stop and account? Or is that a stop under the Road and Traffic Act?
And when you pull somebody over- as we encourage them to do- and say
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‘your lights are out on your car mate, really good idea for you to get that
repaired, it’s dangerous; rather than do anything about it I’ll drop round
and  catch  up  with  you  tomorrow  to  make  sure  you’ve  done  it’.  So  no
enforcement, no prosecution we’re making sure it’s safe. Is that a stop and
account? Is when we walk up to a group of kids in the street and say ‘hello
guys, how are things going?’ We’re engaging them, we’re trying to build
rapport, is that a stop and account? So what is a stop and account and what
is an engagement? So that’s where you start getting- we can be clear where
you apply a power that it can be recorded in a certain way, but as soon as
you  start  to  move  into  something  that’s  much  more  amorphous…  The
reason it  [recording stop and account]  was discontinued was because it
was bureaucratic and undeliverable. Simple as that.”
ChiefOfficer/02
As  Commissioner/02 suggests,  commissioners  interviewed  were  engaged  in  “ongoing”
dialogue with their  chief  constables who had persistently refused to re-record stop and
accounts and justified this on a range of grounds. In particular, as ChiefOfficer/02 finally
argued, but only after some persistent questioning, that the fundamental reason why they
refuse to record those encounters is out of concern for “bureaucracy”. However, a minority
of  constabularies  had  successfully  adapted  technology  to  continue  recording  it  and
minimise bureaucracy, thus casting doubt upon the veracity of this claim (see: Bridges et
al., 2011). Further, as the High Court notes in  Diedrick, despite the Labour government
decision in January 2009 to significantly reduce the level of detail required to be recorded
from stop and accounts,  all  police  forces  still  continued  to  record the  longer  range of
information  until  the  Conservative-led  coalition  government  scrapped  it  altogether  in
November 2010. This further undermines the arguments that the bureaucracy involved was
considered too great to outweigh the benefits in recording stop and accounts, particularly
given the  intelligence  value  of  that  information.  This  suggests  that  chief  officers  own
values rather  than stated grievances  play a greater  role  in defining their  approaches  to
accountability.
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Members of the public interviewed or who spoke at public events observed for this study
were  well  aware  of  these  arguments  but  saw  the  additional  administrative  work  as
necessary for  accountability  and all  police  explanations  were  interpreted  as  excuses  to
avoid listening to the public. As the quote from ChiefOfficer/02 shows, another strategy
chief and senior officers interviewed or observed used was to confuse people in relation to
what constitutes a stop and account by conflating it with generic, friendly conversations
that  police officers  are  expected  to  develop with the public,  such as  “hello  mate”  and
“what's the time?” At times, references were made to the Home Secretary's decision to
cease  the  statutory  requirement  to  record  those  encounters  as  a  further  justification,
particularly in Nottinghamshire where local campaigning was the most vociferous with the
initial support of the PCC. The notes of a public meeting organised by the police provides
a good example of this and records the following response to a related question from a
member of the public:
“Why can’t Stop and Account be stopped?
Neither the Home Secretary nor the Chief Constable Chris Eyre, believes
there is advantage in recording the many thousands of conversations that
would  come  under  category  of  Stop  and  Account.  There  is  no  legal
requirement  to  record  these  encounters  and  if  they  were  recorded,  a
conversation lasting seconds would take minutes of paperwork to capture
the required data. When a stop and search is conducted there is no legal
requirement for a person to provide personal details. This would also be the
case for Stop and Account.”
(Nottinghamshire Police 2014a:3)
Clearly,  references  to  the  Home Secretary's  decision  was made  to  legitimise  the  chief
constable's own decision to avoid recording those encounters. This demonstrated a lack of
transparency in  explaining  to  the  public  exactly  why the  force  continued  to  resist  the
demands of local  ethnic  minorities  to  re-record those encounters,  particularly since the
code of practice delegates this decision to chief constables and is reinforced in the case of
Diedrick.  Further,  observations  of  public  meetings  and  police-community  consultative
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groups revealed a successful strategy employed by police officers to narrow discussions
towards debating stop and search rather than the broader range of encounters raised by the
public at those sessions, including stop and accounts and traffic stops.72 Blame was often
shifted  onto  the  public  for  confusing  the  different  types  of  powers-  and  indeed  for
incorrectly perceiving stop and account to be a legal power- rather than officers seeking to
listen to and understand the impact of those encounters. Senior officers also repeatedly
emphasised the difficulties in recording stop and account, particularly within the context of
budgetary  constraints.  Very  few  members  of  the  public  had  the  confidence  or  legal
knowledge  to  challenge  the  authoritative  performance  of  senior  officers  as  they  were
ignorant  of  the  wider  policy  debate  and decision-making  processes.  Where  challenges
occurred,  this  was  in  relation  to  people  raising  their  own  negative  experiences  and
criticising the police for lacking respect. However, even this was successfully dealt with by
senior officers who offered to meet the person separately and investigate their experiences
rather than addressing the more fundamental point in public or commit to implementing
any changes. PCCs have the potential to empower minority communities by widening the
scope of consultation towards the broader range of police-initiated encounters. Aside from
facilitating police-community engagement events where the onus is usually on participants
to raise these broader issues, PCCs appeared unwilling to broaden the terms of debate and
were even quiet during these public exchanges, perhaps indicative of their resignation on
the issue.
Overall, many non-police interviewees still felt that PCCs have a role to play and saw the
lack of progress as indicative of commissioners' lack of competence. However, chief and
senior  police  officers  interviewed  contested  the  role  of  PCCs.  Interestingly,  one  chief
72 Observations 2014/09/30 and 2016/04/20.
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officer made the following remark which is reproduced alongside the response of their
PCC (emphasis added):
“I don’t know but it seems that they [PCCs] might be slightly overreaching
themselves  if  they  promised  to  do  that  [introduce  stop  and  account
recording], because it is arguably an operational decision that would … sit
outside their ability to deliver. I mean, I don't know if they captured it in
slightly more cautious language than you're sort of suggesting there, but
why  hasn't  it  been  introduced?  Well,  like  [SeniorOfficer]  has  said,
operationally we don't think it's the right thing to do. We don’t think it adds
any value. In fact we think it would probably make things worse.  I'm not
aware  we've  actually  been  asked  to  do  it  by  anybody...  You  have
discussions with people, of course you do, [but] no-one's actually required
us to do it.”
ChiefOfficer /04
So stop and account [recording] is important to find out how much is going
on and clearly there was a suggestion that because of the more accountable
arrangements for stop and search full stop that was being replaced by more
stop and account. This [new electronic recording] process will be able to
detect  any  changes  in  the  balance  between  the  two.  So,  hopefully,  [we
would] have some assurance that we’re not seeing a displacement into stop
and account from stop and search. Clearly if we did pick up that there was
a displacement into stop and account, we’d be pressing for that stop and
account solution at an earlier stage.
Commissioner/05
As ChiefOfficer/04 states, operational independence remains a relevant concept despite a
consensus among all interviewees that it has undergone further ambiguities since PCCs'
introduction.  Chief  officers  in  Nottinghamshire  and  the  West  Midlands  invoked  their
operational  prerogative  to  effectively  hamper  the  ability  of  their  PCC  to  introduce
processes  that  they  disagreed  with.  Further,  ChiefOfficer/05  explains  that  "no-one's
actually required us" to record those encounters, thus raising questions about whether the
necessary negotiations behind-the-scenes had taken place between them and their  PCC.
Commissioner/05 refused to directly answer this question and their long-winded answer
suggests that they may have stalled in formally making this request. Perhaps s/he realised
how limited their powers really were on this issue but it also suggests that s/he lacked the
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resolve to apply public pressure to embarrass their chief officers into implementing those
reforms, a topic returned to later.
By contrast, police officers responded with reluctant compliance to the potential recording
of traffic stops. For example:
“Now that’s a matter for ultimately the Home Secretary and I know as, you
know,  we  said  at  the  beginning  she’s  having  this  debate  with  David
Cameron. I don’t know where we’re heading. You’ve probably got a better
knowledge of where we’re heading.”
Nottinghamshire/Police/01
Nottinghamshire/Police/01's  answer  was  reflective  of  other  officers  interviewed  and
suggests that although they frequently cited the same practical issues in recording those
encounters as stop and accounts, they essentially acquiesced this decision to the Home
Secretary. Unlike stop and account, the Home Secretary was seen as having an enabling
influence  in  introducing  the  recording  of  traffic  stops.  This  was  yet  another  revealing
example of how police accountability remains centralised despite the introduction of PCCs.
Whereas stop and account  recording was an issue raised by PCCs in response to their
ethnic minority electorate, traffic stops was also an issue affecting ethnic minorities but
enjoyed  the  necessary  ministerial  support  to  raise  the  prospects  of  it  being  recorded.
However,  other issues raised in  the same HMIC (2015a) inspection that  prompted this
development,  notably the recording of strip-searches and searches of children, were not
endorsed by the Home Secretary who expressly commissioned research into those areas.
This indicates that chief officers have been successful in restricting the scope of external
reform and  that  the  Home  Secretary  must  also  choose  her  fights  carefully.  This  also
suggests that the Secretary of State and her department have less power to shape police
practice than may have been previously thought.
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As this section has argued, operational independence has presented significant barriers to
PCCs ability to ensure policing is more responsive to the demands of their ethnic minority
communities.  The  inability  of  PCCs  for  Nottinghamshire  and  the  West  Midlands  to
reintroduce stop and account recording was a good example of this. Concerns were also
raised relating to Suffolk police potentially ceasing the recording of stop and accounts, but
this did not materialise to then assess what this revealed about the relationship between the
PCC,  the  public  and  the  chief  constable.  Despite  the  case  study  PCCs  giving  their
electorate  a  direct  participatory  role  in  identifying  how  the  police  should  be  made
accountable, their inability to reverse chief constables' refusal to re-record stop and account
reveals  how local  power remains  unevenly held  by the police,  thus  undermining  what
constitutes democratic police accountability (chapter 2). In other words, chief constables
appear to remain powerful in determining how they are held to account locally. This also
undermines the electorate's ability to obtain the necessary  information  to judge whether
police powers are used equitably, two other elements of democratic police accountability. 
9.2. “Sack the chief constable”
PCCs'  powers  to  dismiss  their  chief  constable  as  a  way  of  ensuring  compliance  with
directives was raised by all interviewees, including by chief officers themselves:
“These people [PCCs] are powerful and, you know, public figures though.
They can make noise and noise can have impact  so if  they’re  truly  not
happy about what they’re seeing and what they’re expecting, first of all they
can sack, you know, they’ve got a power to sack chief constables.”
ChiefOfficer/01
Similar to others, ChiefOfficer/01 suggests that PCCs have considerable powers to change
policing by various means before invoking the ultimate sanction of sacking their  chief
constable. Lister (2013) argues that this power enables PCCs to overcome chief constables’
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operational  independence,  but  this  research  found  otherwise.  As  some  interviewees
highlighted: 
“it’s  quite healthy for us to have a disagreement in the way that we do
something and there’s been a few ones, you know, might be more than a few
((laughs)). But, yeah, it’s healthy to have disagreements and not be afraid.
But I think it’s the way that you do it as well. I don’t believe in airing our
dirty lining in public,  because you see if  I  go out there and say certain
things that would be a headline… it will skew the relationship and create
something that doesn’t really exist, you know, when all-in-all everything is
going well in my view.”
Commissioner/06
“Interviewee: Now if you're not performing as a chief,  he [the PCC]
then ultimately has the power to, sort of, like, dismiss you
and have you-
  Interviewer: - that's a bit of a nuclear option though? 
  Interviewee: yeah,  absolutely.  It's  never  come to  that  for  something
like this but, you know, you go through it and you explain
your position and where you stand so that's your elected
representative. 
ChiefOfficer/03
“I think [PCCs'] effect is helpful and unhelpful in different contexts as well.
So their powers are that they can appoint the chief and effectively sack the
chief, and so I think chiefs are becoming very sensitive to that power. […]
And what you’re seeing is potentially a slight stagnation in the chief officer
labour market, as in they’re not moving very much any more because they
either have a situation where they have a PCC that they get on with or they
don’t want to move into those areas where they’ve got a PCC that’s gonna
be  quite  hard  work  for  them,  and  that  could  develop  into  some  very
unhealthy relationships.” 
National/02
As these interviewees suggest, this “nuclear option”73 operates as a blunt threat in practice.
PCCs appeared to be reluctant to dismiss their chiefs over perceived failures in the use of
police-initiated  stops  because,  as  ChiefOfficer/03  conceded,  “something  like  this”  was
considered too much of a minority issue to justify their dismissal and make such threats
credible.  As  with  National/02,  other  staff  from national  policing  bodies,  all  of  whom
regularly interact with both PCCs and senior and chief officers, felt that this exemplified
73 A term originally coined by Commissioner/01 and adopted by the current author.
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PCCs'  failures  to  more  robustly  hold  their  chiefs  to  account  as  their  relationship  had
become too friendly.  Commissioners, on the other hand, were keen to explain that they
preferred  behind-the-scenes  negotiations  rather  than  exercising  raw  powers,  just  as
Commissioner/06  argues.  They  felt  this  would  be  more  conducive  to  making  police
practice more responsive to their initiatives and avoid provoking the defensive, “inward-
looking culture” that Commissioner/04 criticised earlier.
For  reasons  unrelated  to  police-initiated  stops,  this  power  came  under  public  scrutiny
during  PCCs first  year  in  office.  Lincolnshire's  PCC was  forced  to  reinstate  his  chief
constable after the latter successfully appealed against his dismissal in the case of Rhodes
vs Police and Crime Commissioner for Lincolnshire.74 The High Court ruled the dismissal
was “irrational and perverse” and unnecessary because the PCC had done so without a
prior  investigation  into  his  chief  constable’s  conduct  to  ensure  that  the  dismissal  was
proportionate.  Soon after,  Gwent's  chief  constable  resigned  and  claimed  to  have  been
forced to do so by her PCC (HASC, 2013b), thus showing that commissioners are not
entirely  constrained  in  removing  their  chief  constables.  A  committee  of  MPs  also
expressed its concerns over these and others cases, calling for greater protections for chief
constables against the “maverick behaviour” of PCCs “who wish to make their mark in the
new role” (HASC, 2013a:4). Commissioners interviewed, however, were more conscious
of the potential backlash in dismissing their chiefs than the Committee suggests. One PCC
was more blunt than others by arguing: 
“the real politik of the situation which may in fact work against some of the
accountability issues is there’s not really a lot of votes in seeming to have
lots of rows with your chief constable, particularly as usually even after a
number  of  significant  issues  nationally  the  police  officers  are  actually
((smiles))  a lot more respected than politicians.  Having a row with one-
particularly if you get rid of one- it would be very difficult to get rid of two.
74 [2013] EWHC 1009 (Admin); para78.
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It starts to look like serial incompetence in terms of your ability to cope with
chief  constables.  So  clearly  if  your  motivation  as  police  and  crime
commissioner is to get re-elected, it’s a very risky strategy”
Commissioner/05
As Commissioner/05 suggests, PCCs may be too concerned about the potential dangers in
appearing  unable  to  manage  their  chief  constables  and  the  unwanted  publicity  in
dismissing them to take more aggressive action. This means that these initial controversies
may have indeed been a temporary phase as some commissioners sought to “make their
mark”. In this sense, the PCC structure appears to be incentivising cooperation between the
two actors, as the stressed by the Policing Protocol which outlines the relationship between
them, their police and crime panel, and the Home Secretary (Home Office, 2011b). This
supports Lister's (2013:8) assertion that the roles of PCCs and chief constables are now
more “mutually contingent”.
Ultimately, PCCs’ power to dismiss their chief constables was widely understood to be a
hollow threat  with  regards  to  minority  issues  like  police-initiated  stops.  Chief  officers
appeared well aware that such action was too politically risky for their commissioners to
justify such a drastic measure, particularly since Rhodes. Recognising this, PCCs appear to
be relying on their 'soft powers' to realign police practice to the expectations of their ethnic
minority electorate. Therefore, this ultimate sanction appears to be less 'nuclear' and more
of a blunt threat. This means that the PCC structures risk a return to the 'explanatory and
cooperative'  forms  of  accountability  in  some  police  force  areas,  as  was  the  dominant
relationship from the 1930s to the 1980s (Marshall,  1978). Reiner (2010) argues that a
'calculative  and contractual'  form of  accountability  has  developed since  the  late  1980s
when New Public Management and other neo-liberal policies took hold. As discussed in
Chapter 3, this is clearly embodied in the target-setting and commissioning culture first
237
introduced by the Conservative government's Police and Magistrates Courts Act in 1994,
throughout  various  Acts  under  the subsequent  Labour Government-  notably the  Police
Reform  Act  2002,  and  similar  powers  inherited  by  PCCs'  powers  under  the  recent
Coalition government's Police Reform and Social  Responsibility Act in 2011. It  is this
business-like relationship that could give PCCs significant leverage over police practice,
particularly where they use their standing to bring about public scrutiny of their force's
compliance with key priorities, and when combined with PCCs' powers to commission the
services of a wider range of stakeholders than would have otherwise been included. These
are discussed in the rest of this chapter.
9.3. “Make noise”
Interviewees unanimously felt that the elected nature of PCCs and their public profile gave
them considerable influence to pressure their forces into adopting policies more responsive
to  their  electorate.  Some  PCCs  sought  to  do  this  by  using  their  budgetary  powers  to
commission  ethnic  minority  groups  or  organisations  to  develop  recommendations  for
change and these activities are discussed in this section. 
Differences  emerged  on  the  one  hand  between  PCCs  and  their  chiefs  who  felt  that
commissioners were successfully applying such pressures, and members of the public and
staff from national policing bodies on the other hand who felt otherwise. Here are just two
examples illustrating this difference:
“But they [PCCs] do have influence. If you're not performing as they would
like… there's public naming and shaming, isn't there? So they can put loads
of stuff in the media: 'I think this is disgusting, they're not doing' and you
force the chief into doing something they don't want to do or you sit there
and say [to the chief constable] 'actually no, this is really important. I've
asked you to do it but you're not doing it'. So you call in somebody else to
review it so you can obviously use that in the media and do that.”
ChiefOfficer/03
238
“Do you know what I don’t think they do enough of? If I were to be critical
of them: they don’t tell the public... [I] want them to be loud in the public’s
ear saying how badly the chief constable is doing around a particular issue
if it is bad. They don’t. They’ve gone too cosy, they’ve cosied up to the chief
constables and of course the success of the chief constables is sort of linked
to their success so there’s no incentive to tell the public that it’s not going
so well. I just think there’s something wrong with that.”
National/05
ChiefOfficer/03 suggests that generating negative publicity is  a good way for PCCs to
pressure  their  chief  officers  into  adopting  policies  that  they  refuse  to  do  so  privately.
National/05 agrees but contends that PCCs are generally failing to do this, partly due to
perceived fears that any negative media attention would reflect badly upon commissioners'
own competence.  An earlier quote from Commissioner/06 supports this latter  argument
when s/he was quote as saying s/he did not wish to create media “headlines” as it would
risk “skew[ing] the relationship” with their chief. Perhaps it was fears that 'making noise'
would expose PCCs own limitations in being able to control their chief constables that so
few had  publicly  committed  to  tackling  controversial  issues  like  police-initiated  stops
(chapter  8).  This  supports  Lister's  (2013)  argument  that  the  PCC  model  would
disincentivise public disagreements.
Case study PCCs did, however, use their commissioning powers as leverage to build some
public momentum for change. Nottinghamshire PCC (2012) was the first in the country to
commission  a  group of  local  citizens  to  investigate  ethnic  minority  experiences  of  the
police, focussing on stop and search, community engagement, victimisation and how to
improve the diversity of police personnel. Wright et al.'s (2013) study found varying levels
of public  satisfaction in Nottinghamshire  police,  but the most  common cited grievance
related to stop and search and stop and account. Approximately 30% of respondents to its
statistically representative survey reported to being searched in the two years prior to the
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study  and  over  half  reported  this  had  happened  more  than  once.  Young  people  were
particularly  aggrieved  at  these  experiences,  arguing  it  was  discriminatory  and  lacked
respect. Wright et al. recommended re-recording stop and accounts in order to obtain a
truer picture of police encounters because their respondents could not distinguish between
these stops and the legal search powers, thus reaffirming the PCC’s earlier pledge to do
this. Nottinghamshire's PCC endorsed their findings and commissioned them to set up a
steering group with other 'community leaders' to oversee the implementation of the report's
recommendations. This appears to have been an important means for the PCC to continue
applying public pressure upon his chief officers by making them directly accountable to
representatives of the public for any failures to adopt the report's recommendations. 
However, direct public engagement was no guarantee for change. The immediate police
response to the report was diplomatic and, neither rejecting its findings nor matching the
commissioner's commitment, the chief constable simply reaffirmed the need for positive
relations  with ethnic  minority  communities  by stating “we will  work with the PCC to
consider this report and identify how it may help us to increase the safety and confidence
of  Black  and  Minority  Communities”  (Nottinghamshire  PCC,  2013b). Later,
Nottinghamshire  police  (2014b)  produced  a  detailed  response  to  the  eight
recommendations  on  police  stops,  explaining  how  its  existing  work  already  met  the
proposals rather than committing to implement any new activities. Notably, reintroducing
stop and account  was the only recommendation  to receive  any firm response from the
constabulary  in  the  following  outright  refusal:  "The  Chief  Constable  has  taken  the
operational decision that this will not be rolled out. As such there is no intention to record
Stop  and  Account  in  Nottinghamshire" (Nottinghamshire  Police  (2014b:1).  This  was
justified on the grounds that it was  "not required in law”, would "increase bureaucracy”,
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“the data quality from such recording is poor" and "a conversation lasting seconds would
take many minutes of paperwork to capture the required data." This shows the lack of
power of direct public pressure in ensuring that operational practice is more responsive to
ethnic minorities, even when supported by a PCC.
Other PCCs country-wide adopted similar  strategies.  Staffordshire’s Conservative PCC,
Matthew Ellis, established an independent Ethics, Transparency and Audit Panel (ETAP)
consisting of members of the public who could review any area of policing. The Panel’s
first review was of stop and search use and monitoring and recommended “an overhaul of
the way that stop and search is looked at  and directed” (Staffordshire PCC, 2015a:27).
Similar to the HMIC's (2013, 2015a) inspections, it criticised officers for misunderstanding
their  powers  and  conducting  “stops  without  legal  basis”;  the  varied  quality  of  search
records; the lack of front-line supervision; racial disproportionality; and the low outcome
rates. The panel also criticised the lack of oversight of road traffic stops and recommended
it be reviewed to eliminate any discrimination; it also criticised stop and searches of young
people and children, although it made no recommendations on the latter. Staffordshire's
Assistant Chief Constable (ACC), Bernie O’Reilly, responded: 
“We welcome the report on this topic by the Ethics, Transparency and Audit
Panel  (ETAP)  and  can  assure  our  communities  that  the  findings  of  the
report  will  be addressed.  In  addition  to  acting  on the  recommendations
made by ETAP we are also working towards achieving greater transparency
under the Home Office’s Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme, for example
we will soon be implementing a scheme to give members of the public the
opportunity to observe how we use stop and search to help us tackle crime
and disorder” 
(Staffordshire PCC, 2015b; emphasis added).
As can be seen, Staffordshire PCC used his profile to bring to his chief officers' attention
issues affecting ethnic minority residents, even if the impetus behind the review appeared
to be the significant national government scrutiny at the time rather specific local concerns
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(chapter 6-7). Unlike Nottinghamshire,  however, the chief officer team in Staffordshire
appeared to be more receptive to the panel's recommendations as indicated by the ACC's
commitment to “address” and “act” upon their findings. Clearly, the national scrutiny had
provided an environment conducive to this result, particularly as the report had supported
the recommendations of various national reports that Staffordshire Police already appeared
committed  to  implementing  rather  than  making  any  additional  and  more  fundamental
proposals  that  reflected  local  concerns  like  in  Nottinghamshire.  The  national
recommendations endorsed by the panel related to strengthening existing regulations such
as front-line supervision, monitoring complaints, improving training and also undertaking a
public  campaign  to  highlight  people’s  rights  if  stopped  and  searched.  Thus  its
recommendations left police officers responsible for regulating their own practice, having
failed to suggest an enhanced role for the public, and therefore made it easy for the chief
officer team to endorse the report.
Northamptonshire's Conservative PCC (2015a) commissioned research into his residents’
experiences of stop and search which focussed more on the efficacy of the powers rather
than its impact upon ethnic minorities. The research found high levels of mistrust in the
police, particularly among young people and those who had been searched in the past or
knew someone  who had.  This  led  to  the  PCC using  his  profile  to  successfully  attract
national media attention to call for “fundamental reform” of stop and search and encourage
commissioners  and  constabularies  around  the  country  to  adopt  his  force's  policy  of
suspending police officers and their supervisors from exercising such powers where they
are found to  be misusing  them (Northamptonshire  PCC, 2015b).  To maintain  pressure
upon his force, he then appointed a 'public figure' to review the force’s policies on stop and
search, although the report presented a confusing assessment of stop and search practice
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(see  Brooks,  2016).75 Finally,  the  PCC  commissioned  Northamptonshire's  Rights  and
Equality Council to produce a report into people's experiences of police-initiated stops and
input into police training (NREC, 2014). Elsewhere, Labour's Greater Manchester PCC
(2014) initiated detailed scrutiny into his force through 'themed public meetings', the first
of which was on stop and search in recognition of its  impact  upon his sizeable ethnic
minority electorate; a follow-up progress meeting was held a year later. These sessions
analysed  figures  on  stop  and  search  volumes,  outcomes,  disproportionality,  and  also
provided members  of  the  public  with opportunities  to  share  their  experiences  of  those
encounters.  From  this,  he  pledged  to  develop  a  series  of  recommendations  to  guide
changes to the force's use of the powers. 
Since Staffordshire, Northamptonshire and Greater Manchester were not case study areas,
the potential impact of their PCCs' activities could not be investigated other than through
analysis of documents and discussions at national conferences subject to field observations.
This  analysis  supports  the  findings  from  the  three  case  studies  and  suggests  that
commissioning civic groups to develop recommendations for change was one strategy that
some PCCs were using to publicly apply pressure on their chief officers to making changes
that  the  commissioners  found  difficult  to  achieve  alone.  However,  most  of  these
recommendations narrowly evolved around improving regulations and public information
rather  than making any significant  changes  to  the existing  structures  of accountability.
Perhaps  this  explains  why  these  PCCs  appeared  to  have  more  success  than  in
Nottinghamshire. One exception is Northamptonshire's model of suspending police officers
and their  supervisors from using stop and search where they are found to be misusing
them. This was an idea originally developed by a proactive senior police officer that later
75 The public figure was Duwayne Brooks, a former Liberal Democrat councillor and 'critical friend' on stop
and search matters to the-then Conservative Mayor for London Boris Johnson. He is also the friend of the
teenager Stephen Lawrence who he witnessed being murdered by racist youths in 1993.
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gained  the  support  of  the  commissioner  as  national  pressures  mounted.  The  Home
Secretary also proposed to extend this idea out across the country (chapter 7) but failed to
do so. This suggests that PCCs can play an important role in supporting initiatives that can
more  fundamentally  alter  operational  practices  even  where  unsupported  by  national
government.
In sum, “making noise” was an important means by which PCCs demonstrated to their
ethnic minority electorate that they were sufficiently alive to their concerns to give them
direct opportunities to help propose changes to police practice. This appeared to be a clever
strategy designed to make it harder for senior and chief officers to resist those proposals as
they were direct, often desperate, appeals from the public. It also meant that PCCs could
give  influential  members  of  their  ethnic  minority  communities  an  insight  into  the
difficulties that they faced in implementing those changes whilst also helping to deflect
criticism  away  from  them  and  onto  their  chief  officers.  However,  most  of  these
recommendations narrowly focussed upon stop and search rather than the broader range of
encounters and had also left the power base of police officers unchanged. Unsurprisingly,
many were readily endorsed by chief officers. But where more fundamental changes were
sought, as in the case of Nottinghamshire and the West Midlands with regards to public
support for stop and account recording, this was successfully resisted by chief officers.
This shows the lack of power that the public enjoy to ensure their recommendations are
implemented, particularly without a PCC willing to be more vociferous in championing
those demands. Even so, it was surprising that not a single PCC across the country had
commissioned a policing body, such as the HMIC or College of Policing, to review their
force's  use  and  governance  of  the  various  police-initiated  stops.  These  bodies  have
considerable expertise and can potentially give PCCs significant leverage in introducing
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changes sought by the public, particularly for those encounters repeatedly ignored by the
national debate. This suggests that commissioners were highly selective and had underused
their commissioning powers, an issue returned to in the conclusion.
9.4. “Conduit” for public voice
Public summits were a more frequent method PCCs used to provide ethnic minorities and
others  with  direct  opportunities  to  hold  their  chief  and  senior  officers  to  account.  As
Nottinghamshire/Police/01  argued,  PCCs were  acting  as  the  “conduit”  for  the  public's
voice. The level of accountability this afforded was typically low because members of the
public rarely made any suggestions for change and instead used the opportunity to criticise
police practice. Many were ignorant of the law or police processes and some too resentful
of the police to believe that it was worth suggesting changes. In other cases, suggestions
were  made  but  the  police  had  successfully  deflected  responsibility.  For  example,  in
Nottinghamshire where stop and account was an enduring issue: 
SeniorOfficer  said s/he was focussing  on stop and search but  wanted to
quickly clarify why he would not discuss stop and account. SeniorOfficer
said the stop and search scrutiny board spends a lot of time talking about
stop  and  account  and  also  the  IAG  which  had  both  recommended  re-
recording those encounters but there was no intention to do this as the chief
constable has decided there is no benefit in doing so... A middle aged black
man interrupted to express his grievances over his experience of a stop and
account  and,  although  he  felt  the  “powers”  were  necessary,  he  was
aggrieved  at  his  treatment.  SeniorOfficer  said  the  actions  of  individual
officers cannot be justified and s/he was happy to speak to the gentleman
over lunch... A number of attendees complained that they wanted time to
ask questions on this, showing the degree of interest in stop and account, but
it was not discussed. Interestingly, on all other issues addressed in the rest of
the  presentation,  all  related  to  stop  and  search,  SeniorOfficer  repeatedly
stated that the constabulary was open to feedback on any learning or issues
missed, thus demonstrating how selective the police was in scope of public
consultation. The PCC sat quietly throughout the presentation and question
and answer session, as did a chief officer in attendance who let the senior
officer take the heat.
Observation 2016/03/19
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This  occasion  was  just  one  example  of  community  frustrations  at  the  perceived
unwillingness of police officers to discuss the broader range of issues that  mattered to
them. For them, yet again concerns over stop and account were dismissed, thus reinforcing
perceptions that the police were too unresponsive and resistant to change. Throughout this
exchange, the chief officer present was notably silent and so clearly did not wish to get
involved even as the senior officer struggled and became extremely uncomfortable. Thus
the police had successfully narrowed the scope of debate and even managed to silence the
vocal PCC whose retreat is perhaps a sign of his resignation on the issue having struggled
to persuade the force to re-record those encounters.  This was reinforced in interviews,
including with one person:
“Interviewee: our only mechanism into holding them to account is through
the PCC.
  Interviewer: and is he able to do that as well?
  Interviewee: He struggles. If you interview [him] I’m sure he’ll tell you
but  he  struggles  because  he  has  got  no  remit  over
operational  policing,  he  has  strategic  and  budgetary
[responsibilities].  He  sets  out  a  crime  plan  strategy  for
twelve months or two years, there’s certain targets, certain
interventions he can say, but that’s it. He can’t say ‘well, we
need a specialist hate crime unit’- can’t do it.”
Nottinghamshire//Public/03
As  Nottinghamshire/Public/03  argues,  the  PCC  was  an  important  mechanism  through
which ethnic minority groups sought changes to operational practice but they had become
aware of the limitations of his role. The strong police control over the scope of discussion
was  not  unique  to  the  case  studies  as  an  observation  of  Avon and Somerset  Police’s
summit on stop and search revealed. Here, the public's lack of power was most apparent at
the  end  of  the  session  when  attendees  were  asked  to  propose  issues  for  the  force  to
prioritise  but could only watch as the senior officers (including a chief officer)  agreed
amongst  themselves  which  of  these  suggestions  would  be  adopted  (observation
2014/09/30).
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However, interviews with West Midlands’ police officers showed that its PCC’s stop and
search  summit  was  more  successful  in  helping  them  to  develop  new  'oversight
arrangements' for the use of those powers. This was later published as a joint action plan
between his office and the police force (West Midlands PCC, 2013b). The action plan set
out 16 activities arising from the summit, five of which were owned entirely or jointly by
the PCC and related to facilitating public scrutiny of stop and search. The rest were owned
by the police and related to reviewing the use of the various powers, including the highly
secretive  schedule 7 which points  to  the strong leadership  of  the  PCC in ensuring the
inclusion of this power. StopWatch had firmly encouraged scrutinising this power which
may have supported this development as the consultation outcome had shown through its
extensive  references  to  the  organisation's  proposals,  although  it  excluded  the  group's
proposal  to  include  other  encounters  such as  traffic  stops  and stop and account  (West
Midlands PCC 2014b). The significance of the summit in guiding police scrutiny arose
during interviews, including:
“[the PCC] summit was something that really mobilised and moved things
forward… The PCC summit was around September last year so just over a
year ago and senior officers were there and that really focused the mind
around the force as to some of the deficiencies we had around recording.
We got a lot of criticism that day and some it was justified and some if it
wasn't, but if I'm honest we hadn't really got our house in order about how
we record stop and search so we weren't  really  in a position to have a
defensible argument really. So we kind of took the flack that day and went
away, addressed it and now we can say actually we're in a better place to
say to you this is what we're doing and why we're doing [it]…. At the time I
don't think we could have that argument because we didn't really know what
was happening with stop and search.… Yeah, I think as a force that PCC
summit was quite powerful.”
WestMids/Police/02
Clearly  for  WestMids/Police/02,  the  shock of  the  summit  had  forced  senior  and chief
officers  to  review how they were  monitoring  and  using  their  powers;  all  other  senior
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officers  interviews  agreed.  However,  WestMids/Police/02  also  appeared  to  reject  any
fundamental problem as s/he felt they “took the flack” thus suggesting that the scale of
criticisms endured in summit had promoted some defensiveness. For this officer, it was
important to be able to explain why police use their powers rather than being required to
undertake  any  fundamental  changes,  particularly  now  that  s/he  felt  they  had  finally
developed the “defensive argument” that they supposedly had all along but were unable to
make at the summit.
Overall,  PCCs arranged ad-hoc public meetings aimed at providing their electorate with
important  opportunities  to  vent  their  frustrations  towards  senior  and chief  officers  and
publicly  request  changes,  although  very  few  proposed  any  changes.  However,  as
demonstrated by all of the observations, both within and outside of the case study areas,
the distribution of power remained primarily with the police who were able to narrow the
scope  of  discussion  towards  the  issues  that  they  felt  more  comfortable  discussing,
particularly given the unwillingness of PCCs to intervene during those proceedings. The
West Midlands summit appeared to be the most effective because it directly fed into the
development of an action plan designed to address issues raised by ethnic minorities; it
incorporated  the  expertise  of  a  well-informed  scrutiny  group  (StopWatch),  albeit
selectively; and was also chaired by the deputy PCC rather than the police.
9.5. Scrutiny of police-recorded data and search records
Interviewees’  understanding  of  how  PCCs  should  monitor  stop  and  search  initially
focussed  narrowly  upon  analysing  police-recorded  data,  particularly  in  relation  to
outcomes  and  racial  disproportionality.  This  is  unsurprising  given  that  it  was  police
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authorities  primary  form of  scrutiny and subsequently adopted  by PCCs as  their  main
activity. However, commissioners interviewed were keen to stress a qualitative difference: 
“Commissioner: It’s the culture. Because for the last fifty years no-one’s
ever asked the police a tough question.
  Support staff: And they’ve [the constabulary] never published anything
themselves. They don’t regularly publish their own stuff,
they feel generally anxious about that.
  Commissioner: I’m not blaming the police,  I’m blaming the old police
authority because the previous police authority jolly well
should’ve asked and jolly well should’ve communicated
to the public. Communication to the public doesn’t mean
always  publishing  the  raw  data  or  the  raw  police
papers... but in the old days the police authorities never
took the lid off the can, never looked under the bonnet,
never in my judgement. How could they?”
Commissioner/03
“[Police authority members] didn’t feel that they had to go out there and
consult and speak to people. They wanted to remain- the majority of police
authority  members  resisted  going  out  and  meeting  people.  So  when
incidents  occurred they didn’t  want to  go.  So when we had the [August
2011] riots they didn’t really want to go out there. When we had any kind of
conflict  they  didn’t  want  to  go  out  there.  I’d  be  out  there  with  the
community speaking to people.”
Commissioner/06
As both commissioners argued, they felt that they had introduced a different “culture” than
their predecessors through far greater depth of scrutiny and a more proactive engagement
with  the  public.  Commissioners  felt  that  this  public  engagement  gave  them a  unique
understanding  of  their  electorate  to  then  “look  under  the  bonnet”  and  ask  the  “tough
questions” previously lacking.  Interestingly,  commissioners  were entirely speculative in
these discussions and no-one was able to provide any firm example of having successfully
changed policies or practices as a result of this new culture.
PCCs were also keen to give members of the public direct and regular opportunities to
participate in police accountability through stop and search scrutiny groups. Most of these
had existed under the police authorities as it has long been required by PACE Code A
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(Home Office, 2014h). Observations were carried out of a variety of these groups, both
within and beyond the case study areas, to assess whether PCCs had produced a better
culture  of  accountability.  All  of  these  groups  demonstrated  significant  variation  in  the
depth and quality of accountability as shaped by their degree of independence from the
police  and  attendees  personal  experiences  of  the  police.  Despite  these  differences,  all
scrutiny groups were united in revealing a lack of power enjoyed by the public or their
PCC to  ensure  any recommended  changes  were  implemented.  Members  of  the  public
routinely obtained an explanation for overall  trends in data and officers'  behaviour but
were never given a fundamental say over how those powers were directed or used, even
when the conversation appeared to be heading that way. 
Each case study had an independent advisory group (IAG) firmly under the constabulary's
direction, besides Suffolk whose IAG was financed and supported directly by the PCC.
Since  these  were  'closed  public'  groups,  observations  were  restricted  to  'open  public'
groups although documentary analysis of IAG meetings and interviews with its members
suggested similarly findings. West Midlands PCC provided ample opportunities  for his
electorate to engage in scrutiny panels, with one established for each of the seven districts
comprising the force, although some met far more frequently than others. A force-wide
summit was convened every six months to bring together members of each regional panel
and discuss issues at a strategic level with the PCC. Suffolk PCC provided joint-funding
for its independent Stop and Search Reference Group (SSRG) to continue its work since
2008 in scrutinising police records. More generally, he also organised a series of regular
forums for local communities and businesses within each of his seven policing districts
which required the attendance of the chief constable and senior officers responsible for
policing that area (Suffolk PCC, 2013). Nottinghamshire had the least opportunities and,
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unlike the others, it was not clear how to access its scrutiny groups. Both the PCC's 'BME
steering group' set up to oversee the implementation of Wright et al.'s (2013) 'BME report'
and the force's IAG were closed to the general public. A 'Stop and Search Scrutiny Board'
was managed by the police and also closed off to the public. Therefore, only observations
of ad-hoc public events could be conducted across Notinghamshire.
Analysis of statistical data on stop and search use formed the core activity of all of these
groups and was indeed expected by attendees who relied upon officers to interpret  the
figures for them. Opportunities for members of the public to talk about their own negative
experiences  of  police  encounters,  or  other  known  incidents,  was  another  expectation
regardless of whether time was set aside for this. Due to government reforms, some of the
regular  force-level  or  district-level  groups  also  scrutinised  anonymised  copies  of  the
handwritten stop and search records given to people searched, but this was not the case in
all  scrutiny meetings.  Coventry,  which met  almost  every month,  did not scrutinise any
forms because, as one senior officer later explained, its members had historically done so
and were satisfied enough with their quality to not warrant continued scrutiny. However,
observations revealed members held strong affinities towards the police which most likely
prevented  more  robust  scrutiny from taking place  compared  to  if  it  was  comprised  of
people with negative experiences of the police.
Across all groups, only a shallow degree of accountability was found to take place due to
the  composition  of  its  membership  and  the  strong  steering  of  proceedings  by  police
officers. For example in Birmingham:
Attendee01 demonstrated another core lack of understanding of the powers
when s/he asked what  the Firearms Act  shown on the pie chart  allowed
officers to search for. Senior Officer explained that it provided powers to
search for guns and accounted for 4.25% of overall searches that financial
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year (n= 136). Attendee01 then asked if this was a search that usually takes
place  on  the  street  to  which  Attendee02  look  at  Attendee01  in  quiet
disbelief. SeniorOfficer said yes and said that there were a number of legal
search  powers  as  shown on the  pie  chart.  At  no  time  during  the  whole
session did SeniorOfficer show any proactivity in ensuring a more robust
scrutiny could take place by providing attendees with any basic information
or  explanation  of  the  various  stop  and search  powers  even though most
attendees had clearly struggled to understand. […] Throughout the entire
session, SeniorOfficer was explaining away issues and sped through the two
parts of the scrutiny (data and search records) without much time left for
discussion. SeniorOfficer was clearly in a hurry to leave and a number of
times cut conversations short to move on to the next topic, and even shut
down the computer and got ready to leave as a way of hinting that it was
time to finish even as attendees were discussing an electronic search record
projected onto the screen.
Observation 2016/03/17
As this observation shows, there were significant deficiencies in the types of people invited
to sit on scrutiny groups managed by the police. (Suffolk's independent group provides a
good contrast  and is  discussed after  this analysis  of police-led groups.) Members  were
unable to interpret the figures presented to them to then engage in any meaningful scrutiny
of what those trends implied. As these notes show, this was an inevitable outcome given
that the senior officer failed to educate members to ensure meaningful scrutiny could take
place.  Although  Birmingham was  the  most  extreme  example  of  an  officer  using  their
privileged position to restrict discussions, this was a recurrent finding in most other places
observed albeit more tactfully.
Across  all  observations,  few  attendees  demonstrated  any  awareness  of  the  significant
national developments outlined in chapters 6-7 to ask the 'right questions' and even those
who claimed to have “seen something” in the news were insufficiently familiar with the
relevant details. This was inevitable given that scrutiny groups were dominated by older
citizens who were either employed outside of the criminal justice system or retired, and
most  attendees  had never  been searched or had any negative  experience  of the police.
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Birmingham was  unique  in  having a  number  of  young  people  (four),  but  all  of  them
expressed strong support of the police and had no adversarial experiences either (one was
even vocal in his desire to become a police officer). Two older members did but were
content on receiving explanations rather than engaging in more in-depth scrutiny. Members
in  all  police-led  scrutiny  groups  neither  appeared  aware  of  independent  sources  of
information to hold their officers to account nor able to find the time or willingness to keep
themselves  up-to-date  with  the  many  changes  that  occurred  during  the  course  of  this
research. For example, not a single question had been asked in any scrutiny panel or other
public  event  about  how compliant  their  force  was  with  the  Home  Office  (2014)  best
practice scheme; how forces sought to meet the APPGC’s (2014) recommendations with
regards to searches of children and young people; or how their force was responding to the
highly critical  HMIC (2013;  2015a;  2016) inspections  despite  these gaining significant
media attention. Only in rare circumstance were these raised by senior officers in Coventry
and  Suffolk  in  order  to  comply  with  the  Home  Office's  demands  but  scrutiny  group
members were not sufficiently aware of the details to engage in any meaningful dialogue
or even remember for subsequent meetings.
Commissioners  and police  officers  interviewed  conceded  that  scrutiny  group members
were typically too inclined towards the police to provide critical scrutiny but it was still
striking to see how true this was in practice. Coventry's scrutiny group provided the best
example of this, although this finding recurred to a lesser extent elsewhere:
SeniorOfficer presented stop and search data covering the last month via a
projector  and  highlighted  a  rise  in  volumes  for  the  second  consecutive
month.  Last  month  there  were  229  searches  in  Coventry.  SeniorOfficer
argued that his/her previous warnings had now materialised with regards to
a rise  in  search volumes  for  two consecutive  months,  which  would  also
mean  that  those  increases  were  not  a  temporary  blip  as  it  cannot  be
attributed to an anomaly or the effect of police operations... Following the
presentation, no member followed this up with any question. Instead, one
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vocal member argued that the police should be given an award for their
activity  as  the  distribution  of  searches  appeared  to  coincide  with  police
recorded crime (others agreed), even though the presentation also showed
that the outcomes rate was still low.
Observation 2013/03/07
As  this  observation  shows,  members  strongly  supported  the  police  even  where  senior
officer(s) present tried to obtain feedback and were more open in expressing concerns over
their own officers' practices. However, members were disinterested and instead reaffirmed
their  support  of  the  type  of  police  practice  which  would  have  almost  certainly  been
challenged by people actually affected by those powers.  Although younger  participants
were encouraged to attend the scrutiny groups in all case study areas, there appeared to be
no proactivity in recruiting them outside of Suffolk or Birmingham West and Central, thus
restricting the scope and depth of scrutiny.
This strong police steer of how they are publicly held to account was also observed outside
of the case study areas, such as a summit organised by Avon and Somerset Police at its
rural headquarters:
Seniorofficer  repeatedly  cast  doubt  on  disproportionality  figures  by
constantly referring to the  “complexities” in calculating it  and contrasted
the  differing  rate  of  searches  for  blacks,  mixed  and  Asians  across  the
different command units across the force. One example provided was the
search rate of blacks being at 2.5 times the rate of whites in the City of
Bristol but only 0.8 times in Law Hill i.e. a comparatively lower rate than
whites. Using this, SeniorOfficer asked if it is a  “distraction” to focus so
much  on disproportionality...  "because  the  figures  are  so  complex...  but
[conceded] the perception of stop and search is as important as its reality" .
A small group of young people predominantly from black and mixed race
backgrounds- all of whom later said that they resided in Bristol (many miles
away from the headquarters)- looked at each other confused and screwed
their  faces  at  the  data  and  explanations  given  for  disproportionality  but
lacked  the  understanding  to  challenge  these  claims  and  others  made
throughout the session.  I  doubt they lacked any confidence because they
regularly asked questions and spoke about their own experiences of being
stopped and searched.
Observation 2014/09/30
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As this observation suggests, it was not just in the case studies that people from ethnic
minority backgrounds were unable to challenge the authoritative assertions of senior police
officers  in  undermining  potential  criticism.  As  the  notes  show,  their  ignorance  was
exploited by senior officers who used this to steer discussions, narrow the terms of debate,
and pre-empt claims of racial stereotyping by casting doubt on the validity of the figures
used  to  calculate  this.  Such  assertions  would  have  almost  certainly  been dismissed  as
simplistic  by  national  policing  staff  and  some  officers  from  other  constabularies  had
similar statements been made at the national forums observed for this study. In fact, a staff
member from a national policing body used their presentation later on at the summit to
gently challenge some of SeniorOfficer's claims, thus suggesting that the officer quoted
may  have  deliberately  exploited  the  public's  lack  of  understanding  knowing  that  they
would not be able to respond.
Contrary to these police-led groups, observations of those organised by members of the
public and held outside of police stations showed far more critical discussions taking place
and its  inclusion of people regularly subject  to various  police-initiated  stops.  Suffolk’s
Stop  and  Search  Reference  Group  (SSRG)  provided  the  most  robust  scrutiny  of  any
observed. This was led by the very active Ipswich and Suffolk Council for Racial Equality
(ISCRE) and partly financed by the PCC who attended the occasional meeting. Indeed, the
SSRG was credited by interviewees in Suffolk for achieving some changes to stop and
search practices due to its intrusive scrutiny of search records which regularly resulted in
management action taken against constables and their supervising officers. 
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However, SSRG members were equally constrained in their scope and depth of scrutiny as
well  as  lack  of  power  to  effect  fundamental  changes.  Although  SSRG  sets  its  own
discussion  items  and  could  choose  which  search  records  to  scrutinise  from a  sample
provided by the force, the geographical extent of its scrutiny was initially constrained by
the  constabulary  which  only  shared  Ipswich-wide  but  not  force-wide  forms  until  the
introduction of BUSSS. This shows how central activities still strongly influenced local
accountability.  Surprisingly,  not once was stop and account raised as a discussion item
despite Suffolk being one of only a handful of forces still recording it. Although the SSRG
appeared to provide the most robust form of scrutiny of any group observed, their reliance
upon police data and lack of understanding of national activities hampered its ability to
reach its full potential.  The group was itself self-critical concerning the extent to which
they had managed to achieve changes to police practice in its eight year history: 
Following a lengthy discussion about  what  learning is  instilled  from the
group's scrutiny of search records, one attendee asked the police in the room
to explain what happens when a supervisor rejects a form as unsatisfactory.
After  a  senior  officer  provided  some  explanation,  discussions  suddenly
moved onto police culture and whether the group had in fact managed to
achieve changes to police officers' behaviour. Another attendee expressed
their frustration with the process, arguing forcefully: “when we started back
in 2008 the forms were bad, now they're still bad- well, better but still bad.”
Other attendees laughed and expressed their agreement. As this discussion
item was being drawn to a close another attendee interrupted to express their
frustration  that  “[scrutinising]  forms  don't  change  a  damn  thing”,  and
argued they needed to change police culture and also questioned whether the
SSRG had any longer term impact upon learning within the Constabulary.
Observation 2015/11/25
As these outbursts suggest, scrutiny group members doubted whether the desired longer
term changes to police practice were taking place without also being able to address the
elements  of police culture perceived to encourage inequitable  practices  and narrow the
scope of accountability, as Brogden et al. (1988) argued previously.
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In  sum,  observations  graphically  illustrated  the  general  lack  of  understanding  and
independence of scrutiny group members to ensure police officers were sufficiently held to
account for stop and search use, albeit with some variance across sites. At best, they were
important opportunities for some members of the public, including ethnic minorities, to
raise their concerns with police officers who could then choose how to deal with those
issues,  or  ignore  them.  Jones  et  al.'s  (1994)  study  of  three  police  authorities  found
significant variation in their  capacity to effectively scrutinise their  force,  including one
which  failed  to  take  up  the  opportunities  provided  by  a  forthcoming  chief  constable.
Observations carried out for this research found a similar picture across all public scrutiny
groups. Formal groups organised independently of the police appeared to provide the most
robust scrutiny, especially where members had prior experience of police stops or had a
good but critical working relationship with senior officers, notably in Suffolk. However,
even Suffolk's independent group was powerless to overcome the limited scope of scrutiny
it was permitted to be engaged in by the force. 
Explanations of policy or practice was regularly given to all scrutiny events observed, but
no  systemic  change  arose  from  any,  partly  because  most  attendees  did  not  have  the
relevant experience or understanding of those powers to ask the 'right questions'. PCCs and
officers interviewed were aware of these dynamics but rather than being more proactive in
recruiting members belonging to the social groups regularly subject to police stops, relied
upon their website, social media, existing attendees and police officers to recruit additional
members. They also continued to hold meetings in police stations rather than venues most
likely to attract affected groups. Little surprise then that only Suffolk had produced the
highest degree of accountability that these groups were able to achieve. PCCs' overall lack
of engagement with or monitoring of progress within these groups also meant that where
257
members were independent and vociferous in seeking explanations, they lacked the power
to extend the debate beyond the traditional locus of stop and search scrutiny or achieve a
more fundamental influence over these practices. In essence, despite PCCs relying upon
these scrutiny groups as the primary means of public scrutiny, they remain as patchy and
powerless as research has always suggested they have been (Morgan, 1987; Brogden et al.
1988; Rowe, 2004).
9.6. Conclusion
Almost forty years after Marshall (1978) argued that the nature of police work warranted a
special form of control beyond the retrospective, 'explanatory' forms of accountability (also
Baldwin & Kinsey, 1982), an analysis of three PCC case study areas has found that power
remains firmly in the hands of chief constables, at least with respect to police-initiated
stops. This chapter's analysis of similar activities undertaken by PCCs elsewhere suggest
that  despite  having firmer  powers  than  their  predecessors,  they collectively  face  many
constraints  in  progressing local  police  accountability  beyond the shallow,  retrospective
explanations that has dominated in modern times, particularly concerning issues affecting
ethnic minorities.  When measured against the criteria of what constitutes as democratic
police accountability (see chapter 2), PCCs score unevenly, thus validating Jones’ (2008)
argument that reform to police governance usually produces this outcome.
First,  the  highly  discretionary  nature  of  police  powers  (Young  et  al.,  2010)  presents
commissioners  with  legal  barriers  to  directly  ensure  their  use  is  more  equitable  and
responsive to their ethnic minority communities. The best example of this is the ongoing
refusal of the chief constables for Nottinghamshire and the West Midlands to reintroduce
stop and account recording despite it being a persistent demand of their ethnic minority
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communities and a major electoral pledge of the PCCs. Due to the concerns expressed
about potentially discriminatory practice, this means that PCCs have also been unable to
ensure that they or their public have sufficient information to assess whether officers are
using those encounters equitably, the chief aim of democratic police accountability.
Second,  interview  data,  field  observations  and  documentary  analysis  support  Lister  &
Rowe's (2015) argument  that  PCCs have narrowly interpreted  their  role  particularly in
relation to issues affecting ethnic minorities. The case study PCCs were among the most
active in trying to improve the stop and search experiences of ethnic minorities and some
other  commissioners  undertook  similar  activities.  On  a  positive  note,  these  activities
appeared to enhance public participation by giving people more opportunities to directly
hold  their  senior  and  chief  officers  to  account  than  police  authorities  did.  This  was
primarily through local  opinion surveys  to inform recommendations  for change, public
summits, or more regular scrutiny groups established to monitor stop and search records.
However,  none  of  these  were  conducive  to  more  fundamental  changes  to  ensure  this
increased participation would translate into a more responsive police service because chief
constables could still ignore any recommendations. Senior officers responsible for regular
scrutiny were also able to cherry-pick what issues would be discussed at those meetings
and respond to questions  with half-truths  that  attendees  were unable  to  verify.  Further
hampering the effectiveness of PCCs activities was their absence in monitoring how well
scrutiny  groups  were  operating  and  their  later  reluctance  to  publicly  endorse  more
fundamental reforms sought by citizens or civic groups, or reaffirm those previously made
during the election campaign.
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However, contrary to Jones et al.'s (1994) argument that participation is not essential for
democratic  policing,  this  study found that  public  participation is a necessary feature to
enhance police accountability, despite the structural limitations of many of these activities.
This  is  because,  the  potential  embarrassment  faced  by  senior  officers  in  having  to
repeatedly explain unpopular decisions or persistent malpractice provided at least  some
incentive to address some of the more obvious and pressing issues. Therefore,  without
public  summits  and  scrutiny  groups,  little  else  was  preventing  local  policing  from
becoming even more unresponsive to ethnic minorities than this study discovered to be the
case. Public participation had also supported other elements of democratic accountability,
such as prompting opportunities for redress against perceived deficiencies, and ensuring
more information entered the public to support future accountability.
As interviews revealed, PCCs were too averse to using their raw powers to force their chief
constables to comply with directives on police-initiated stops as it affected too small  a
population to warrant such drastic action. However, PCCs were also hesitant to use their
public  profile  to  pressure  their  chief  constables  into  changing  their  stop  and  search
practices  despite the national  environment  favouring greater  public accountability.  This
was a consistent theme countrywide and the general lack of attention to minority issues
elsewhere  suggests  that  PCCs  have  largely  acquiesced  these  matters  to  their  chief
constables  and the Home Secretary.  This  is  perhaps  why national  policing  bodies  had
largely  excluded  PCCs from their  activities  (chapter  7).  Therefore,  whilst  this  chapter
contradicts Lister's (2013) prediction that PCCs would be too powerful for chief constables
to resist “encroachment” into operational matters, it  did support his argument that their
roles would become “mutually contingent”.
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In  conclusion,  just  as  preceding  chapters  have  argued  that  chief  constables  have
determined the extent to which national reforms translate into operational practice,  this
chapter argues this was amplified at the local level. This shows that despite some PCCs
successfully  enhancing  public  participation,  the  fundamental  issue  of  power  remains
unevenly  concentrated  within  the  hands  of  chief  constables,  thus  undermining  more
responsive policing for ethnic minority communities. As one interviewee argued:
“But  they’re  [chief  constables]  not  being  cooperative  anyway.  They’re
giving the impression of being cooperative to keep the PCC nice and, sort
of, happy. I think they [PCCs] need to be much, much more transactional
about it. They need to tell the public more, have a louder voice and it would
make a difference because the police don’t like being seen to be told that
they’re wrong in public. It’s why I’m not terribly popular ((laughs)).”
National/05
As National/05 argues, chief constables were successfully managing their PCCs but this
was because commissioners were failing to assert  their  authority and use their  broader
range of influences to produce changes. National/05's argument also suggests that some of
the progress made by PCCs in obtaining their chief constable's support for one-off reports
they  commissioned  or  for  setting  up  scrutiny  groups  was  due  to  the  chief  constables
permitting such developments rather own commissioners resilience, even if the latter could
be credited for providing the necessary impetus.
Interestingly,  case  study  PCCs  did  demonstrate  greater  powers  to  enhance  equity  and
police responsiveness on broader issues, such as domestic violence, rural crime and hate
crime.  What  distinguishes these areas from police-initiated  stops is  that  they are (i)  of
broader public interest; (ii) are not 'protected' by operational independence as they do not
directly relate to the exercise of specific legal powers; and (iii) involve linking together
other local bodies or criminal justice agencies outside of the police's legal authority. For
example, Suffolk PCC commissioned research into domestic violence (see Bond, 2015)
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and, together with an increasingly vocal chief executive, used his public meetings with the
chief  constable  to  pressure  the  constabulary  into  implementing  the  report's
recommendations  and  monitor  progress.  The  PCC's  influence  was  acknowledged  by
Suffolk Police which stated: “The Police and Crime Commissioner  has made domestic
abuse one  of  his  priority  areas  and has  been at  the forefront  of  driving improvement,
involving  both  the  police  and  other  county  partners”  (Suffolk  Constabulary,  undated).
Nottinghamshire's PCC used his commissioning powers and public office to reverse his
constabulary’s hesitation to establish a dedicated hate crime unit, for which he was widely
praised for achieving (e.g.  observation 2016/03/19).  The impetus  behind this  campaign
came from the highly influential and well organised local civic group Nottingham Citizens
which obtained the support of the PCC's office at a public event but not that of the chief
constable on the grounds that the force could not guarantee the necessary resources when
faced with further austerity measures (observation 2014/10/09). The reverse was achieved
partly through the PCC's multi-agency approach in securing the support from all  other
agencies and potentially leaving the police in an embarrassing and isolated position. West
Midlands  PCC had  supported  a  harm-reduction  approach  to  reducing  deaths  in  police
custody by establishing a street triage scheme with nurses specialising in treating mental
health  problems,  something  other  commissioners  country-wide  had  also  engaged  in
(APCC, 2013). 
These  developments  suggests  that  the  'electoralism'  of  PCCs  (Sampson,  2012)  has
promoted  populism  and  that  the  constraints  to  stronger  local  police  accountability
identified in this chapter may be unique to the exercise of police powers rather than wider
policing  issues.  As  discussed  earlier,  commissioners  were  keen  to  suggest  that  their
relationship with their chief constables was positive overall. Perhaps it was due to progress
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being made on wider policing issues such as those just discussed that some PCCs were
compromising  on  minority  issues  like  police  stops.  Ultimately,  these  broader  areas  of
progress  show just  how powerful  PCCs  can  be  in  producing  a  policing  service  more
responsive  to  public  concerns,  as  Jefferson & Grimshaw (1984) and Loveday & Reid
(2003)  argue  elected  commissioners  can  do  without  encroaching  into  operational
independence. The next chapter concludes this thesis by reviewing its main findings. In
light of these findings, it  critically assesses government proposals intending to enhance
local police accountability to their  PCCs, including in areas neglected thus far, namely
redress.
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10. Conclusion:  Democratic  Accountability  Revisited  and  Prospects  of
Reform
“Police  and  crime  commissioners...  have  shifted  power  away  from
Government to the public, and replaced the bureaucratic accountability of
police  authorities  with  democratic  accountability.  […] Today policing  is
more accountable, more transparent and more efficient than it was before
2010. And today, the historic principle of policing by consent is stronger
than ever before.” 
Rt. Hon. Theresa May (2016)
This  thesis  has  investigated  the  extent  to  which  directly-elected  Police  and  Crime
Commissioners (PCCs) have introduced greater democratic accountability of the police,
focussing particularly on the policing experiences of ethnic minorities in relation to police-
initiated stops. The first section of this concluding chapter draws upon this study's findings
to make broader judgements concerning how PCCs have fared in filling the historic local
deficit  in  police  accountability,  including  through  an  assessment  of  the  three  criteria
specifically investigated by this thesis: responsiveness, participation,  and power. It  also
considers  the  issue of  equity considering  its  overriding importance  in  the literature  on
democratic policing and its accountability (chapter 2). The second section then examines
government  proposals  to  further  enhance  PCCs'  role  and  their  potential  to  strengthen
democratic accountability, including in areas thus far neglected such as redress.
10.1. Democratic accountability revisited
According to the opening quote, by the-then Home Secretary and now Prime Minister,
Theresa May, PCCs have indeed enhanced police accountability on the main elements of
democratic policing that this thesis has explored. She characterised their predecessors as
“bureaucratic”-  a  dirty  word  in  policing-  despite  research  suggesting  that  some  were
actually  relatively  effective  (e.g.  Jones  et  al.,  1994;  HMIC, 2010;  Millen  & Stephens,
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2011). Contrary to her statement, police authorities did have some democratic legitimacy
in so far as most of its appointed members were drawn from locally elected councillors.
But what was most striking was just how upbeat her assessment was in stark contrast to her
more critical judgement of PCCs on the same criteria just over two years before. Earlier,
May (2013) admitted that PCCs' electoral legitimacy was “disappointingly low” and that,
despite some “encouraging” innovations introduced by commissioners, their overall ability
to produce the democratic accountability she so praised in 2016 was actually “mixed” as
they were failing to “use the powers we gave them to hold their forces to account.” In
particular, she criticised a number of commissioners for 'parroting' the lines of their chief
constables during moments of crisis and hastening to their defence.76 Yet such was her
faith in PCC two years later that she also outlined proposals to further expand their powers
as analysed in the second part of this chapter. Perhaps the praise was a necessary strategy
to sell those proposals, but to what extent have PCCs filled the democratic deficit?
PCCs  were  introduced  following  claims  of  a  democratic  deficit  in  local  police
accountability  (chapter  3).  This  deficit  first  emerged  from  the  1930s  as  the  watch
committees found their powers to direct police officers and exercise  control of decision-
making restricted  with the emergence  of operational  independence,  though not without
ongoing  controversies.  As  successive  Conservative  and  Labour  governments  enhanced
police  powers,  police  authorities  found  themselves  hampered  further  without  the
commensurate increase in their own powers to hold their chief constables to account for
their burgeoning operational practice (chapter 3-4). Instead, governments have transferred
power to the Home Secretary who has come to wield great influence in setting targets,
76 Although the Home Secretary was referring to a specific incident, it was clear that this was used as an
example to send a more general message to PCCs. The incident concerned the alleged 'stitch-up' of her
colleague Andrew Mitchell MP, then Government Chief Whip, who was forced to resign in 2012 over
what later emerged to be false allegations that he swore at police officers stationed at the Prime Minister's
residence. Several officers involved were later dismissed and one imprisoned for falsifying evidence.
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regulating police practice and directly intervening in police authorities'  matters,  thereby
making the police more responsive to national concerns rather than local priorities (chapter
3) and producing “a de facto national police” (Reiner, 2010:205). Police powers to stop
and search and other types of stops are a primary example of how this deficit has produced
policing styles at odds with local expectations and undermined police relations with ethnic
minority  communities  in  particular  (chapter  4).  Unsurprisingly,  police  authorities  were
only able to produce a shallow form accountability  based upon receiving  explanations
rather than exercising any control over decisions made, as democratic theories on modern
British policing have rightly distinguished (chapter 2).77 Even then research shows wide
variation  in  the  extent  to  which  chief  constables  have  felt  compelled  to  offer  such
explanations (e.g. Jones et al., 1994; Millen & Stephens, 2011; Caless & Tong, 2013). 
Perhaps unfairly  at  times,  police  authorities  have collectively been criticised  for  being
'architects of their own decline' by failing to exert what little remained of their dwindling
powers  to  more  robustly  hold  their  chief  officers  to  account  (Jones  et  al.,  1994;  also
Scarman,  1981; Morgan, 1987;  Millen & Stephens,  2011;  Caless & Tong, 2013).  It  is
within  this  context  that  PCCs  have  emerged,  been  granted  firmer  powers  than  their
predecessors, and tasked with reversing the local democratic deficit (chapter 3). Certainly
the findings of this thesis suggest that PCCs can potentially fill much of this deficit but
appear to be overly cautious in doing so. Unlike police authorities, PCCs have more direct
claims  to  legitimacy in representing  the interests  of their  electorate.  Although the first
election turnout in 2012 gave them a low mandate having returned only 15% of the eligible
vote, this improved to 27% in 2016 (Electoral Commission, 2013, 2016). Their full-time
77 Newburn (2012) and Sampson's (2012) comparative analyses of the British and various models of police
governance in the United States of America shows that this separation between explanations and the
exercise of control is not a necessary feature of democratic policing and its accountability, and neither is
centralisation. Afterall, chief officers in Britain were once under the control of the once powerful watch
committees and at a time when the Home Secretary was powerless to direct either of them (chapter 3).
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position also ensures that more regular and immediate scrutiny of police practices can take
place  which  all  chief  officers  interviewed  for  this  thesis  welcomed,  although  this  was
mainly for the self-serving reason of speeding up financial decision-making. The former
lengthier process of deliberation is partly what the Home Secretary was alluding to in the
opening quote when she unfairly characterised all police authorities as “bureaucratic”. Yet
recognising  the  benefit  of  some  of  this  bureaucracy,  PCCs  have  continued  their
predecessors' tradition of holding official meetings in public and publishing the details on
their  website.  However,  many  have  added  the  innovation  of  giving  their  electorate
opportunities  to  question  senior  and  chief  officers  at  those  meeting;  police  and crime
panels have also done the same. Also, PCCs assume responsibilities for crime reduction
grants  previously  dispersed  among  a  wider  range of  agencies  thus  concentrating  local
power into their hands, although this can also narrow the opportunities available to local
civic groups by making grants dependent upon the whims of their commissioner. 
Taken  together,  PCCs  have  amassed  considerable  powers  and  these  give  them
extraordinary potential  to fill  much of the historic deficit  in local police accountability.
They are  certainly  able  to  seek  better  explanations  in  public  and in  private;  influence
operational practice by setting the police budget, priorities and any performance targets
unfettered by the Home Secretary;  and also decide their  chief constable's performance-
related pay or terminate their contract almost unhindered (chapter 9). But this is all subject
to  some caveats:  PCCs'  ability  to  improve  local  accountability  concerning  how police
officers exercise their legal powers  appears to be hampered by operational independence
and, more significantly, by commissioners' own narrow interpretation of their role (chapter
8-9). This means that while PCCs appear to have improved some aspects of local police
accountability,  they  have  proven  unable  to  address  the  more  contentious  aspects  of
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policing, such as police-initiated stops. This support Jones' (2008) argument that electoral
reform is patchy and produces an uneven result. The rest of this section elaborates these
findings by discussing how PCCs measured in relation to the three aspects of democratic
police accountability that this thesis has investigated.
10.1.1. Equity
Equity is  the overriding  priority  of  democratic  policing  (Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984;
Jones et al.,  1994; Newburn & Jones, 1997; Loader & Walker, 2007; Manning, 2010).
Therefore, minimising the inequitable experiences of ethnic minorities or other vulnerable
groups must be a central concern for the institutional arrangements governing the police.
However,  operational  independence  limits  the  extent  to  which  institutional  actors  can
effect  such  changes  because  they  still  rely  upon  individual  officers  to  realign  their
discretionary practices to more equitable policing styles. 
PCCs are, however, responsible for formulating the policing priorities that chief constables
are legally obliged to have regard to implementing. It is precisely through these processes
that PCCs could promote more equitable policing experiences in so far as they embody an
“ordered compromise” (Jones, 2008:695), or an outcome that  “proves satisfactory to all”
(Brogden et al., 1988:191) even if some groups continue to disagree with “some specific
actions” (Reiner, 2010:34). The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 that
established PCCs also requires  them to consult  their  local  population  in  devising their
priorities  and lets  commissioners  create  their  own mechanisms  for  doing  so.  Whereas
Jefferson & Grimshaw (1984) would also leave it to elected commissioners to define these
processes,  Loader  &  Walker  (2007:  chapter  8)  elaborate  more  than  any  others  in
establishing a guiding framework.  As they argue,  these processes must  ensure that the
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range of competing claims are recognised but,  crucially,  ensure resources are allocated
based upon its own merits so as to avoid the concerns of less vocal groups- and presumably
also absent  claims-  from being ignored.  By contrast,  Manning (2010) would speed up
unnecessary delays by automatically distributing resources in favour of the most marginal
social groups. 
Lister & Rowe (2015) are highly critical of PCCs' ability to achieve these better democratic
processes, having analysed the manifesto pledges of all PCC candidates in 2012 and the
profile of those subsequently elected,  both of which were found wanting in relation to
ethnic diversity. Although, they did not review the police and crime plans of successful
candidates to assess its impact upon PCCs' decision-making, this thesis has and the results
support their claim (chapter 8). All 41 PCCs' original and 'refreshed' plans were analysed
for explicit references to police-initiated stops, which very few actually did, although this
number increased alongside the greater government and parliamentary scrutiny into those
powers (see table 8.1). Those who did, such as the three case study PCCs, were found to be
experiencing tremendous difficulties in ensuring their chief constables were implementing
their  pledges  to  reform  these  encounters  in  response  to  concerns  of  ethnic  minority
communities, notably reintroducing stop and account recording (chapter 9). But what was
striking was just how few PCCs had prioritised any issue affecting ethnic minority groups,
apart from the 'usual suspects' who preside over areas with sizeable minority electorates.
All  of  this  suggests  that  the  'electorialism'  (Sampson,  2012)  of  the  PCC structure  has
exacerbated  inequalities  as  commissioners  have  prioritised  the  concerns  of  the  wider
electorate at the expense of less powerful minority groups. Further, PCCs' reliance upon
police-public  consultation  and  scrutiny  groups  to  give  their  minority  electorate
opportunities  to  scrutinise  police  practice  suggests  a  failure  to  seek  better  ways  of
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incorporating  those  very  sections  of  the  population  who  have  historically  lacked  the
confidence in these processes to participate in them.
10.1.2. Responsiveness and public participation
In  the  opening  quote,  the  Home  Secretary  rather  optimistically  declared  “policing  by
consent is stronger than ever before”. One way of measuring this is through the extent to
which the police is responsive to the wishes of the public, another criteria of democratic
policing  (Jefferson  &  Grimshaw,  1984;  Manning,  2010;  Loader  &  Walker,  2007).
Although participation is  related to this,  few distinguish it  from responsiveness as this
thesis does (also Jones et al., 1994; Jones & Newburn, 1997).
Police authorities were found to be unresponsive to their public (Morgan & Swift, 1987;
Jones et al. 1994; Millen & Stephens, 2011) and this appears to have improved with the
advent of PCCs (chapter 8-9). Similar to Caless & Owens' (2016) study, this thesis found
PCCs to be far more engaged with their electorate and this was recognised by all research
participations, including by interviewees who admitted to being initially opposed to their
introduction.  However,  PCCs have largely failed to ensure police priorities also reflect
issues affecting ethnic minorities despite this being cited as a key measure of their success
(Newburn, 2012; Lister & Rowe, 2015).
Nottinghamshire, Suffolk and West Midlands PCCs were amongst the most responsive in
this regard, all of whom also sought to enhance opportunities for the public to directly
scrutinise  the  use  of  police-initiated  stops  (chapter  8-9).  However,  these  have  only
reproduced the traditionally weak and explanatory forms of accountability, particularly as
most  of these activities  involved establishing  yet  another  public  committee  or meeting
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dedicated  to  scrutinising  data  that  the  police  (helpfully?)  supplied  and helped them to
interpret.  More innovative  activities  involved commissioning ethnic  minority  groups to
undertake  one-off  research  reports  but  without  the  necessary  'people  power'  to  then
monitor  and  drive  through  any  changes  rejected  by  chief  officers.  Some  PCCs  even
established youth-led committees or youth commissioners to produce recommendations,
such  as  in  Avon  &  Somerset,  Kent,  Leicestershire,  Northamptonshire  and
Nottinghamshire. As important as these have been in giving some members of the public
opportunities to scrutinise police practice, these are unlikely to attract those most adversely
affected by police powers. More fundamentally,  they fail to illuminate the discretionary
practices that Brogden et al. (1988) argue is important to ensure adequate accountability. In
this regard, PCCs have been eclipsed by the Home Office (2014f) Best Use of Stop and
Search Scheme which enables members of the public to go out on patrol with the police to
see how they conduct searches. Although officers may modify their behaviour during these
observations, and 14 out of 43 forces were not even compliant with this initiative by the
end of the research period (HMIC, 2015a), it does more than any other activity to open up
discretion  to  public  scrutiny,  although  observers  are  still  powerless  to  change  those
practices (chapter 7).
Overall, this suggests that whilst the introduction of PCCs has improved opportunities for
ethnic  minorities  to  participate  in  police  accountability,  commissioners  have  failed  to
ensure that this also translates into policing styles more responsive to their demands. This
is despite the public profile and firm powers that commissioners enjoy to pressure their
chief constables into adopting the practices sought by their communities. Instead, PCCs
country-wide were relying upon softer approaches and traditional mechanisms for public
participation.  Therefore,  PCCs were narrowly  interpreting  their  mandate  to  that  of  the
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ballot box, in line with warnings to this effect (e.g. Jones, 2008; Millen & Stephens, 2011;
Reiner, 2016).
10.1.3. Power
Have  PCCs,  as  the  Home  Secretary  declared,  really  “shifted  power  away  from
Government”? Essentially,  this  thesis  has  been an  investigation  of  power and whether
PCCs have reversed the century-long erosion of local democratic control of the police.
According to  some theories  of democratic  policing and its  accountability,  control  over
decisions must be dispersed more evenly within governance structures (Jones et al., 1994;
Loader  &  Walker,  2007).  Since  the  emergence  of  operational  independence,  local
democratic bodies have found their control over the police restricted but it was successive
central governments that have struck the deadliest blow by not only failing to give police
authorities additional powers to counterbalance those afforded to police officers but also
assumed greater powers itself to directly intervene in local affairs (chapter 3). Of course,
many  police  authorities  were  collectively  failing  to  exercise  the  full  extent  of  their
dwindling powers, but this is unfair to the few who did (Jones et al. 1997; HMIC, 2010;
Millen & Stephens, 2011).
Reiner  (2010),  Newburn  (2012)  and  Lister  (2013)  are  all  sceptical  about  central
government devolving its powers, but this thesis suggests otherwise. PCCs have gained
stronger powers over the budget; setting their own objectives and performance targets; and
hiring and dismissing their chief constables. The latter is their ultimate power over chief
constables  and  whereas  police  authorities  required  the  Home  Secretary's  approval  to
employ or dismiss their chiefs, PCCs can do so with only limited restraints. A number of
PCCs have already done so with only one chief constable having successfully appealed
272
against his dismissal in the case of Rhodes (see chapter 9). Therefore, PCCs are certainly
not as impotent as their predecessors but, contrary to Lister's (2013) prediction, they have
not  proven  to  be  “too  powerful”  for  chief  constables  to  prevent  “encroaching”  on
operational matters, or at least in relation to minority issues like police-initiated (chapter
9). This study found commissioners to be overcautious in applying public pressure on their
police force to change and were particularly averse to threatening their chief constables
with dismissal  for failing  to  implement  policies  popular  with their  minority  electorate.
Chief officers appeared to be taking advantage of this.
Interestingly,  Nottinghamshire  PCC  managed  to  reverse  his  chief  officer's  initial
apprehension in establishing a dedicated hate-crime unit, a pledge made to and supported
by the very powerful civic group Nottingham Citizens. So too had Suffolk PCC persuaded
his force to undergo a significant overhaul in how it investigates domestic violence. Both
PCCs made use of their full range of powers to mount considerable public pressure upon
their  chiefs  to  reform  (chapter  9).  Significantly,  both  developments  involved  pooling
together the wider criminal justice system and local council and neither of these policing
activities are firmly covered by operational  independence,  even though they do have a
considerable impact upon operational policing, particularly the investigation of domestic
violence. Therefore, this suggests that not only are some of the limitations that this study
has discovered unique to the accountability of legal police powers, but that it also depends
on how willing PCCs are to use the full extent of their hard and soft powers to introduce
reform.  As  chapter  9  concluded,  perhaps  it  is  because  commissioners  were  making
progress on these issues that affect the broader electorate that they appeared so willing to
compromise on minority issues such as police-initiated stops.
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Over the course of the study, the Home Secretary- the other key player in the tripartite
structure-  made  true  on  her  promise  to  “withdraw  from day-to-day  policing  matters”
(Home  Office,  2011b:  para27),  something  also  noticed  by  PCCs  and  chief  officers
interviewed. Indeed, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act also removed the
considerable  powers  amassed  by the  Home Secretary  since  the  1990s  to  direct  police
forces  in  setting  objectives  and measuring  performance  (see  chapter  3).  However,  the
Home Secretary still retains the power to direct remedial action on any matter that receives
a negative inspection by the HMIC, and to also dismiss chief constables in the 'public
interest'. Stop and search was a brilliant  example  of how the Home Secretary has not
abdicated her oversight role by introducing considerable reform to the governance and use
of those powers. But chief officers were still able to resist some of these pressures, thus
suggesting  that  the  Home Secretary  is  less  powerful  an  actor  than  previously  thought
(chapter 7). Although she refrained from formally invoking her powers to direct remedial
action following the damning HMIC (2013, 2015a, 2016) inspections and also failed to
introduce reform of the wider range of issues she promised to deliver on, this episode was
extraordinarily revealing of power relations within the new governance structures. Overall,
it suggests that the degree of direction from central government is entirely dependent upon
how future Home Secretaries conceptualise their role (chapter 6-7). 
Certainly chief constables, the third element of the tripartite structure, appear to be the
most  powerful  actor.  This  is  supported  by  their  consistent  refusals  to  implement  their
PCC's pledge to re-record stop and account, and selective implementation of the reforms
recommended  by  various  national  policing  bodies  and  those  demanded  by  the  Home
Secretary (chapters 7 & 9). As for the general public, aside from being able to elect a PCC
every  four  years,  their  general  impotence  remained  virtually  unchanged.  Despite  the
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impetus behind stop and search reform arising from the actions of frustrated citizens, they
were totally reliant upon the local and national actors who claimed to be acting in their
interest  but  yet  failed  to  give  them any  meaningful  role  in  stop  and  search  scrutiny.
Ultimately, the PCC arrangements appears to provide little incentive for members of public
to engage in these structures, particularly for ethnic minorities and other groups routinely
subject to police coercion.78 Arguably, this lends itself to the types of litigation and public
disorder that appeared to be more effective in highlighting frustrations over policing and
producing some reform.
10.2. Prospects of reform
The words 'police' and 'reform' are rarely far apart. With the re-election of a (now majority)
Conservative government in May 2016 and PCCs entering their second term, they appear
to be the model of local police governance for the foreseeable future. As this concluding
section discusses, they are also set to gain additional powers in the Police and Crime Bill
which may strengthen local democratic police accountability.  Some proposals may even
address  some of  the  areas  of  democratic  accountability  neglected  by  the  current  PCC
arrangements, notably redress which is what most of these developments relate to.
10.2.1. Internal complaints
PCCs will be given powers to define how far they wish to be involved in the complaints
process.  Currently,  they retain their  predecessors'  phenomenally vague duty of keeping
themselves  'informed'  of  how their  police  force  handles  complaints.  At  the  minimum,
government proposals will give PCCs a more explicit duty of holding their chief constables
to  account  for  how complaints  are  handled.  Similar  to  the  current  study's  findings  on
78 See Bowling et al. (2008) for a good discussion of a wider range of powers and their disproportionate 
impact upon ethnic minorities.
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police-initiated stops, this is unlikely to ensure more robust oversight as it still relies upon
chief constables' cooperation and prevents proactive commissioners from introducing more
fundamental changes to those processes. Two commissioners interviewed alluded to this
when they stated:
“Well, my role in complaints is very limited: I can ask if people contact me
if I don't think the police have done it properly to ask them to reinvestigate
it. That is the only power I've got. The complaints process is a nightmare,
it's  long,  it's  very defensive  from the  police...  Do I  think it  needs  to  be
fundamentally reformed? Yes, I do.”
Commissioner/01
“So one of the things- very simple things- that we managed to change is the
way some of the letters [to complainants] are written. I’d still  like to see
improvements but it’s a step.”
Commissioner/02
As  indicated,  Commissioner/02  sought  greater  “improvements”  but,  alongside
Commissioner/01, had been constrained in doing so, thus demonstrating PCCs' overall lack
of power over mechanisms for redress. Research with complainants and litigations show
tremendous dissatisfaction with these processes, including the length of time taken; the
lack of communication and information; being pressured into informal resolution rather
than making an official complaint; and not being taken seriously (Waters & Brown, 2000;
Smith, 2003). Procedural changes such as what Commissioner/02 appeared to be primarily
concerned with  and claimed  to have some limited  success  in  introducing may help  to
address some of these issues. However, it still fails to address the more fundamental and
systemic issue of public mistrust  in a system that continues to allow police officers to
investigate themselves. This is a flaw repeatedly highlighted by numerous inquiries whose
recommendations  for  a  system of  dealing  with  complaints  entirely  independent  of  the
police has been ignored by successive governments (Scarman, 1981; Macpherson, 1999).
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To promote greater independence, the Bill enables PCCs to assume greater responsibilities
by  either  (a)  'receiving  and  recording  complaints'  whilst  letting  their  force  conduct
investigations; or (b) become the 'single point of contact''79 responsible for managing the
entire process and, if desired, (c) assume control of the entire complaints department from
the chief constable. Clearly, the latter provides PCCs with the greatest potential to make
local complaints  independent.  But its  integrity can easily be called into question if  the
police officers typically employed to investigate complaints are not replaced by civilian
staff, and if the elected commissioner had previously been employed as a police officer or
member of staff. According to Caless & Owens (2016), eight (19.5%) of the forty-one
PCCs elected  in 2012 were former  police officers.  However,  this  is  likely to be much
higher if broadened out to include those who were formerly employed as police staff as the
current author discovered by meeting candidates during the election campaign and elected
PCCs at various meetings and conferences throughout the research.
According to research, most complainants desire the relatively simple goal of obtaining an
apology  for  perceived  wrong  (Waters  &  Brown,  2000;  Smith,  2003).  Commissioners
interviewed were all aware of this, including the aforementioned commissioners who more
eloquently than others stated: 
“If you've got something wrong it's easy to say 'I'm sorry we've got it wrong,
you know, we apologise we're gonna learn from that mistake'. Do the police
ever do it? No they don't, you know, ((thuds on table)) 'we're always right’,
you know, ‘there's no point coming to us telling us we've made a mistake,
we never make mistakes.'  Well,  it's not a very sensible organisation who
takes that view.”
Commissioner/01
“And the other thing we discovered with complaints is they [police] weren’t
very good at saying sorry, you know, ‘yes, we got something wrong, sorry’.
So one of the things  we’ve managed to instil  is  sometimes  you  have to
admit when you’re wrong. Don’t just be defensive.”
79 See explanatory notes accompanying the Police and Crime Bill HL 55–EN (paras472-477).
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Commissioner/02
This awareness may instil the cultural changes that both research and these commissioners
argue would make the complaints processes more responsive to complainants. However,
despite both commissioners appearing to be well versed in how these issues undermine
confidence in complaints, they appeared to be hesitant to assume greater responsibilities:
“Perhaps I should have thought about this a bit more and tried to withdraw it
out of [the] police. But [there are] some commissioners who are doing some
work around trying to set up better  complaints  procedures particularly in
XXXX and I've just kind of took the view that rather than getting into this
myself I'd wait and see what the results of their work was”
Commissioner/01
“I certainly would like additional powers regarding complaints. I don’t think
we’d want everything the government is suggesting... They should still be
investigated  by the PSD [professional  standards  department]  but  that  we
monitor  the  progress  much  more  closely...  It’s  a  difficult  thing.  It’s  a
principle  thing  because  we’ve  kept  ourselves  fairly  small  so  that  more
money can go into policing. We don’t want to build an empire, or a bigger
empire ((laughs)).”
Commissioner/02
Public dissatisfaction and mistrust in the complaints process emerged from almost every
observation  conducted  in  both  PCCs'  police  forces  and  elsewhere.  Despite  the
rationalisations offered by both commissioners, their lack of proactivity and that of their
colleagues  elsewhere  suggests  that  PCCs  nationwide  may  be  just  as  hesitant  as
Commissioner/02 admits to adopt “everything the government is suggesting.” Ultimately,
this may be because commissioners have little incentive to assume greater responsibilities
for complaints and risk facing the same barrage of criticisms traditionally directed towards
the police. This is exacerbated by the lack of powers PCCs have to directly change the
operational practice that gives rise to complaints in the first place.
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10.2.2. “Super complaints”
Currently, the role of any civic group in the complaints system is restricted to initiating a
complaint on behalf of a specific person and supporting them through the process (Police
Reform Act, section 12(1)). The Bill seeks to expand the role of the public by empowering
groups awarded 'designated body' status to make 'super complaints', defined as "a feature,
or combination of features, of policing in England and Wales by one or more than one
police force is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public" (Police
and  Crime  Bill,  section  24).  Incidentally,  a  number  of  interviewees  highlighted  the
importance of local, credible civic groups in raising to their attention issues that would
have otherwise gone unnoticed:
“Youtube and social  media:  people  who are  filming  stuff  and sharing  it
helps sometimes if you don’t get your camera ripped off you. What else?
And, you know, campaign groups like StopWatch,  like Runnymede,  like
OpenSociety, Release, the LSE have done a lot of work as well around, sort
of, pushing and keeping on pushing to keep it on the agenda.”
National/04
“So when we did our piece of work before, the forces which thought about
this the most and the most advanced were those which had been challenged
either through Liberty or the EHRC or StopWatch, one of those monitoring
groups who’d actually challenged them over their use of those powers”
National/06
“People  aren’t  necessarily  confident  enough  to  make  complaints  and
sometimes  those  people-  you  know,  like  working  with  Cageprisoners-
sometimes people feel more comfortable to talk to a third party about their
issues and have that party then drip issues through to us”
National/08
As  these  interviewees  with  national  policing  staff  suggest,  locally-based  groups  have
played  a  key  role  in  influencing  their  own  work  and  developing  subsequent
recommendations  aimed  at  reforming police-initiated  stops  (chapter  6).  As National/08
indicates,  CagePrisoners has  been widely  credited  for  the  IPCC's  decision  in  2009 to
require all police forces to refer onto it complaints relating to the highly secretive schedule
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7 ports power. This ultimately led to the IPCC's successful judicial review that forced the
Metropolitan Police to comply with its investigations (see chapter 6). As others indicate,
StopWatch has become a leading voice in police-stops for which national policing bodies
have become amenable towards even if most forces appear to ignore it (chapter 6). As
chapter 9 highlighted, a number of local groups from within the case studies have also
played a key role in shaping their  police force's approach to those powers, particularly
Suffolk's  Stop and Search  Reference  Group which  the  HMIC (2013) endorses  as  best
practice. Whilst these examples relate to police-initiated stops, they also show the potential
of civic groups to raise attention to wider experiences of the police and assist in changing
it.
However,  as  the Bill  indicates,  this  is  not  a  general  provision enabling  any charity  or
advocacy group to exercise. This is restricted to those awarded 'designated body' status by
the Home Secretary for their “experience in representing the interests of the public” and
the ability to “demonstrate that they had the capacity and capability to test and compile a
range of  evidence  to  form the  basis  for  a  super‐complaint” (HL  Bill  55–EN:para567).
Therefore,  super  complaints  may  considerably  enhance  the  ability  of  the  public  to
challenge almost any aspect of policing and could do more to answer Millen & Stephens's
(2011) call to re-conceptualise the tripartite governance structure into a quartet to include
citizens.  It  may  also  give  them  more  meaningful  ways  to  participate  in  police
accountability rather than the rare, periodic input of PCC elections. In practice, however,
as  with  so  much  in  modern  policing,  this  depends  upon  how future  home  secretaries
conceptualise their role. Designating a variety of local charities or advocacy groups could
give traditionally powerless minority groups powers to raise attention to the broader range
of police encounters not subject to formal scrutiny, and indeed other policing experiences.
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But restricting it to a narrow few could constrain civic participation,  prevent collective
action, and even exacerbate tensions between social groups, as most members of the public
interviewed argued was already happening in their areas.80
10.2.3. Commissioning services
PCCs wield significant budgetary responsibilities and are assuming ever greater powers
over local  crime reduction  funds.  However,  commissioners  had significantly underused
these powers despite its capacity to widen public participation and enhance their influence
over the police, even if its success ultimately depends upon police officers to incorporate
any  recommendations  into  operational  practice.  Astonishingly,  despite  the  unique  and
extraordinary powers of the HMIC to obtain information  for its  inspections,  for which
police-initiated stops is just one example (chapter 6-7), only four PCCs had commissioned
it to inspect their force.81 
Following  concerns  about  inappropriate  practices  in  police  officers  resolving  more
detectable  crimes  at  the  expense  of  serious  crimes,  Kent's  PCC  became  the  first  to
commission an inspection into how her force recorded crime which led to changes made to
these  operational  decisions.  Both  South  Yorkshire  and  Greater  Manchester  PCCs
commissioned  inspections  into  how their  force  investigated  sexual  offences,  including
against  children.  Arguably  these  matters  are  firmly  within  the  confines  of  operational
policing even if the wider issue is one of public confidence. Such was the level of concern
in  South  Yorkshire-  which  contributed  to  its  PCC's  resignation-  that  the  HMIC  now
80 This was particularly the case in Nottingham where every interviewee criticised the local council decision
a  few years  beforehand  to  effectively  discontinue  the  city's  leading  race  equality  council.  'Different
communities',  interviewees  argued,  were  placed  in  direct  competition with each  other  in  bidding for
various funding streams in the absence of a unifying civic force.
81 These  can be viewed from:  https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/commissions-from-
pccs/
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produces  quarterly  inspection  reports  into  progress  made  against  its  recommendations.
Even the typically secretive world of counter-terrorism has been subject to a review by a
conglomerate of five East Midlands PCCs who commissioned an inspection of their joint
counter-terrorism unit.82 Although the inspection result was positive, it does highlight the
potential  for PCCs to restructure or withdraw from collaborations which would have a
significant impact upon operational capacity. Perhaps one reason why so few PCCs have
commissioned  the  HMIC  is  due  to  their  loss  of  control  over  the  inspection  process
knowing  that  the  results  are  automatically  made  public,  unlike  the  privacy  of  a
consultancy. Further, any negative inspection report may solicit unwanted media attention,
call to question the PCC's competence, and could potentially result in a direct remedial
action by the Home Secretary.
A number of PCCs have instead opted to commission local groups or organisations  to
conduct research or carry out specific services. Suffolk's PCC commissioned independent
research into domestic violence which produced changes to practice following his repeated
public  demands  to  do  so,  thus  illustrating  the  potential  significant  of  commissioning
powers.  Other  PCCs  have  commissioned  youth  groups,  scrutiny  panels  and  crime
prevention programmes.  However,  Nottinghamshire  PCC's commission of research into
ethnic minorities' experiences of the police resulted in some of its recommendations being
implemented but not the crucial one on stop and account recording (chapter 9). It was also
only  towards  the  end of  the  research  that  the  dedicated  hate  crime  unit  the  PCC had
pledged to establish was set up. This suggests that whilst commissioning the electorate to
deliver programmes can improve their  participation and carries  a certain weight of the
public legitimacy that  makes  it  harder for the police to resist,  the fundamental  lack of
82 Composed of Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire.
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power that ethnic minority groups hold and the reluctance of PCCs to apply public pressure
on their chiefs means that changes to practice still rely upon the will of chief and senior
police officers. 
10.3. Final thoughts
This  thesis  is  the  first  study  of  PCCs'  impact  on  relations  with  ethnic  minority
communities,  although  the  findings  can  also  be  applied  to  police-community  relations
more  generally.  While  recent  scholarship  has  attempted  to  understand what  these  new
structures  mean for  police accountability  in  Western  democracy,  these discussions are,
unfortunately,  speculative. This is because claims are made without testing those claims
empirically  and  research  has  focused  narrowly  on  how  PCCs  and  chief  constables
negotiate their role. However, by analysing how a wide range of stakeholders negotiate
operational  policing  (i.e.  police-initiated  stops),  this  thesis  has  shed new light  into the
impact  of  PCCs  on  democratic  policing.  The  collaborative  nature  of  this  studentship
enabled a full immersion into the research context. This meant that developments could be
identified that would have otherwise gone unnoticed and also that stimuli are understood
from  the  point  of  view  of  those  actually  engaged  directly  within  and  around  those
structures.  It  therefore  provided  the  greatest  depth  for  understanding  how  police
accountability operates in practice.
The central finding from this research is that PCCs represent an uneven improvement in
the local democratic accountability of the police, as Jones (2008) predicts. Compared to the
police authorities, PCCs were found to be more engaged with their electorate and granted
them greater  opportunities  to participate  in setting police priorities  and scrutinising the
police,  albeit  still  limited  in  nature.  For  example,  they  were  bringing  together  key
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stakeholders  through organising  public  summits  or  providing the  necessary funding of
scrutiny groups to ensure that citizens could routinely hold senior police officers to account
for operational policing. Only some PCCs were providing more innovative methods for
their  electorate  to shape police  policy,  primarily by commissioning citizens  to conduct
research locally and develop recommendations. Government proposals to enhance PCCs'
functions may also help to improve local accountability by extending their powers beyond
that enjoyed by their predecessors, namely the complaints process and other areas of the
criminal justice system beyond their current remit. 
However, this only represents a potential rather than a necessary outcome because PCCs
appeared  unable  to  more  robustly  hold  their  chief  constables  to  account  for  their
operational practice, practices that tend to disproportionately affect ethnic minorities. This
was partly  due to the legal  constraints  imposed by operational  independence  but  more
significantly because PCCs were themselves largely unresponsive to minority concerns, as
predicted by Millen & Stephens (2011) and Lister & Rowe (2015). The few PCCs around
the country who were more responsive were too hesitant to exert the full extent of their
existing  powers  to  produce  changes  to  operational  practices  and  too  cautious  to  even
publicly embarrass their chief constables into doing so. Therefore, despite the considerable
potential  of PCCs to significantly improve local police accountability,  in  practice, they
appear to be repeating the mistakes of their predecessors by undermining their own ability
to do so, especially in relation to 'minority issues'.  If PCCs were supposed to improve
democratic policing, they have actually undermined it by exacerbating social inequalities.
This  study  is  not  without  its  limitations.  Notwithstanding  PCCs'  fear  of  public
embarrassment, it is unclear why so few had used their wider powers to better align their
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police force's policy to the expectations of ethnic minorities locally, particularly given the
strong  national  pressures.  Perhaps,  it  was  a  reflection  of  commissioners'  own lack  of
creativity rather than a by-product of austerity or other structural problem. Also, it remains
unclear why the PCCs for Nottinghamshire, Suffolk, and the West Midlands appeared to
be the most receptive to their electorate whereas others were not. In other words, why were
the PCCs studied incredibly outspoken on police-initiated stops, but not their colleagues
who also preside over police forces with similar- if not worse- ethnic disproportionality
and historic  failures  over  stop and search  use?  Afterall,  ethnic  minority  groups across
England  and  Wales  were  just  as  vociferous  as  this  study's  research  participants  in
vocalising their frustrations and pressuring PCCs and chief officers into changing police
practice.  While it may be that the case study PCCs had a personal affinity to stop and
search reform,  future research  should probe these issues  to  shed better  light  onto how
commissioners develop their priorities and what influence the public has in shaping their
agenda.
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Appendix A – Stop and Search Powers and Other Police Encounters in 
England and Wales
Purpose and 
object of the 
encounter
Extent of the 
search
Is reasonable 
suspicion 
Required?
Is prior 
authorisation 
required?
PACE-regulated powers
Section 1,
Police Criminal and 
Evidence Act 1984
Stolen items or 
weapons
People, drivers, 
and vehicles
Yes No
Section 23,
Misuse of Drugs Act
1971
Controlled 
drugs
People, drivers 
and vehicles
Yes No
Section 47, 
The Firearms Act 
1968
Firearms and 
ammunition
People, drivers 
and vehicles
Yes No
Section 43,
Terrorism Act 2000
Articles useful 
for terrorism
People, drivers, 
passengers, and 
also vehicles
under section 
43A
Yes No
Exceptional powers
Section 60,
Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 
1994
Dangerous or 
offence 
weapons
People and 
vehicles
No Yes
Section 44 
(repealed),
Terrorism Act 2000
Articles useful 
for terrorism
People No Yes
Section 47A,
Terrorism Act 2000
Articles useful 
for terrorism
People and 
vehicles
No Yes
Other
Section 163,
Road and Traffic Act
1988
Drivers' 
identification 
and insurance 
policies
Drivers only No No
Stop and Account Confirm or ally 
suspicious 
behaviour
None No No
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Appendix B -  Anonymised List of Interviewees 
Note: to protect the identity of police and crime commissioners, deputy police and crime
commissioners, chief constables, deputy chief constables and assistant chief constables
interviewed,  they  are  aggregated  into  a  dedicated  category  rather  than  identified
alongside other interviewees from the same case study area.
Total interviews = 42
#
Police and crime commissioners, deputy police and crime 
commissioners and office staff
1 Commissioner/01
2 Commissioner/02
3 Commissioner/03
4 Commissioner/04
5 Commissioner/05
6 Commissioner/06
7 Commissioner/SupportStaff/01
8 Commissioner/SupportStaff/02
Chief constables, deputy chief constables and assistant chief 
constables
1 ChiefOfficer/01
2 ChiefOfficer/02
3 ChiefOfficer/03
4 ChiefOfficer/04
Public appointees and staff from national policing bodies
1 National/01
2 National/02
3 National/03
4 National/04
5 National/05
6 National/06
7 National/07
8 National/08
9 National/09
10 National/10
Nottinghamshire
1 Nottinghamshire/Police/01
2 Nottinghamshire/Police/02
303
3 Nottinghamshire/Public/01
4 Nottinghamshire/Public/02
5 Nottinghamshire/Public/03
6 Nottinghamshire/Public/04
7 Nottinghamshire/Public/05
8 Nottinghamshire/Police&CrimePanel/01
9 Nottinghamshire/Police&CrimePanel/02
Suffolk
1 Suffolk/Police/01
2 Suffolk/Public/01
3 Suffolk/Public/02
4 Suffolk/Public/03
West Midlands
1 WestMids/Police/01
2 WestMids/Police/02
3 WestMids/Police/03
4 WestMids/Police&CrimePanel/01
5 WestMids/Public/01
6 WestMids/Public/02
7 WestMids/Public/03
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Appendix C - Interview Questions
Note: questions were adapted to the person interviewed and semi-structured. Therefore, 
the following questions are only indicative of the topic of conversation.
Objectives for this interview
 To identify how, if at all, stop and search features in the case study area and how it is
perceived by the research participant
 Understand  how  their  role  and  associated  activities  fit  within  stop  and  search
governance and scrutiny
 Understand their attitudes towards the PCC structure and what role PCCs can play, if
any, in stop and search governance, reform and scrutiny particularly in light of police
‘operational independence’
Introduction
 Thank
 Blurb of research: impact of PCCs on police-communities relations esp. BME
 Ask permission to record but can go off-record and stop recording at any time
1. Please explain what you envisage your role to be as XXXXX and what that 
means in practice?
Prompts:
a) Re: relations with the public
b) Re: Police & Crime Panels
c) Re: Home Office, HMIC, IPCC and CoP
d) Re: PCCs
e) Re: chief constables
2. What does operational independence mean to you and how do you define or 
negotiate your role with the PCC/chief constable?
3. What are the key issues affecting BME communities in XXXXX?
Prompts: 
a) How do you attempt to engage them on these issues?
b) How do you ensure 'representation' across communities?
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4. What are your views on stop and search and its use? 
HO 2014 (S1 PACE 10,206  -4% pc;  S60 434 -66% pc)
Prompts:
a) Is it operational for the chief constable or strategic issue for PCCs/police authorities?
b) Police say it is an “essential tool in the fight against crime”- what is your view?
1. Arrest rate: 
S60 S1
2% (-99%) 8.6% (10%) 2012/13 - HO 2014
2% 7.5%
2. What are the factors behind its historic increase in use? And 
disproportionality?  
Black Asian Mixed Other
S1 4.8 1.4 2.1 1.0 2012/13 – HO 2014
5.6 1.3 2.6 0.9 2011/12 – MOJ 2013
S60 24.7 3.4 5.3 1.9
29.5 3.2 9.4 1.7
c) What are the factors behind recent reductions in use? And disproportionality
5. What role do police authorities/PCCs have on stop and search use or do you 
think they don’t?
Possible discussion points:
a) Where does it fit within the context of ‘operational independence’?
b) How would you resolve any tensions between yourselves and the police 
authority/PCCs? 
E.g. stop and account reintroduction  [if relevant]
6. How well do you think the PCC system is working in comparison to police 
authorities?
Possible discussion points:
a) PCCs have only five powers but no job description; operational independence barrier
b) Police and crime panels prefer a more direct relationship with the chief constable.
c) Police and crime panels have little to no powers to hold PCCs to account- what are 
your thoughts on this?
d) What additional powers would you need to fulfil your role?
7. Going forward, what changes, if any, would you advocate/expect to be made in 
relation to stop and search? 
Prompts:
a) What influence can you have on (a) overall level of use of stop and search and (b) the 
ethic disproportionality in its use
b) Ask for specific examples where s/he was able to influence changes e.g. training, 
codes of practice, level of authorisation, etc.
c) HMIC Inspection and Home Office - what do you expect to emerge out of the 
consultation?
Thank & Close
Thank; possible follow up Qs by interview or email later.
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Appendix D - List of Observations
Note: events organised jointly or entirely by StopWatch and subject to an observation 
are indicated by an asterisk (*).
Total observations = 26
Date Event Location
2012/10/18 West Midlands PCC husting, co-organised by 
brap*
Handsworth 
Community Fire 
Centre, Birmingham, 
(West Midlands)
2012/11/01 Suffolk PCC husting, co-organised by Ipswich 
Suffolk Council for Racial Equality*
University Campus 
Suffolk, Ipswich 
(Suffolk)
2012/11/05 Leicestershire & Rutland PCC husting, co-
organised by Equanomics*
Highfields Community 
Centre, Leicester 
(Leicestershire)
2012/11/05 StopWatch: 'The Human Cost of Stop and 
Search'*
Clapham Junction, 
London
2013/04/24 Observation at Heathrow Airport and the use of 
security measures and counter-terrorism powers
London
2013/05/14 Home Affairs Select Committee session on 
Leadership and Standards
Houses of Parliament, 
London
2013/06/05 CagePrisoner's Schedule 7 Stories St Bride Foundation,
Holborn, London
2013/09/20 West Midlands PCC summit on stop and search Tally Ho Police 
Training Grounds, 
Birmingham (West 
Midlands)
2013/11/19 Public Administration Select Committee Inquiry 
into Crime Statistics
Houses of Parliament, 
London
2013/11/19 Police, Local Authorities & Community 
Engagement
Westminster Hub, New
Zealand House, 
London
2013/12/12 Observation at Birmingham Airport and the use 
of security measures and counter-terrorism 
powers
Birmingham 
International Airport
2014/02/06 Observation at Gatwick Airport and the use of 
security measures and counter-terrorism powers
Gatwick Airport
2014/09/25 British Transport Police Stop and Search 
Community Consultation Group
BTP headquarters, 
Camden, London
2014/10/09 Nottingham Citizen's Hate Crime Commission 
Report Launch
University of 
Nottingham, 
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Nottingham 
(Nottinghamshire)
2014/11/04 ACPO Police Public Encounters Board West Mercia Police 
HQ, Hindlip Hall, 
Worcester
2014/09/30 Avon & Somerset Police Stop & Search Summit A&S Police 
HQ,Portishead, Bristol
2014/11/22 Nottinghamshire Police and Crime 
Commissioner's BME Steering Group‘s 
Conference
Marcus Garvey Centre,
Nottingham 
(Nottinghamshire)
2015/07/29 Suffolk Stop and Search Reference Group Ipswich Suffolk 
Council for Racial 
Equality, Ipswich 
(Suffolk)
2015/11/25 Suffolk Stop and Search Reference Group University Campus 
Suffolk, Ipswich 
(Suffolk)
2016/01/26 Capita Stop and Search Conference Copthorne Tara Hotel, 
London
2016/03/07 Coventry Stop and Search Scrutiny 
Panel/Community Safety Forum
Coventry Central 
Police Station, 
Coventry (West 
Midlands)
2016/03/17 Birmingham West & Central Stop and Search 
Scrutiny Panel
Handsworth Police 
Station, Birmingham 
(West Midlands)
2016/03/09 Nottinghamshire Police and Crime 
Commissioner's BME Steering Group‘s 
Conference
Marcus Garvey Centre,
Nottingham 
(Nottinghamshire)
2016/04/20 Nottinghamshire Police and Crime 
Commissioner's Hustings; co-organised by 
Embrace in Community*
NCVS, 7 Mansfield 
Road, Nottingham 
(Nottinghamshire)
2016/04/21 Suffolk Police and Crime Commissioner's 
Hustings; co-organised by Ipswich Suffolk 
Council for Racial Equality*
University Campus 
Suffolk, Ipswich 
(Suffolk)
2016/04/27 West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner's
Hustings; co-organised by Birmingham 
Empowerment Forum*
St Pauls & St Silas 
Church, Birmingham 
(West Midlands)
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Appendix E - Police and Crime Commissioners Responses to Key 
National Reports and Consultations 
Police and crime commissioner, 
or other local policing body
HMIC
(2013)
Home Office
(2013)
HMIC 
(2015a)
Avon and Somerset x
Bedfordshire x
Cambridgeshire x
Cheshire x x
Cleveland x
City of London (Police Committee) x
Cumbria
Derbyshire x
Devon & Cornwall
Dorset x x x
Durham x
Dyfed-Powys x x
Essex
Gloucestershire x
Greater Manchester x x x
Gwent x
Hampshire
Hertfordshire x
Humberside
Kent
Lancashire x
Leicestershire x
Lincolnshire
London Mayor’s Office for Policing & Crime x
Merseyside x x
Norfolk
North Wales x x
North Yorkshire x
Northamptonshire x
Northumbria x x x
Nottinghamshire x x
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South Wales x
South Yorkshire x x
Staffordshire x
Suffolk x x
Surrey x
Sussex x x x
Thames Valley x x x
Warwickshire
West Mercia x
West Midlands x x
West Yorkshire x x
Wiltshire
Total respondents: 21 18 13
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